Southern flank: what awaits NATO there?

Last month's NATO Summit in Madrid, beyond the attention given to the East because of the war in Ukraine and the incorporation of Sweden and Finland, the southern flank was also mentioned. The inclusion of this front as one of the areas to watch in NATO's strategy raises questions about what the situation is on the ground and what can be done. Both are relevant, as understanding how and where NATO can intervene is likely to have an impact when action is taken. 

Before analysing what lies ahead for NATO in the region, it is useful to clarify what the southern flank is. Geographically it is Africa, with Spain as the forward border. Within that southern flank is the Sahel. In geographical terms the Sahel stretches from Senegal in the west to Eritrea in the east. Politically, it encompasses Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad, all of which are characterised by jihadist terrorism and are countries of origin and transit for migratory flows to Europe. 

NATO does not enter a scenario immune to international presence. There are eight international missions on the ground: MINUSMA of the United Nations, EUTM Mali, EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUCAP Sahel Niger of the European Union, Barkhane and Takuba of France, Gazelle of Germany and MISIN of the Italian Army. 

As of today, these six missions are in the doldrums: Barkhane and Takuba are relocating to Niger after being rejected by Mali, the EU missions are at a standstill and will most likely eventually leave, as contributing countries such as Germany and Spain announced troop reductions. MINUSMA will continue for another year, but will also most likely end up leaving, as countries such as Germany are considering withdrawing in the autumn and the mission has become the most lethal and dangerous of all UN missions. Meanwhile, political instability is spreading, with three countries under military rule, as well as terrorism, affecting West African countries such as Benin, Togo and Côte d'Ivoire. 

While the scenario is dire, NATO is unlikely to intervene. The war in Ukraine has a higher priority than instability in the Sahel. The Alliance's appetite for launching an international mission in the wake of the Afghan fiasco must also be taken into account. In addition to little political interest, there are the likely logistical and human challenges of controlling a geographic area that encompasses five countries, with poor communications infrastructure and a hostile climate. Such challenges are likely to require a greater deployment of assets and personnel than those used in Afghanistan. Meeting them would cost a great deal of money, time and manpower, which few NATO countries are likely to be willing to pay for.

There is also no interest in NATO intervention from Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. There is a strong anti-Western sentiment there and more sympathy for Russia. NATO's presence would only worsen this sentiment. There should also be reflection within the Alliance as to why no G5 Sahel leaders beyond Mauritania were invited to the summit. While Mauritania is a member of the G5 Sahel, it is not the country most affected by the terrorist threat, but Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. If NATO is so concerned about the situation on the southern flank, it should have met with the leaders of these countries to see how it could help them. Failure to invite them will most likely result in a reinforced Russian presence in the area, as Moscow will be seen as more responsive to their needs than NATO. Evidence of the unease over their exclusion from the summit is the Malian government's recall of the Spanish ambassador for consultations following an interview with the Spanish Foreign Minister, José Manuel Albares, on 30 June in an interview on Spanish radio. In it, the minister did not rule out a NATO intervention if a threat to NATO security were to materialise. Such an incident demonstrates with certainty that the countries in the region are not interested in NATO's presence.

In conclusion, the southern flank, especially the Sahel, was discussed at the Summit. This region encompassing Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso suffers from jihadist terrorism and irregular migration. On the ground there are several international missions whose future is up in the air, while Russia is making a strong entry through the Wagner Group. The war in Ukraine and the Afghan fiasco make it unlikely that NATO will intervene in the region as the logistical and territorial challenges in the theatre of operations are compounded by NATO's lack of interest in the southern flank. Nor do they have the support of local politicians, who probably see it as an affront that they were ignored at the summit. Proof of this is the recall of the Spanish ambassador for consultations following statements by the Spanish Foreign Minister that did not rule out Alliance intervention. It is more likely that these countries will turn more towards Moscow than towards NATO, since in their eyes the former is not as paternalistic as the latter. NATO would have a difficult time in such a scenario.