The integral conception of Russian strategy

In the realm of US-China strategic competition, the war in Ukraine has been the catalyst for geopolitical synergies that directly affect Europe. The strategic focus is said to have ended its migration to Central Europe from the western half, apparently relegating Germany and France. For its part, the military coup d'état in Niger is likely to herald the chronification of a zone of high instability in North Africa-Sahel, which would directly and primarily affect Europe.

The recent NATO Summit in Vilnius did not set out an explicit strategy against Russia, but it did provide a more global version of the Alliance's future, very different from the Cold War classic, which needs to be tested in the new global scenario. In relation to southern Europe, its original "area" and its "approaches" continue to be areas of great instability that have been experiencing population displacements for years, via the Mediterranean, the Canary Islands and Greece. From the tone of the final communiqué, it is once again clear that US involvement in Europe's defence is urgently needed. 

In relation to Ukraine, in the last few days, the development of military operations has been reported in the "friendly press" with a pessimistic tone, after abandoning the usual "paltering" towards Kiev. 

The "chronification" of instability in North Africa-Sahel is likely to be encouraged and developed from Moscow as a secondary effort to support Russian action in Ukraine. It can be argued that the current developments constitute a strategic manoeuvre by Russia to redirect the conflict specifically from Ukraine to the West African region. This region is considered one of the most crucial French strongholds, firmly held for many decades. While it is not unusual for West African nations to experience coups d'état, the recent ones in Mali, Burkina Faso, and the ongoing coup in Niger exhibit a shared characteristic in the alignment of the new regimes with Russia. This is evident in the ongoing protests in these nations, where the Russian flag is displayed at popular demonstrations. 

Wagner's action has been going on in the area for years, meeting no "resistance" from the former "colonising power": France, which abandoned the area. A power that is unable to find its place in the international context, it preaches "strategic autonomy" for Europe, but oscillates and changes its position according to the circumstances. In this situation, France, Italy, Spain and Turkey are potentially playing a leading role in the Mediterranean, a maritime space that witnessed naval incidents in 2021 between the Turks on the one hand, and the French and Greeks on the other.

France has had a vocation as Lord of the Desert, at present reinforced by the need for uranium, but another military intervention in the area is problematic. One option would be to take the Sahel conflict as an opportunity to give meaning to European defence. In that case, "Libya 2011", with its operational shortcomings, should be present as a reference for decision-making and not fall into the same mistakes. A possible presence of Turkey and the UK would distort the European nature, as it is unacceptable for Ankara to hide its "neo-Ottoman" impulses, nor for London to cease to be the Atlantic ambassador. Against this backdrop, the alternative remains of configuring and establishing NATO's Southern Front, which would involve US action. 

Also relevant is the situation in the Maghreb with Algeria's position, its likely alignment with Russia and the potential conflict with Morocco over the Sahara sovereignty dispute. It is important to bear in mind the substantial military aid to the Alawi kingdom, developed in recent years, from Washington, from where Rabat's collaboration with Jerusalem is viewed with pleasure. This situation affects Spain.   

In the situation described in North Africa-Sahel, Western powers expect little from Madrid. Spain continually shows signs of being a "strategic pivot" by continually demonstrating its state weakness, which in the foreign sphere turns into "strategic abulia"; one need only recall the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq in the midst of combat in April 2004, or its lack of prominence in the current geopolitical situation. In recent years there has been no real Spanish foreign policy, which has led to wide-ranging fluctuations of sheer incompetence. 

Nor can the political instability in France be ignored in this situation, with very serious problems of citizen coexistence between different groups as a result of immigration and economic forecasts. Last month's riots bear witness to this. 

While it may seem far-fetched to conceive of Russia as enabling another front in its conflict with the West, the situation in Niger presents a compelling logic. Russia's strategic efforts in Africa extend beyond merely supporting the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Its strategic goal would be to secure access to valuable natural resources and increase geopolitical influence. The Wagner Group's deployment as Moscow's proxy in Niger represents a reinforcement of the threat to regional stability and security that its longstanding presence in the entire Sahel region represents. 

Regardless of the short-term motives for deploying the Wagner Group in support of Niger's rebels, the long-term advantage for Russia would be the full and active presence of a proxy military force in Niger, allowing Russia to maintain a near-total presence in West and East Africa, thus challenging the West's strategic interests in Africa.