A prospective analysis on the safety of upcoming events

Large events with the capacity to gather crowds of people have been potential targets for terrorism, especially those of Jihadist aetiology. In the same way, we have been able to deduce that their priority objective was to cause the greatest number of victims and achieve media repercussions. The aim was to create a climate of terror and confusion in society in order to achieve politico-religious ends.

However, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been a noticeable halt in the global events agenda. This disruption, in turn, has also led to an attenuation of attacks in the West due to a reduction in the opportunity factor. The confinement has prevented crowds of people, reducing the risk factor to which we were accustomed.

Despite this, the vaccine has led to a clear stabilisation of the epidemic and, as a result, we are seeing an adjusted and progressive return of such events. From the point of view of terrorist prevention, the re-establishment of the new normality raises a number of questions. Consequently, through this analysis we will develop a set of factors that could give rise to a scenario of uncertainty and insecurity from a terrorist prevention perspective.

The health crisis caused by COVID-19 has led to a major transformation of our daily lives. For example, the government's recommendation to minimise our personal contacts has reduced the time we devote to leisure and social life. This has led to a noticeable decrease in the programming of events of all kinds: music concerts, football matches, theatre performances, musicals, etc.

As a result, we have been able to observe a clear mitigation of jihadist terrorist activity in the West. Evidently, the epidemic situation has made these mass gatherings exponentially more difficult and, therefore, also the capacity to carry out attacks.

However, despite this temporary absence of material acts, it has been observed that Jihadist terrorism has been able to adapt to the new times and has even been able to emerge stronger¹. Terrorist groups have thus had more time to draw up their radical discourses, their strategic operational lines, purchase weapons and even increase their financing.

So, after more than a year of the suspension of events, we are gradually seeing the return of these events. These events include a variety of health measures to prevent mass contagions, such as, for example, the reduction of capacity. However, there has been a reduction in resources and tools focused on the prevention of terrorist events. In turn, this deterioration in security could be used by organisations to operate, although they may see this anomalous situation as an opportunity. This begs the question:

Are we really prepared for a safe return from a preventive terrorist point of view?

Is the media monopoly on the health crisis making us forget the problem of jihadist terrorism in the West?

In the course of this prospective analysis, we will provide a number of novel factors that could underline the dangers posed by new events. These factors are intended to provide a critical viewpoint to ensure greater security.

The confinement could have boosted online recruitment processes. 

Firstly, it is known that DAESH has used the pandemic to boost online recruitment processes thanks to the good use of propaganda². In fact, as experts point out, the Islamic State, through fictitious identities and multiple means of interaction, has managed to establish links with minors³. The Internet, in general terms, would have provided greater protection thanks to its anonymity, generating a situation of impunity.

Thus, taking advantage of the confinement and greater presence at home of citizens, they would have opted for the use of online radicalisation, thus betting on the exchange of objectives and ideas thanks to radical forums. The main objective of these forums would be to recruit new personnel and plan future attacks⁴. As a result, a perfect ecosystem would be created for the production of new attacks.

We are currently witnessing a critical international scenario given the situation in Afghanistan. The planned US exit has simultaneously brought about the return of Taliban power in Kabul. This is creating a great deal of turmoil globally as we see a desperate race to escape the country.⁵ 

But the question is: how might this affect terrorism? To try to answer this question, the following headings should be nuanced: 

Afghanistan could be used as a training ground for terrorists 

As geopolitical experts, such as Colonel Pedro Baños, point out, it is possible that the Taliban could reopen the training camps used by Al-Qaeda for the 9/11 attacks. 

Moreover, it is also possible that the Islamic State could find a new operational base in Afghanistan after its defeat of the self-proclaimed caliphate in Iraq and Syria⁶. It would therefore be an unstable territory plunged into chaos and disorganisation. In general terms, the perfect ecosystem for DAESH to reappear and consolidate itself once again as the vanguard of Jihadist terrorism. However, it should be noted that these are opposing groups whose interests have often clashed.

The potential "Trojan horse" of refugees 

The evacuation of thousands of Afghan civilians to Western territories has inevitably generated a climate of uncertainty and insecurity. All the more so given the headlines: "Afghan refugee arrested in France for links to the Taliban"⁷. 

As specialists point out, it does not seem unreasonable that radicalised individuals were managing to penetrate our territory through the evacuation of Afghan civilians. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the Taliban's aim is not to act in Western territory. Rather, their main 'goal' would be to act on indigenous territory. However, we should not dismiss the idea that this atypical geo-strategic scenario could lead to the Taliban switching tactics. 

US counterattacks in the wake of the Kabul attacks could generate a jihadist terrorist build-up 

In the aftermath of the recent attacks at Kabul airport, the United States would conduct an accelerated counter-offensive. Thus, on 28 August, the US would launch the first punitive operation against Islamic State bases in Afghanistan⁸. 

As part of these response operations, we have often seen bombings that not only caused casualties among terrorists, but also among innocent citizens. In fact: "The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights released its count of those killed by the US-led international coalition bombing where more than a quarter of the total number of casualties from fighter jets were civilians"⁹.

It is precisely these events that create a real incentive for the perpetration of attacks in the West. For example, in the attacks of 13 November 2015 in Paris, several of the victims of the Bataclan heard these words from the terrorists: 

"You bomb our brothers in Syria, in Iraq", "French soldiers, American soldiers, bomb from the air. We are men and we bomb from the ground", "thank (François) Hollande, you elected him"¹⁰. 

In this sense, we could observe a substantiation and rationalisation of terrorism through the use of a "defensive jihad" based on the sacred values that Islam presents¹¹. Thus, the use of violence would be justified by the attacks. 

For this reason, we do not rule out the possibility that terrorist organisations use this methodology to encourage radicalisation. Indeed, Afghanistan presents an ideal context for the enhancement of polarisation and the increase of hatred from the in-group (Islam) towards the out-group (the West).

On 26 August 2021, a double suicide bombing took place at Kabul airport. The event resulted in dozens of deaths, with the number of people killed ranging from 200 to over 200¹². It was carried out by means of a vehicle bomb, also known as SVBIED¹³. The responsibility for this massacre is said to lie with the Islamic State in Khorasan (ISIS-K), also known as the Afghan branch of DAESH. 

The production of this attack once again shows us the subsistence and operational capacity that ISIS still harbours despite its overthrow in 2019.  Thus, it is not surprising that the 2017 National Security Strategy still continues to point to jihadist terrorism as one of the major threats and challenges that our state has to face¹⁴. Thus, it cannot be ruled out that the development of these attacks could be extrapolated to Western territories. 

It would therefore be illogical to reduce preventive measures in the face of an imminent attack. On the other hand, it would be interesting to reinforce security in the coming events, as it is not inconceivable that, thanks to the epidemic situation and the current geostrategic scenario, ISIS has managed to emerge stronger.

The COVID-19 pandemic has been a turning point in our lifestyles. We are now faced with an uncertain landscape labelled as "the new normal". Consequently, we are witnessing the production of numerous protocols and health measures for the avoidance of infection.

However, we must not forget that, from a National Security point of view, other risks such as jihadist terrorism also continue to exist. This is why this threat should not be avoided, as it is precisely terrorist organisations that seek to perpetrate attacks by exploiting the surprise factor.

Consequently, the "relaxation effect" with regard to terrorism would be a handicap to overcome if diligent security is to be achieved in the coming events. 

Conclusion: "The new normal" calls for a gradual recovery of the lifestyle to which we were accustomed. Consequently, we are gradually seeing a revival of new events adapted to the contemporary landscape. 

There are several factors that may jeopardise security in the forthcoming events. The epidemic situation generated by COVID-19 has, in part, caused us to overlook other issues such as jihadist terrorism.

In fact, we have recently witnessed a geostrategic panorama that could be unfavourable from the point of view of jihadist terrorist prevention. A preventive exercise of reflection is therefore necessary.

Awareness-raising and prevention are therefore postulated as fundamental pillars in the security of upcoming events. In this sense, the maintenance and strengthening of various preventive security measures should be encouraged. Otherwise, the relaxation and avoidance of the terrorist problem could have damaging consequences for our rule of law.

Coordinated by Jacobo Salvador Micó Faus, coordinator of the Terrorism and Armed Conflict Area. Collaboration of Sec2Crim

References:

1.  GIL VALERO, José Luis. Terrorismo islamista y crimen organizado en la Unión Europea. El tráfico ilícito de armas de guerra. Documento de Opinión IEEE 63/2021. http://www.ieee.es/contenido/noticias/2021/05/DIEEEO63_2021_JOSGIL_Armas.html y/o enlace bie3 (consultado 20 de agosto de 2021)
2.  LOPEZ, Sandra, MENDIETA, Gorane y MICO, Jacobo S. Tendencias Online de la propaganda yihadista. Análisis del caso español. Documento de Opinión IEEE 85/2021. http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2021/DIEEEO85_2021_JACMIC_Tendencias. pdf y/o enlace bie3 (consultado 30 de agosto de 2021)
3. VICENTE, Álvaro. “Fórmulas utilizadas para la radicalización y el reclutamiento yihadista de menores en España”. ARI 76/2018, Real Instituto Elcano. Disponible en: https://cutt.ly/TWfmLWS (consulta: 19 de agosto de 2021) 
4.  GIL VALERO, José Luis. Terrorismo islamista y crimen organizado en la Unión Europea. El tráfico ilícito de armas de guerra. Documento de Opinión IEEE 63/2021. http://www.ieee.es/contenido/noticias/2021/05/DIEEEO63_2021_JOSGIL_Armas.html y/o enlace bie3 (consultado 20 de agosto de 2021)
5.  ZUCCHINO, David. “Guerra en Afganistán: cronología de una guerra de dos décadas”. En: ABC.es (en línea) (Madrid): 2021 (consulta: 29 de agosto de 2021) Disponible en:   https://cutt.ly/NWfQkTS
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7.  INFORMACIÓN.ES “Un refugiado afgano, detenido en Francia por vínculos con los talibanes” En: Información.es (en línea) (París): 2021. Disponible en: https://cutt.ly/BWfWzV5 (consulta: 30 de agosto de 2021) 
8.  SÁNCHEZ VALLEJO, María Antonia. “EE UU afirma que su ataque de represalia por el atentado de Kabul ha matado a dos miembros del ISIS-K”. En: elpaís.com (en línea) (Nueva York): 2021 Disponible en: https://cutt.ly/FWfWaLU (consulta: 30 de agosto de 2021) 
9.  USTYANOWSKI, Tristán. “Siria: más de 3.000 civiles habrían muerto a causa de las bombas de la coalición”. En: https://www.france24.com/ (en línea) Disponible en: https://cutt.ly/kWfWeou
10.  NORBERTO, Paredes. “Ataque en el Bataclan: el duro testimonio del chileno que sobrevivió a la masacre en el club de París hace 5 años” En: BBC.com (en línea) Disponible en: https://cutt.ly/cWfQ2Ax (consulta: 13 de agosto de 2021) 
11.  MICÓ SALVADOR, Jacobo. Aproximación a los procesos de desradicalización desde las teorías psicosociales (2020). Observatorio Internacional de Estudios sobre el Terrorismo. Disponible en: https://cutt.ly/PWl1ew0 (consulta: 30 de agosto de 2021) 
12.  MUNUERA, Javier y GARCÉS, Carlos. “Directo: Afganistán últimas noticias | El balance de muertos en el atentado sube a 170” En: elmundo.es (en línea) (Madrid): 2021. Disponible en: https://cutt.ly/FWfQSd1 (consulta: 29 de agosto de 2021) 
13.  HURTADO, Lluís Miquel. “Doble atentado suicida en el aeropuerto de Kabul con decenas de muertos” En: elmundo.es (en línea) Madrid: 2021 Disponible en: https://cutt.ly/SWfQLXs (consultado: 29 de agosto de 2021) 
14.  Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional, diciembre de 2017. Disponible en: https://www.defensa.gob.es/Galerias/defensadocs/Estrategia_Seguriad_Nacional_2017.pdf (accedido en agosto de 2021)