Senegal: a warning to the rest of the continent

Senegal, one of the African continent's "model" countries in terms of economic development and political stability, experienced unusually violent protests against the government and the socio-economic consequences of COVID-19 restrictive measures between 3 and 8 March.  The trigger was the arrest in early February of popular opposition leader Ousmane Sonko for alleged rape. Sonko has grown in popularity in recent years thanks to a discourse critical of corruption and the lack of opportunities for youth.  In fact, the protests should be interpreted as the culmination of the frustrations of a country's society that has noticed how COVID-19 has reactivated despair - which translates into the decision to emigrate to the Canary Islands despite the danger of the so-called Atlantic route - and a setback in political freedoms, exemplified by the government's heavy-handed approach to the protests, mobilising the army and silencing the private media.

Unlike Mali (with which it shares a border), Senegal is a safe country immune to jihadist terrorism. Since its independence in 1960, it has experienced peaceful electoral processes, without suffering the curse of coups d'état that afflicted its neighbours. This respect for democracy was embedded in Senegalese society and a source of pride. Economically, Senegal has experienced rapid economic growth, thanks to its rich fishing waters and a thriving tourism industry - with Dakar and St Louis as its main attractions - reinforced its image as an oasis of peace in an unstable region.

This image began to crumble on 3 February of that year. On that day, a massage parlour employee denounced Ousmane Sonko, the main opposition leader, for rape. This led to his arrest and imprisonment pending trial. Sonko, a customs inspector, became known after the publication of a book in which he denounced the corruption of current president Macky Sall and his brother in the management of hydrocarbons. His investigations struck a chord with the youth, who do not enjoy the benefits of economic growth, with many young graduates working precariously or risking their lives in the Canaries. His impact led him to found a party in 2017 and win 15.6% of the vote in the 2019 presidential election. His political aspirations did not change his discourse critical of the corruption of power. This discourse is coupled with his relative youth for a leader of an African political party (46 years old), something that facilitates his popularity among young people.

His arrest led to protests that quickly spread across the country in early March. These protests should not be seen as a consequence of the activist's arrest, but rather as the final outcome of a malaise due to the feeling of democratic regression and the social impact of COVID 19.

According to the latest Afrobarometer published this month¹, 69% of Senegalese think that the law treats them unfairly, while 78% thought that citizens should be careful what they say when talking about politics. This rollback of freedoms was evident during the riots, when the government silenced the private media and mobilised the army to quell the unrest. This rollback of freedoms may lead to more violent protests like those experienced this month in the future, especially if the government decides to accuse Sonko of being an Islamist. It should be borne in mind that Senegal borders directly on the Sahel - a hotbed of jihadism in the area - and that the country's main religion is moderate Islam. Accusations of radical Islamism have already been used by the government against Sonko, entrenching rather than diminishing his status in the opposition.

Economically, poverty and unemployment, present before COVID 19, have increased. The pandemic has hit tourism, one of the country's main economic engines, hard, damaging job opportunities for many young people. In addition to the decline in tourism, there has been a decline in fishing, the main livelihood of many communities, as a result of declining fish stocks off the Senegalese coast and access to foreign vessels, depriving local fishermen of their livelihoods. This explains the reactivation of the Canary Islands migration route, which despite its dangerousness is the one most used by young people, especially those aged 18 and 35, 56%² of whom cited lack of work as the main reason for migrating. Added to this is the feeling that economic benefits end up outside the country in the hands of multinationals. During the protests, the anger of the demonstrators focused on French supermarkets and petrol stations, symbols of inequality and economic malaise. Even the discovery of hydrocarbons and their profits are viewed with suspicion by the population, with 41% thinking that the profits will be monopolised by the ruling elite³. 

As a result, we are left with a fertile scenario for instability. Although the protests are over, the bad economic situation will continue, which will push many young people to migrate further. This situation will not change with the end of the pandemic if hydrocarbon profits end up in the hands of the elites. Add to this the likely corruption that the exploitation of new hydrocarbon deposits will bring, and protests are sure to return and could be violent. The rollback of freedoms could fuel economic unrest. We will have to see what happens until 2024, the year of the next presidential elections - especially Sonko's career in the opposition and the government's attempts to weaken him - to assess the extent to which there is a rollback of freedoms in the country.

In conclusion, Senegal, a model country for the West economically and democratically, experienced violent protests in early March against the imprisonment of opposition leader Ousmane Sonko. The protests were the culmination of Senegalese youth unrest over the lack of freedoms and economic opportunities stemming from COVID 19 as well as a weariness with corruption and the unequal distribution of wealth, the latter two key factors in Sonko's popularity. The virulence of both the protests and the government's response call into question the supposed stability of Senegal, a country bordering the fragile Sahel. We will have to see what happens in the coming years to see whether the country becomes a new hotbed of violence or whether it manages to improve its economy and democratic standards.  

1. Les Sénégalais pensent que la loi traite les populations avec inégalité | Afrobarometer
2. AD405: Insatisfaits de leur gouvernement, les jeunes sénégalais évoquent la recherche d’emploi comme principale raison d’émigrer | Afrobarometer
3. Senegal | Afrobarometer