Mercenaries in Ukraine: Continuation of an existing phenomenon

In the Ukrainian conflict, there is a familiar phenomenon: the presence of mercenaries on both sides. Whether through security companies or battalions - as in the case of the Russian Wagner Company or Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov's Praetorian Guard - or individually, as on the Ukrainian side, with volunteers joining the neo-Nazi Azov battalion or the International Legion for the Defence of Ukraine, the latter created by Kiev to attract volunteers to its cause, this phenomenon opens up a number of questions: What is a mercenary? 

This phenomenon opens up a series of questions: what is a mercenary, is there any international regulation of their use, what is their impact in the theatres where they operate, and are there any contemporary examples of their use? And are there contemporary examples of their use? 

The first thing to clarify is what a mercenary is. Article 47 of Protocol 1 of the Geneva Convention defines a mercenary as any person who is recruited for the purpose of fighting in a conflict, is not a member of the armed forces of the belligerents, is not a national and does not live in areas controlled by the warring factions and fights for personal gain, which is given by the country/group where the mercenary is fighting.2 If we stick to the Geneva Convention, the Azov battalion is not a mercenary unit, as they are part of the Kiev armed forces and their ranks are made up of individuals motivated by neo-Nazi ideology, interested in learning military knowledge and tactics rather than financial gain. However, the Geneva Convention's definition is not without its ambiguities: how would we define a combatant who goes to war for political or religious reasons - more compelling reasons for going to war than the desire to make money? Moreover, the Geneva Convention definition calls into question the phenomenon of mercenaries from 1960 onwards, because many mercenaries fought for warring factions and were embedded in the armies of the countries of the conflicts where they fought.  

In the contemporary history of mercenaries - from 1960 onwards - we observe two trends: those who joined a country's armed forces in a private capacity and the phenomenon of private security companies hired by countries to fight.  

In the first case - those who joined the armed forces or factions of a war in a private capacity - we find the mercenaries who fought in the Congo in the 1960s, either for the government or the secessionist rebels in Katanga, those who fought in the 1970s in the Angolan and Rhodesian wars and then served in the South African army in the 1980s in Namibia and finally in the 1990s in the Balkan war. What motivated many of these volunteers - mostly European and North American and with military experience - was the opportunity to serve in a real war - an opportunity that many volunteers lacked in their own countries' armed forces - as well as ideological motives, usually anti-communism. All these factors resulted in the presence of colourful characters such as Peter McAleese, a former member of the SAS and British Parachute Regiment who served in the SAS and Rhodesian police, the South African Parachute Brigade and was hired by the Cali Cartel to kill Pablo Escobar.

In the Ukrainian case, both the Azov battalion and the International Legion of Defence of Ukraine are said to be associated with this type of mercenary. Both are made up of individuals who come as individuals to fight in Ukraine, motivated both by ideological motives (especially those who join the Azov Battalion) and by the need to feel the need to fight a war, as in the case of the International Defence Legion of Ukraine, which prioritises the recruitment of those with combat experience.

The effectiveness of these mercenaries in the wars where they have fought has to be seen beyond whether they contributed to changing the turn of events for the side on which they fought, which is rather unlikely since having mercenaries, even if they have military experience, is not in itself a guarantee of victory, to analysing their effectiveness in the units in which they served. In this respect, we observe how the units where mercenaries serve tend to be the most effective: In Rhodesia, the units where mercenaries served (SAS, Rhodesian Light Infantry and Selous Scouts) inflicted more casualties on the enemy than they took. A decade later, in South Africa, mercenaries - many of them Rhodesian veterans - founded the Pathfinder Company of the South African Parachute Brigade and their military expertise contributed to the effectiveness of 32 Battalion and the Reconnaissance Commandos, units feared by their opponents. In this respect, we could say that this type of mercenary, although they do not have a strategic impact on the wars in which they serve, have a high tactical and operational value due to the military experience they bring and their effectiveness in the units where they served.  

The second type of mercenary - those who serve in private security companies - is perhaps the best known, thanks to cases such as the US company Blackwater and more recently the notorious Wagner, in the service of the Kremlin. Their origins are similar to those of the individual mercenaries described above. In the 1960s David Stirling - founder of the British SAS - created WatchGuard International, but it was a South African company, Executive Outcomes, that pioneered the use of private security companies to wage war on behalf of other countries, as Wagner is doing in Mali and the Central African Republic.  

Executive Outcomes - made up mostly of South African special forces veterans - was contracted by the Angolan government in the 1990s to fight in the civil war then raging in the country. Their effectiveness on the ground was immediate: within two months of being hired, they had accomplished their mission, at the cost of three deaths among their ranks. Executive Outcomes paved the way for the use of mercenaries embedded in private security companies to be hired by countries to both advise and fight their wars. Its legacy is being taken up by the Wagner group, which has been able to exploit the need of countries such as the Central African Republic and Mali for a strike force capable of quickly and unscrupulously resolving insurgencies on their territory. Like Executive Outcomes in Angola, Wagner has proven its effectiveness in CAR and its impact in Mali remains to be seen. In the case of Ukraine, their presence was reported in the Donbas War and they are most likely fighting in the current invasion of Ukraine. These types of mercenaries do have a strategic impact on the conflicts in which they operate, as in most cases their use is very likely to tip the balance in favour of the country they are fighting for, in addition to the political mileage they can gain if these companies are led by powerful figures in countries with expansionist foreign policy aspirations.  

In conclusion, the Ukrainian conflict has revealed the presence of mercenaries on both sides of the conflict. There is international legislation defining and regulating their use. But the definition is not faithful to the history and motives that motivate mercenaries to fight. Looking at the history of mercenaries, there are two types: those who join a conflict as individuals and private security companies. The former join out of ideology and a sense of experiencing war, their usefulness being more tactical and operational than strategic. Mercenaries serving Kiev fall into this category as they are driven by ideological motives (Azov Battalion) and the experience of fighting a war (The International Legion of Defence of Ukraine). With regard to private security companies, the cases of Executive Outcomes and Wagner demonstrate that their impact is strategic, as they are capable of taking down insurgencies and terrorist groups in a short time. This makes such entities valuable actors in both conflict resolution and as pawns in the foreign policy of a major power.