Russia-Ukraine: the conflict that resists oblivion

So far this year, Russia-West relations have deteriorated from their already dismal state. Josep Borrell's disastrous visit to Moscow earlier this year and the imprisonment and hunger strike of opposition figure Alexei Navalny have been joined this month by another front: the revival of the conflict between Ukraine and the Moscow-backed separatist regions of the Donbas - an industrial area in eastern Ukraine bordering Russia. The resumption of the conflict - which began on 26 March when the ceasefire in force since July last year broke down - has coincided with Russia's deployment of large numbers of troops near the separatist regions and with exercises in the Crimea region, illegally annexed by Russia. This has alarmed the EU and NATO, which have expressed their support for Kiev, which has put the possibility of entering both back on the table. 

Will the conflict between Ukraine and the Donbas overheat, is this a new front in the tense relations between the West and Russia, and is it feasible for Ukraine to join NATO and the EU as a result of renewed fighting?

The war began as a result of the protests that rocked Ukraine in late 2013 when the government of then president Viktor Yanukovych refused to sign an association agreement between Kiev and the EU. While the focus in the West has been on painting a dichotomy between a 'Westernised' people and a pro-Russian government elite, the reality is far more complex. Ukraine is a product of the turbulent and complex history of Eastern Europe. Throughout its history, what is now Ukraine was controlled by Austro-Hungarians, Poles and Russians - all of whom left their mark - as well as having a rich national identity based on a common language and history, cemented by myths such as Vladimir the Great. The result is a country that combines Central European cities like Lvov with Soviet-style industrial centres like Kharkov. Beyond the urban contrast, this identity duality results in a conflict of loyalties between being Ukrainian (speaking Ukrainian and seeing Ukraine as a people and a nation) or being Russian (speaking Russian and feeling attachment to Russia, beyond the USSR). It was the feeling of attachment to Russia that caused the conflict, as the inhabitants of the Donbas did not share the Europeanism of the Maidan protests, resulting in the armed seizure of Ukrainian government headquarters and the decision to secede from Kiev. The rest is well known: there was war throughout 2014 and early 2015, until the Minsk truce stopped the fighting. However, this did not mean a cessation of hostilities, as a series of fragile truces between the contenders followed, broken by artillery exchanges, mine detonations and sniper fire, with both sides accusing each other of having been the cause of the resumption of hostilities. 

This is the context in which the recent revival of the Ukrainian conflict has unfolded. However, what is new now is the presence of a large number of Russian troops near Ukraine's borders and the narrative deployed by Volodimir Zelinsky - Ukraine's young president - of seeking support from the West, going so far as to call for his country's inclusion in NATO and the EU, both of which are frozen but highly controversial processes. In the case of the former, while it is true that Ukraine is one of the six countries with Enhanced Opportunity Partnernship status¹ - the highest level of trust that NATO gives to non-member countries - and that, since the beginning of the conflict, relations between NATO and Kiev have improved in terms of political and military support, a hypothetical (albeit distant) NATO membership for Ukraine would worsen the fragile relationship with Russia. Indeed, it could lead to an escalation of the conflict in the Donbas, with Moscow fighting openly. For Russia, Kiev's NATO membership is a red line, as it demonstrated in 2008 with Georgia in the conflict over the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This decision was prompted by NATO's announcement at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, where it opened the door to Ukraine and Georgia joining the Alliance, albeit on a long-term basis.² For Moscow, beyond the fact that Kiev's accession to NATO is a long-term process, the Alliance's membership of Ukraine and Georgia is a long way off.  For Moscow, beyond the fact of identity (defence of Russian minorities in both countries), and considering both countries as part of its sphere of influence, the incorporation of both countries would deprive it of having the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov as its only waters free of the inclemency of ice. This logic explains the relevance of the Crimean peninsula, especially the port of Sevastopol, in Russian military doctrine and thus its occupation in 2014. 

As for the European Union, although the issue was addressed at Zelenski's meeting with Macron on 16 April,³ the fact is that, to date, the EU is not considering the inclusion of new members. The corruption of the Ukrainian administration and its weak economy remain a drag on membership. The conflict with Russia is also an obstacle, especially in light of the fragile EU-Moscow relationship and Moscow's hostility to Ukraine's EU membership. 

In conclusion, the revival of the Donbas conflict adds another front to the delicate relationship between the West and Russia. The origin lies in a struggle of identities, between feeling Ukrainian or Russian, because throughout its history, what is now Ukraine changed hands, as well as having its own history and identity. It was the feeling of attachment to Russia that motivated the current conflict. What has been new is Russia's movement of large numbers of troops close to the area of action and how Kiev has used this crisis to advance its desire to join NATO and the EU. Both options are viewed with hostility by Russia because of their geostrategic implications. It remains to be seen how de-escalation will play out, especially if Putin and Biden meet to resolve it, as both are the main sponsors of the warring factions. 
 

1. Los otros países son Australia, Finlandia, Georgia, Jordania y Suecia
2. Véase NATO - Official text: Bucharest Summit Declaration - Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008, 03-Apr.-2008 (Especialmente el punto 23). 
3. Au cœur des échanges entre Emmanuel Macron, Angela Merkel et Volodymyr Zelensky, l’épineuse « désescalade » avec la Russie (lemonde.fr)