The waters between the Canary Islands and Morocco: a new front in the bilateral relationship?

Spanish and Moroccan flags

Relations between Spain and Morocco have experienced ups and downs over the past two years. Right now the situation seems to have stabilised with Spain's recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, which has reduced migratory pressure towards Ceuta, Melilla and the Canary Islands, the meeting between the Spanish president and the King of Morocco in April, and meetings between ministers from both countries. 

However, the situation could change due to pending issues. One of these is the negotiation to fix the maritime median between the Moroccan and Canary coasts. The waters to be negotiated, west of Morocco and the Canary Islands, have a subsoil rich in tellurium, cobalt and other rare minerals that are key to the modern economy. Whoever has control over these waters is likely to profit from their exploitation, so both sides are likely to aspire to control them. The conflict over Western Sahara may cloud the negotiations. Although Spain has recognised Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara - thus recognising sovereignty over its waters - this is not a position shared by the EU, as was seen last year when the European Court of Justice (ECJ) annulled EU-Moroccan fisheries agreements because they included Western Sahara. The Polisario Front could take the Spain-Morocco negotiations to the CJEU if it considers the waters at stake to be Saharawi and not Moroccan. A ruling by the CJEU in favour of the Saharawi position would certainly close the negotiations, as Morocco will not accept the Polisario Front having a say in a territory it considers its own. 

The maritime zone to be negotiated is located to the west of the Canary Islands, with an extension of 350 miles. Of these 350 miles, there is a 200-mile zone to the southwest where the territorial waters of Morocco and the Canaries overlap. Within these 200 miles lies Mount Tropic, a seamount with potent deposits of tellurium and cobalt. Both minerals are key to the manufacture of solar panels and batteries for electric cars, two fundamental elements of the renewable economy. Therefore, whoever controls its waters will most certainly profit from the extraction of both from its soil, giving the controlling country economic benefits. It is therefore quite likely that when negotiations over the waters begin, both countries will be vying for control of Mount Tropic, leading to friction. If Morocco sees that it may lose control of Mount Tropic, it is likely to launch a national law to annex the waters surrounding the mountain, arguing that they are its own. Such a move was already made in the early 2020s, but the Alawite country eventually backed down when it realised that its move did not have the support of the international community. However, the international community's growing recognition of Morocco's position on the Sahara strengthens Rabat's ability to take unilateral decisions in negotiations if it fails to achieve its objectives. In this respect, the Spanish government's decision to support the Moroccan position could serve Morocco to annex Mount Tropic in the same way it tried to do in 2020.

The Saharawi conflict could arise when negotiations between Spain and Morocco begin. Although in the eyes of both, the waters to be negotiated are seen as Moroccan or Spanish, for a large part of the international community they are still Sahrawi, which would force the Polisario Front to be included in the negotiations, something unacceptable to Morocco. In this respect, the CJEU's decision to suspend the EU-Moroccan fisheries agreements on the grounds that they included Western Sahara - which is not seen as Moroccan - may play a key role in hindering negotiations, especially if the Polisario decides to take them to the CJEU for an assessment of their legality. A CJEU ruling in favour of the Polisario's thesis would certainly bring negotiations to a halt, which could deteriorate relations between Spain and Morocco. A deterioration in Spanish-Moroccan relations would result in an upsurge of migration to Ceuta, Melilla and the Canary Islands that would arouse suspicion on both sides, which would accuse each other of worsening the relationship. 

In conclusion, although relations between Spain and Morocco are at a good point after last year's crisis, there are still pending issues that could condition the relationship for better or worse. One such issue is the negotiation to fix the maritime median of the waters to the west of the Canaries and Morocco. These waters - especially Mount Tropic - are rich in tellurium and cobalt, with whoever controls them likely to benefit economically from their exploitation. Morocco is likely to resort to national laws to annex the waters if it fails to gain control of the mineral-bearing waters in negotiations, as it did in 2020. International recognition of its position on Western Sahara gives Morocco the strength to attempt this now rather than in 2020. The Saharawi conflict could play a role in the negotiations. The Polisario Front could ask for its voice to be heard in negotiations over waters it considers to be its own. At this point, the CJEU's decision to suspend the fisheries agreements between Morocco and the EU because they included Western Sahara could complicate the negotiations, as both parties would be forced to include Polisario, which is unacceptable to Morocco. This could lead to a downgrading of relations between Spain and Morocco that could result in a surge of migration to Ceuta, Melilla and the Canaries, raising tensions between the two sides. 

We will have to see how the negotiations go when they start to know whether or not this issue degrades Spanish-Moroccan relations.