G20 as a reflection of international dynamics
02 de enero de 2024 (13:31 h.)
The G20 emerged at the end of the last century as a platform for informal intergovernmental cooperation to try to control and prevent the spread of the Asian financial crisis. Although it was created as a ministerial forum, it was decided to convene a summit in the wake of the 2007/8 financial crisis.
Its successful response to that crisis consolidated the new summit format and secured the organization's future.
The G20 is an informal intergovernmental conference, whose decisions are taken by consensus, comprising a regular schedule of numerous expert meetings, according to a bottom-up (experts, working groups and sherpas) multilateral negotiation dynamic (Ministers and Summit).
The final Summit Declaration reflects the work of all, but is the responsibility of the rotating presidency, the last one held on September 9-10 in New Delhi in face-to-face format, and in virtual format on November 22, both under the Indian presidency.
Its conclusions are not binding, but the degree of compliance with the commitments made at the summits seems to be quite high. Although it remains an essentially economic and financial forum, the G20 has ended up expanding its agenda to many other issues affecting the entire planet, including the treatment of major international conflicts.
The G20 emerged at the end of the unipolar world, when the USA preferred to deal with the solution of international economic and financial problems, in an increasingly globalized world, with the most important economies, which are no longer only its allies, the EU, Japan, etc., but also the emerging economies, such as China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, Russia, etc.
One of the distinguishing factors of the G20 is its composition: no international forum has been able to mobilize such a representative regional group of developed and emerging countries. Its members account for 85% of the world's GDP.
Over the years, the relative economic power of the USA has been declining - it currently accounts for just under 25% of world GDP, a far cry from 50% in the 1940s - while the power of the emerging countries continues to grow: China is now the world's second largest economy (close to 20%) and India has overtaken the United Kingdom as the world's fifth largest economy in terms of GDP.
In economic terms, we already live in a multipolar world and the composition of the G20 reflects this.
The invitation to the African Union as a permanent member at the last G20 summit may have been a sign of greater awareness of the problems of developing countries, particularly the most fragile ones, and this helps it to gain more legitimacy.
The increase in World Bank funds, the reform of the Regional Banks or the new treatment of the debt of developing countries following COVID, issues on the agenda, are also evidence of a greater awareness of the problems of the developing world.
The question is whether all the innovations, many inspired by emerging member countries - and more are sure to come in the coming years, driven by the upcoming G20 presidencies of Brazil and South Africa - will be enough to keep the Group cohesive.
China, whose president has not attended the last three summits, does not seem to be enthusiastic about the G20 and is prioritizing its own global proposals, such as the Belt and Road Initiative or the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, etc.
The US, for its part, is no longer the champion of free trade (one of the pillars of the G20), and a possible victory of Trump, more protectionist and nationalist than Biden, would make it even more difficult to reconcile US interests with those of other countries, even allies, in multilateral forums, and the G20 is no exception.
On the other hand, the BRICS, with an informal structure similar to that of the G20, is preparing for its first enlargement (Argentina, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Iran, Egypt and Ethiopia).
A certain competition with the G20 is looming, trying to make up for its shortcomings and correcting the excessive Western weight. But like the G20, BRICS is also a rather heterogeneous group and its cohesion leaves something to be desired.
In its last communiqué after the Johannesburg summit last summer, despite references to numerous international conflicts (Middle East, Haiti, Sudan, Sahel, Libya...even Western Sahara), it resolves the aggression of Ukraine by Russia in a rather laconic manner (.... "We recall our national positions concerning the conflict in and around Ukraine as expressed at the appropriate fora, including the UNSC and UNGA").
Although in the final New Delhi Declaration the G20 agreed on a much stronger formulation, the lack of mention of Russia also greatly diminished its impact. After the invasion of Ukraine, Russia feels more at home in BRICS than in the G20 where it has become a rather atypical country.
In spite of everything, perhaps the G20 is one of the international bodies that best fits the world reality and one of those that have best adapted to the new international dynamics, globalized and multipolar, as an ideal forum for tackling global challenges, including those affecting the least developed countries.
But the growing polarization between the great powers, the US and China, may hinder cooperation among G20 members and affect its effectiveness, making it difficult to reach agreements on global policies.
A deepening of cooperation between Western industrial countries and emerging countries would be needed to not only regularly monitor the evolution of the world economy and help solve the problems of the developing world, but also to retain the interest of China and the US.
The G20 is not only an ideal forum for managing global challenges, but also for defusing possible strategic rivalries.
Enrique Viguera. Ambassador of Spain
Article published in The Diplomat
Its successful response to that crisis consolidated the new summit format and secured the organization's future.
The G20 is an informal intergovernmental conference, whose decisions are taken by consensus, comprising a regular schedule of numerous expert meetings, according to a bottom-up (experts, working groups and sherpas) multilateral negotiation dynamic (Ministers and Summit).
The final Summit Declaration reflects the work of all, but is the responsibility of the rotating presidency, the last one held on September 9-10 in New Delhi in face-to-face format, and in virtual format on November 22, both under the Indian presidency.
Its conclusions are not binding, but the degree of compliance with the commitments made at the summits seems to be quite high. Although it remains an essentially economic and financial forum, the G20 has ended up expanding its agenda to many other issues affecting the entire planet, including the treatment of major international conflicts.
The G20 emerged at the end of the unipolar world, when the USA preferred to deal with the solution of international economic and financial problems, in an increasingly globalized world, with the most important economies, which are no longer only its allies, the EU, Japan, etc., but also the emerging economies, such as China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, Russia, etc.
One of the distinguishing factors of the G20 is its composition: no international forum has been able to mobilize such a representative regional group of developed and emerging countries. Its members account for 85% of the world's GDP.
Over the years, the relative economic power of the USA has been declining - it currently accounts for just under 25% of world GDP, a far cry from 50% in the 1940s - while the power of the emerging countries continues to grow: China is now the world's second largest economy (close to 20%) and India has overtaken the United Kingdom as the world's fifth largest economy in terms of GDP.
In economic terms, we already live in a multipolar world and the composition of the G20 reflects this.
The invitation to the African Union as a permanent member at the last G20 summit may have been a sign of greater awareness of the problems of developing countries, particularly the most fragile ones, and this helps it to gain more legitimacy.
The increase in World Bank funds, the reform of the Regional Banks or the new treatment of the debt of developing countries following COVID, issues on the agenda, are also evidence of a greater awareness of the problems of the developing world.
The question is whether all the innovations, many inspired by emerging member countries - and more are sure to come in the coming years, driven by the upcoming G20 presidencies of Brazil and South Africa - will be enough to keep the Group cohesive.
China, whose president has not attended the last three summits, does not seem to be enthusiastic about the G20 and is prioritizing its own global proposals, such as the Belt and Road Initiative or the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, etc.
The US, for its part, is no longer the champion of free trade (one of the pillars of the G20), and a possible victory of Trump, more protectionist and nationalist than Biden, would make it even more difficult to reconcile US interests with those of other countries, even allies, in multilateral forums, and the G20 is no exception.
On the other hand, the BRICS, with an informal structure similar to that of the G20, is preparing for its first enlargement (Argentina, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Iran, Egypt and Ethiopia).
A certain competition with the G20 is looming, trying to make up for its shortcomings and correcting the excessive Western weight. But like the G20, BRICS is also a rather heterogeneous group and its cohesion leaves something to be desired.
In its last communiqué after the Johannesburg summit last summer, despite references to numerous international conflicts (Middle East, Haiti, Sudan, Sahel, Libya...even Western Sahara), it resolves the aggression of Ukraine by Russia in a rather laconic manner (.... "We recall our national positions concerning the conflict in and around Ukraine as expressed at the appropriate fora, including the UNSC and UNGA").
Although in the final New Delhi Declaration the G20 agreed on a much stronger formulation, the lack of mention of Russia also greatly diminished its impact. After the invasion of Ukraine, Russia feels more at home in BRICS than in the G20 where it has become a rather atypical country.
In spite of everything, perhaps the G20 is one of the international bodies that best fits the world reality and one of those that have best adapted to the new international dynamics, globalized and multipolar, as an ideal forum for tackling global challenges, including those affecting the least developed countries.
But the growing polarization between the great powers, the US and China, may hinder cooperation among G20 members and affect its effectiveness, making it difficult to reach agreements on global policies.
A deepening of cooperation between Western industrial countries and emerging countries would be needed to not only regularly monitor the evolution of the world economy and help solve the problems of the developing world, but also to retain the interest of China and the US.
The G20 is not only an ideal forum for managing global challenges, but also for defusing possible strategic rivalries.
Enrique Viguera. Ambassador of Spain
Article published in The Diplomat