Spain-Morocco: when will the High Level Meeting take place?

A presidential meeting between Spain and France took place this week. France is our neighbour behind the Pyrenees and the historical ties between the two countries are strong, in addition to anti-terrorist cooperation and mutual interest in a strategically strong Europe.

There is another meeting that has not taken place, nor is it known when it will take place: that between Morocco and Spain. It was originally scheduled to take place in December, but was officially postponed by the Moroccan authorities because of COVID 19. Unofficially, it is well known that it was postponed following the Trump administration's decision to recognise Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. This was met with hostility from part of the Spanish coalition government, which is sympathetic to the Saharawi cause. This did not please Rabat, which treats any criticism on this issue harshly.

Spain cannot continue to ignore Morocco. The Alawite country is undergoing a rapid economic transformation that needs to be exploited and where the Canary Islands and Andalusia - the communities closest to Rabat - can play a transformative role, especially in renewable energies. Spain will also have to reflect on its position on Western Sahara, as Trump's decision has been echoed in Europe, as happened this week in Portugal, where several political figures wrote a letter to the government calling for the recognition of Moroccan sovereignty.

Beyond the Sahrawi issue - important but not the only one in the bilateral relationship - we must analyse whether the pillars on which Spain's current foreign policy is based can help or hinder the relationship.

In an opinion piece in the 16 March edition of El Mundo¹, Manuel Muñiz, Secretary of State for Global Spain at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation, listed the four pillars that guide the current cabinet's foreign policy: support for democracy and human rights, the construction of a fairer global economy, the fight against climate change, and progress towards a more autonomous EU in foreign policy.

Spain can strengthen two of these pillars if it takes advantage of the opportunities that the Sahara's economic development brings: the fight against climate change and the construction of a fairer global economy. Moroccan development goes hand in hand with a commitment to renewable energies. As Mounir Houari, director general of the Dakhla Investment Centre, explained in an interview with this magazine², there is a plan to create a water desalination plant that will be powered by a 50 MW wind farm. He also emphasised a point that Madrid should take into account as a symptom of the opportunities that are being lost in the absence of the High Level Meeting: Houari commented that one of the most relevant wind energy plans was being exploited by Americans and Germans: "I would also like to highlight, within the wind projects, one of the biggest bets is being made by American and German investors. It is a 950 MW wind farm that will feed the blockchain platforms". It is interesting to highlight the case of Berlin's interest in continuing to invest in the region beyond the occasional diplomatic incidents, such as the one earlier this month when Germany decided to suspend Schengen visas for Moroccan citizens. Although the health crisis was used to argue for such a decision, also as with Spain, disagreements over the Saharawi conflict influenced Berlin's decision. This did not impact on trade relations, as Rabat continues to consider Germany 'a strategic ally in the renewable energy sector"³.  

The last two pillars, the defence of human rights and the aspiration for an EU with a common defence and foreign policy, will also influence the way in which Madrid orients its relationship. Regarding the latter, the Portuguese missive was not limited to the national level, but also advocated opening the way for other EU countries to follow the Portuguese proposal. This last point is relevant, as Lisbon currently holds the presidency of the EU Council - the Union's decision-making body - which it will hold until June. Although its programme for its presidency does not include any specific mention of the Saharawi conflict, we should not let our guard down in the face of possible changes, especially if we use the Trump administration's decision as a reference. If Lisbon were to recognise Moroccan sovereignty and if its decision were seconded by other EU countries, Spain would miss out on the opportunity to become a preferential partner in terms of trade. Politically, it would be interesting to see how Madrid tries to reconcile its current position based on UN principles with the scenario described above.

Finally, human rights will be relevant. Reports of abuses of Sahrawi activists and arrests for criticising the Alawi monarch are reported in the Spanish press. If Spain decides to invest in the Sahara, this issue is likely to come up, with the tensions that this would cause in the relationship. Madrid will have to reflect on the familiar dilemma of putting rights before business or vice versa.

In conclusion, it is urgent to know when the High Level Meeting between Morocco and Spain will take place. Rabat is undergoing a rapid economic transformation, especially in the Sahara, which needs to be exploited by Spain. The pillars on which the Sánchez government's Spanish foreign policy is based have a place in the relationship with Rabat. The Sahara offers opportunities in the renewable energy sector that are being exploited by the US and Germany. Portugal is already under pressure to recognise Morocco's position on the Sahara. This issue, which at first glance appears bilateral, may become European, as Lisbon currently holds the rotating presidency of the European Council. Finally, human rights will bring to the table the debate on the morality of investing in the Sahara, especially considering Morocco's sensitivity to any criticism of its conduct in the area.

1. MUÑIZ, Manuel. "La política exterior como política de Estado", El Mundo, 16 March 2021. Available in: La política exterior como política de Estado | Opinión (elmundo.es).
2. "Dakhla will play a key role as a hub for Africa". Atalayar, 4 February 2021. Available in: Dakhla will play a key role as a hub for Africa (atalayar.com).
3. "The crisis will not affect trade relations'.  bladi.es, 7 March 2021. Available at: Morocco-Germany: the crisis will not affect trade relations (bladi.es).