Mali: Ça suffit for Paris
From 24 May -when the latest coup took place in Mali- until now, the situation in the country has undergone a series of major changes. The most relevant is the French decision to suspend its military cooperation with Mali and to start thinking seriously about ending Operation Barkhane. However, such a scenario would open the door to increased instability in the country and the region, as what happens in Bamako has a contagion effect on neighbouring countries, as seen with jihadist terrorism and inter-ethnic violence. Moreover, Paris's departure leaves a vacuum as to which international actor will fill its void. Russia is knocking on Mali's door to offer its services, especially the use of the well-known Wagner mercenaries.
What is behind the French decision, will security improve after France's departure, and can Russia be the new international actor in the area?
The Elysée's reaction to cut all military aid to Mali and the announcement of a reconsideration of its military presence in the country (the end of Operation Barkhane, ongoing since 2014) is surprising. The reaction is novel in that it breaks with the mantra that has guided French foreign policy on the continent since the independence of its former colonies: prioritising French security and hegemony at the expense of human rights. It can be argued that Macron has realised that this policy did not work with Mali, a country incapable not only of managing the terrorist threat on its own, but also of building trust among its citizens (avoiding inter-ethnic violence) and creating a stable and democratic government (as evidenced by two coups d'état in less than a year). However, if one analyses what has happened over the course of this year, one will come to the conclusion that the Paris decision is due not only to a change in prevailing foreign policy dogma, but also to domestic considerations and failed demands from Paris for more involvement of countries in the region in the fight against terrorism.
France has a presidential election next year, where a weakened Macron will put his mandate on the line. Barkhane, with 55 dead, is an unpopular mission in public opinion, which sees it as a waste of lives and money, as well as not contributing to improving the country's security. The French army, already stretched to the limit by its missions abroad and at home2, has been calling since 2019 for a reorientation of the mission, more focused on the use of special forces and advice. Finally, Macron has repeatedly called for the G5 Sahel countries to become more involved in managing the terrorist threat themselves, as seen at the last meeting of this coalition in February of this year in Chad. This has not happened, with the countries in the region experiencing abrupt political changes that have called into question their stability and reliability in the fight against terrorism3. Finally, there is the unpopularity of the French presence in Mali, which is deeply rooted in the country and heightened by accusations of bombings against civilians mistaken for terrorists.
For Paris, all this has led to the conclusion that it is not profitable to remain militarily present in the area, as the political, military and reputational cost is too high for worse. But a hypothetical French de-escalation would leave the future of the fight against terrorism in the region up in the air and open the door to the intervention of other international actors in the hornet's nest.
The terrorist threat, already on the rise under Barkhane, both in terms of intensity and territorial expansion, would be reinforced by the French withdrawal. Before explaining why this is the case, it is important to stress that terrorist groups operating in the Sahel are not limited to the stereotypical Al-Qaeda and Daesh affiliates (of which there are some), but also operate on ethnic and national terms, fertile ground for jihadist proselytising. However, because of their relevance and violence, we will focus on the affiliates described above, as it is these that are leading the most disturbing shift in the terrorist challenge.
The Daesh and Al-Qaeda affiliates in the region are ISGS (Islamic State of the Greater Sahara) and the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (JNIM) respectively. It is the Daesh affiliate that is of most concern, not only because of its violence, but also because of the possibility that the deterioration of the situation in Mali (and by extension in the area) will facilitate the creation of a front between ISGS and ISWAP (Islamic State in West Africa) in northern Nigeria. The latter group has been in the news since it was revealed that it was they who killed Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekaku, confirming ISWAP's expansion and strength in the region. This could lead to conflict with the JNIM -Al Qaeda's franchise- over control of territory. This is no pipe dream, as it has already happened in 2019 and 20204.
As for the international actor that would replace France, Russia has already begun to take an interest in Mali. Moscow has the advantage that some of the military personnel in the government were trained in its military academies, such as Sadio Camara, defence minister in the transitional government of the August 2020 coup, whose resignation led to the May 2021 uprising. Moreover, there is popular sympathy for Russia, something wisely exploited by Kremlin-linked news portals5. Indeed, Moscow has an advantage here, as it was not a colonial power and can still exploit the aura of anti-colonialism it had in Soviet times. But the most attractive thing Russia offers Mali is the way it offers its services. Unlike France and the European Union, which are concerned about human rights when offering economic and military aid, Moscow does not stand in the way. If Russia were to enter the Malian hornet's nest - most likely through Wagner's mercenaries - the Malian junta will find that Russia will not object to the Malian army being complicit in inter-ethnic killings, or executing suspected jihadists rather than prosecuting them, unlike the West, which has been reprimanding Bamako for such acts. Moreover, Wagner has - for the time being - a reputation for doing his job well, obviating the brutality of his methods. This is what the countries where Wagner has operated (Libya and the Central African Republic being the best known cases) want: to eliminate the terrorist threat by all means.
In conclusion, the coup in Mali in May this year resulted in the French decision to cancel its military cooperation with Bamako. While at first glance the decision seems novel in breaking with the Paris consensus on its Africa policy, we have seen how weariness at all levels with Barkhane, electoral considerations and frustration with the inaction of neighbouring countries on the terrorist threat played an important role. A hypothetical French departure would reinforce the terrorist threat, especially the struggle between Al-Qaeda and Da'esh franchises for influence. The latter is relevant, as Da'esh franchises in the Sahel and West Africa, besides being the most violent, are the most powerful, with the worst-case scenario portending a union between the two.
Finally, French withdrawal would leave the door open for Moscow's entry on the ground. Its Soviet-era anti-colonial reputation, coupled with its ability to achieve order without encroaching on human rights via the Wagner mercenaries, is attractive to Bamako, which will continue to need international assistance in its fight against terrorism.
References:
1 - Ça suffit: Enough! In French.
2 - The French army has been protecting sensitive sites in the country since 2015 as part of Operation Sentinelle (Sentinel).
3 - In addition to the coups in Mali, it is worth noting the death of Chad's president in April this year while fighting rebels within its borders.
4 - Sahel – a new battlefield between IS and Al-Qaeda? (theafricareport.com)
5 - France fears being replaced by Russia in Mali - 09.06.2021, Sputnik World (sputniknews.com)