Moscow: further proof of the European Union's external weakness 

This month has got off to a disastrous start for the European Union.  

In the fight against COVID, its vaccination strategy has been called into question, especially after the negotiation with AstraZeneca. Brussels' transparency was called into question when the deal - which included many censured sections - was unveiled. Such ineffectiveness at a critical moment (where there is a race to see who will be the first to reach 100% vaccination) has once again put the spotlight on the weakness of von der Leyen's executive.  

This was compounded by the visit of Josep Borrell - the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Common Security Policy - to Russia. It came shortly after the return and imprisonment of Russian opposition figure Alexei Navalni after his poisoning in August last year, so the meeting was expected to be less than friendly. What Brussels did not anticipate was that it would give an image of inefficiency and weakness when its values and actions are called into question, which Lavrov - the Russian foreign minister - did, in addition to expelling three diplomats from EU countries (Germany, Sweden and Poland) while the visit was taking place.  

This unease was reflected in Borrell's turbulent appearance in the European Parliament after his visit, where 70 MEPs demanded his resignation by letter and where most groups (mainly Populist and Liberal, but also some Greens) criticised the trip.  

Borrell's visit to Moscow has highlighted the gap between the EU's ambitions to be seen as an independent political actor (embodied in strategies, press conferences and speeches) and the reality of 27 autonomous foreign policy voices. The visit not only reinforced this impression, but also showed that Brussels has not made much progress in resolving this problem. In fact, despite having values, bodies and missions for its foreign policy, the 27 have not agreed to unite their divergences on Russia.

As far as Russia is concerned, two camps can be identified: on the one hand, the Baltic and Central European countries, hostile to Moscow, and on the other the tandem of France and Germany together with the southern countries, more concerned with the Mediterranean and the Sahel. Apart from this geographical division, within the EU institutions and structures - especially in the European Parliament - there is no unity on Moscow. There are political families in Brussels that are sympathetic to Russia (Identity and Democracy and The Left in the European Parliament-GUE/NGL), an example being the words of Irish MEP Clare Daly of the left-wing formation, where she criticised Russophobia, the spectre of a return to the Cold War and the military complex.1 This sympathy for Russia widens the divide between the two blocs described above, as loyalties to a political family in Brussels influence the behaviour of parties in their home countries: if MEPs from a group in country X vote against sanctions against Russia in the European Parliament, they are likely to do the same in their home countries, complicating the EU's goal of having a single voice in foreign policy.  

Add to this the fact that Russia - led by Russia Today - is adept at exploiting the EU's weaknesses, whether by criticising its anti-Moscow policy, its reluctance to approve the Sputnik vaccine or its failure to care for its own, as was the case a year ago with the delivery of medical supplies to Italy when the country was in the grip of COVID.2  

The end result of such disunity and its media exploitation by the adversary is to give the image of a Union with great ambitions to be recognised as an independent and capable foreign policy actor, but with few means and disunity to that end. While it is true that Brussels needs a strong and credible foreign policy with a single voice on a par with its economic potential, it is also unquestionable - even if it pains to say so - that, to date, the Union has failed to correct its divergences.  

The main obstacle is that a way must be found to transform the 27 visions, priorities and voices of the Union into one and in a way that benefits all. The Union cannot depend on the Paris-Berlin tandem for its decisions. In the case of Russia, both are in favour of dialogue with Moscow, whether for economic interests (the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline for Germany) or political ones (the French ambition of an autonomous Europe independent from the Anglo-Saxon world through a cordial relationship with Russia). This interest in talking to Moscow - which may be reflected in the EU's foreign policy - is not symptomatic of the EU's real position vis-à-vis Russia, as it ignores the reluctance of Eastern European countries. A vision that brings together all EU sensitivities through meetings and dialogues would strengthen the EU's foreign policy and dispel the sense of abandonment that Eastern countries feel from Brussels towards Moscow. 

So far this month, the EU has suffered two setbacks that call into question its independence as a foreign policy power. To its weakness in negotiating the supply of the AstraZeneca vaccine was added Josep Borrell's controversial visit to Moscow and Russia's behaviour during it.  

What the trip demonstrated was that the Union, for all its ambitions, does not yet have a single voice for its foreign policy, especially when it comes to that relationship with Russia. Here, the divisions are not only geographical but also economic and political (dependence on Russian gas in the case of Germany and the ambition of a Europe independent of the United States for France). If these divergences are not resolved, Brussels will continue to nurture the image of a weak foreign policy power, something Moscow will exploit, as it has done before. The solution cannot always come through Paris and Berlin, as their views on Russia do not reflect the wishes of the 27.  

In conclusion, to demonstrate unity, the 27 should come together and establish a common policy towards Moscow that reflects member states' fears and objectives. Only in this way can they make progress towards the goal of creating a Union that is recognised as a credible foreign policy actor.