The end of the myth of a peaceful Europe?
One activity in international politics, which has become increasingly prevalent in our time, is the introduction of a word into the political narrative, with the intention of solving a problem. Thus, when the new war in Europe emerged, the adjective "geopolitics" was put into circulation to adjectivise one of the "natures" of the European Union.
But its justification becomes a new problem, as there is little clarity on the meaning of the term as it is polysemic and controversial. It is mainly used in two broad meanings: firstly, focusing on the role of geography in international politics and, secondly, as a synonym for "power politics", as opposed to a rules-based order. The term "geopolitical Europe" has been used and continues to be used, since before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in senses of confused meanings.
Those who refer to a more 'geopolitical' Europe rarely explain the meaning they use. More often than not, in circumstances such as these, intellectual confusion is sown by inane debate. The much commented episode of the television interview with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz a month after the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a case in point. The chancellor said: 'What frightened me is this incredible emphasis on geopolitics in the Russian president's thinking', given that to think in such terms was to reject the European 'peace order'. At the same time, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell urged the EU to become more 'geopolitical', while Scholz still saw 'geopolitics' as something to be rejected rather than embraced.
From what can be gleaned from conversations and interviews, apologists for a more "geopolitical" EU broadly advocate the idea that Europe should be a "third force" (power?) in international politics after the United States and China. There are no known serious attempts to clarify how this can be reconciled with the very idea of the EU, which has long been understood from a Europeanist point of view as the "antithesis of geopolitics", in two different senses derived from the two meanings of the term indicated above.
The meaning of "geopolitical" as a qualifier of the EU, which shapes the current debate, more academic than political, revolves around the contrast between the model of rules: "World Order"; and that of "power relations" in international politics: "Geopolitical". It should be borne in mind that concepts matter as long as they are used as drivers of action, otherwise they remain confined to the academic realm, which is frustrating.
The assertion is made that the assumption of the 'geopolitical' quality does not dispense with the values that underpin the EU's civilisational basis, but it is also unclear whether it dispenses with the optimistic assumptions that follow from this while at the same time, in open contradiction, reassessing the risks associated with economic interdependence. Europe recognises that interdependence can be used as a weapon for political purposes and does not necessarily imply a liberal transformation of political systems around the world. In short, it is made official that we are facing a radical change in the EU's perception of the world, and this affects the hitherto view of Europeanism as the light of the world.
It is preached that the EU comes from an innovative process of the European Communities, but it is more like a transmutation, since they are conceptually different. It was the end of history that generated it as a beacon that would establish political power based on rules as a method of relations between the countries that formed part of the celestial European project and that would later be exported and imposed in international politics. This early version is only acceptable if one takes into account the less realistic and more liberal atmosphere unleashed by the euphoria of "victory" in the "Cold War".
During its lifetime, the EU discourse has not proclaimed as its goal the attainment of great power status, a level that Europeanism considered obsolete. To explain its nature, it was assimilated to a 'normative' power particularly suited to play a role in the transformation of international politics. In recent years, however, it has been admitted from Brussels that, rather than transforming international politics, the EU must transform and adapt to it. High Commissioner Borrell constantly communicates that the EU must 'learn to speak the language of power'.
A geopolitical Europe could be defined as one that emerges from a realistic assessment of the international system, meaning an acceptance of its complex, and therefore conflictual, nature, a willingness to reduce its vulnerabilities, a reduced reliance on the capacity of economic interdependence to influence international relations, and a readiness for political confrontation when our interests are at stake.
This appropriateness of the conceptualisation of geopolitics makes particular sense when it refers specifically to the European Commission, which is more oriented towards compliance with the EU's own rules, in particular those of the single market. Presumably, this version of geopolitics was what von der Leyen had in mind when he promised a 'geopolitical commission' in 2019. The implication, therefore, was that his Commission would no longer confine its activity to rules and would act in more realistic strategic terms in relation to the exercise of power, particularly in the economic sphere afforded by the size of its market. It would thus be less concerned with ideological coherence and aim to think more strategically or, to put it another way, in defence of interests.