Gaza, Ukraine and Europe

It would be a tautology to say that Central Europe and the Mediterranean basin are zones of geopolitical instability. The wars in Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh were joined last October by the war in Gaza. These wars are part of the hyper-announced change in the international system, a situation whose geopolitical synergies are unknown and whose management mechanisms have yet to be devised.  

Europe's reactions to Hamas's savagery in Israel have once again highlighted the helplessness of European states. EU Council resolutions and statements by politicians who travelled to Israel are incredibly weak and routine, as well as revealing serious differences between them. At the same time, the war in Gaza has activated the news priority by pushing Ukraine into the background, coinciding with signs of a possible change in the situation in the former Soviet republic. What for almost two years the narrative of the conflict was limited to a disfigured account of military operations, now other aspects are beginning to come to the fore. 

Concern has recently surfaced in the US government over the lack of public attention given to the war in Ukraine since the Gaza war began, expressing fears that the shift in media priority could spill over politically and affect continued aid to Kiev. At the same time, there are reports of discreet talks between the Ukrainian government and US and European officials on the implications of possible peace negotiations with Russia, while official reports from Kiev have toned down the victorious tone and shown signs of fatigue.  

For now, Western logistical support for Kiev continues, as it has throughout the conflict, with the United States playing a key role in both quantity and quality. Russia has been defensive throughout the course of the war. Since the beginning of 2023, Ukraine has been practising a counter-offensive that would decide the war; it began in the summer and in winter a stalemate was reached in the operations with a great human toll, unbearable for Ukraine. 

According to the Pentagon, an estimated $43.9 billion has been spent on assistance to Ukraine since the war began. Aid is encountering parliamentary problems and the spectre of its reduction or withdrawal may soon materialise, which would be critical to the outcome of the war. The type of conflict can be described as geographically limited, so military options had to be limited to this. The fact is that attrition was practised, which made it necessary to combine combat power and time. Having opted for a war of attrition, operations are possible because of the permanence of the flow of resources, which is difficult to guarantee indefinitely. Take artillery, for example. In 2022, Russia is estimated to have consumed 10 million shells, while its own production is estimated at 2 million per year, making it dependent on supplies from other countries for the continuation of a high tempo of operations. 

There have been contacts between US and European representatives, as the war has reached a stalemate and the difficulties of continuing to support Ukraine have grown exponentially. In addition to the difficulties of recruitment, due to the enormous number of casualties and public discontent with the recruitment methods, there is also the fact that March 2024 is the election year in which Zelensky's support for continuing the fight to the end will be tested.  

An important aspect to bear in mind is Washington's strategic support for Kiev. It would be lengthy to explain the evolution of events that ended in open war, but when it comes down to it, the final situation to consider is the strategic balance in Europe. The option of integrating Ukraine into NATO is far from justifiable as it is a high-risk move, as the conclusions of the Vilnius Summit show. This leads to the conclusion that Ukraine's EU membership, without being under the umbrella of Atlanticism, is difficult to sustain. Criteria to be applied to the EU enlargement option. 

Given the high risk that, if the war were to continue, Russia could achieve a victory that would imply control over the whole of Ukrainian territory, the signing of a peace that would maintain Ukrainian sovereignty over the territory not occupied by Moscow is an admissible option for the United States. This situation could serve as a reference for NATO to structure its defence of Eastern Europe with Ukraine as a buffer. 

The situation affects the EU's plans, as the end of the war in Ukraine, as long as it does not contemplate a Kiev victory, raises the threat to a Europe whose defence depends on the American friend. At the Brussels summit on 17 October, the different positions of European countries on the Gaza war became clear. Following the issuing of a minimal communiqué, which recalled the need to avoid a regional escalation and to collaborate with the parties, including the Palestinian Authority. It ended with the offer: 'The EU stands ready to contribute to the revival of a political process based on the two-state solution, including through the Peace Day effort, and welcomes diplomatic initiatives on peace and security and supports the immediate holding of an international peace conference'. The weak echo of the communiqué is a strong indication of the EU's weak influence in the international context.