EU words and deeds in Latam

Without setting foot in Central America, Josep Borrell, the EU's High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, referred to last November's Nicaraguan elections as "a complete fake". Similarly, the co-president of the European-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly (Eurolat), Javi López, another Spanish Socialist, described them as "a real farce" and criticised the "campaign of furious repression" underway in the Central American country.

Nicaragua is already one of the usual suspects in Latin America. Cuba has received condemnation after condemnation, accompanied - for the past five years - by an effort to maintain links that allow for a European presence on the island. Venezuela's political, social and economic drama has won more EP resolutions than any other Latin American country. And also humanitarian support for the tragedy of its emigration.

How much weight does Latam really have in the EU? Communiqués and condemnations are necessary but insufficient instruments. Civilian missions, declarations and sanctions are incomplete tools. Borrell's concern about 'the fall of confidence in democracy' in Latin America, as pointed out by Latinobarómetro, is realistic. And it is true that the deterioration of democracy and the increase in human rights violations have increased the focus on the region and the attention paid to it by the European Parliament and the European External Action Service (EEAS). But this needs to be reflected in increased resources and linkages.

The symptoms of Europe's lack of attention to Latin America are evident. European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen did not once refer to Latin America during her annual State of the Union address in September. Among the priorities for cooperation funds in the EU budget, Latin America is practically irrelevant.

Ratification of the most important treaty with the region, EU-MERCOSUR, a text agreed in June 2019, remains stalled. And the association agreements that the EU has to renew with Mexico and Chile need to be reactivated. There have been no summits at the highest level (presidents and heads of state) since 2015. This deficit is expected to be partly covered by the EU-Latin America and the Caribbean summit early next month.

European foreign policy cannot be ambitious, neither in Latin America nor anywhere else in the world, as it is subject to the requirement of unanimity. This is one of the elements that hampers the EU's international power projection, preventing effective and swift decision-making. A change to qualified majority voting is needed, while extending the European Parliament's powers of scrutiny and decision-making in the areas of foreign affairs and defence.

At the second plenary session of the Conference on the Future of Europe, held on 23 October in Strasbourg, one of the reiterated proposals of young people and citizens was precisely the end of unanimity.

For the moment, the EU is far from the 'geopolitical EU' that some analysts project, endowed with the 'strategic autonomy' that Macron speaks of. "The EU is rich but not powerful," a senior member state official recently told the FT.

Despite these structural limitations, with his visit to Peru and Brazil (31.10. to 05.11.2021), Borrell wanted to 'reverse the trend' of the EU's loss of weight in the region. He hopes to ensure that Latin America occupies a privileged place on the EU agenda. Although this trip is his first to the continent since he took office in 2019, this is due to external factors. Borrell is more receptive to what is happening in Latin America than his predecessors, Mogherini and Ashton. But the region is far from being a priority for Brussels.

Why Peru and Brazil? Borrell assured that Peru, "the country most affected in the world by COVID-19", will be the one to which the EU will increase its financial support the most. Pedro Castillo, who has "all the support and consideration" of the EU, said Borrell, rejecting criticism from opposition sectors that denounced electoral fraud in the Andean country's elections last June. He conveyed his "respect" for the "process of transformation" headed by the questioned president.

In his next stop in Latin America, he declared that "the world needs Brazil committed to fighting climate change". He expressed his conviction that the environmental policies being pursued by the government would help the ratification of the trade agreement between the EU and Mercosur. He stated that the goals announced in Glasgow could be a "good starting point" (President Jair Bolsonaro did not come to Glasgow for COP26).

The High Representative pointed to another, less obvious reason. He chose to visit Peru and Brazil even because of the very differences that exist today between the two countries. "One with a left-wing orientation, the other more to the right. One in the midst of a major political transformation, the other more developed". He also wanted to express "the spirit of cooperation and respect for political plurality" that prevails in the EU.

His stance has been criticised, as has his decision to send an EP observer mission to Venezuela's regional elections last November, ignoring the advice of his EEAS staff. The European People's Party announced this week that it would not participate in the mission in order "not to whitewash" the Maduro regime.
Seventy kilometres north of Lima, the Chinese port operator Cosco Shipping Ports begins construction of the new port of Chancay. The total investment is expected to reach 3 billion dollars when the works are completed in 2024.

It will become the most important Pacific port in South America and will play a key role in China's New Silk Road in the region. 19 Latin American countries have already signed an agreement with Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative. In Latin America, Chinese companies control more than 10 ports in 7 countries.

Their Asian competitors are also making progress. Europe seems to overlook the fact that projects such as Chancay will not only promote trade with China. They will also accelerate trade with other emerging Asian economies.

As a supplier, South America is currently experiencing the beginning of a second export boom to Asia. Like China 20 years ago, South America's farms and mines provide the raw materials for urban growth, infrastructure and the rise of the middle classes in emerging Asian markets.

Brazil is a paradigmatic case: in the last twelve months, it has exported more to Asia - even without considering China and Japan - than to the European Union. It now exports more goods and services to Singapore than to Germany. More to South Korea than to Spain. More to Malaysia than to Italy. More to India than to the United Kingdom. More to Thailand than to France.

With exports, Asian investment in South American infrastructure will increase as well. Raw materials are only valuable if they can be transported. The port of Chancay in Peru is a clear example. Likewise, loans and investment financing will increasingly come from the Far East in the future. In September the BRICS New Development Bank admitted three new countries to the five founding members: Uruguay, Bangladesh and the United Arab Emirates.

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