The decision factors
This is not the first, nor the second, nor, I believe, the tenth time that, in trying to analyse any conflict with military involvement, I have had to resort to writing about these concepts, which for years I have taught at the Armed Forces Academy and practised in real operations in UN, NATO or Spanish headquarters, both at home and abroad.
I believe that this situation has been virtually unforeseeable in its evolution for the vast majority of analysts, including myself. It is still too early to advance the final outcome of this conflict, artificially created by Putin against Ukraine in order to absorb it, as well as to finish writing the necessary Lessons Learned, which are essential in any conflict, especially when, as in this one, things do not work out as expected, go awry and can even lead to results that are totally contrary to what was foreseen.
But, in order to try to correct or partially mitigate our own and others' mistakes, what is unquestionable now is that we must begin to try to explain what has happened so far, what is happening and what may happen; provided, of course, that the situation, the strategy to be employed, the entity and the amount of resources involved do not change drastically.
The decision factors, as many already know, are: the mission, the environment, the enemy, the terrain and the means.
A series of elements that must be studied and analysed in all sorts of detail, because each one separately or in coordination directly influences the process of making any military decision.
All of them have a similar assessment, none of them is preponderant over the others. A fairly negative assessment, even of just one of them, can derail the planned operation, force major changes in its orientation and even cancel it.
With respect to the mission, it must be clear, complete, achievable, straightforward, feasible and must not leave any unresolved issues to be developed at a later date. It is irresponsible to ask for pears from an elm tree or for the mission to be so complex that it can give rise to different interpretations.
The environment is a factor that is apparently ambiguous or very broad, but frankly decisive because it encompasses concepts such as the population (average age, religion, beliefs, ancestry and level of education), its political regime, the degree of its spirit of national defence, ways of life, its own industry, dependencies, various types of external support, economic development and several others.
The enemy must be studied from a quantitative and qualitative point of view, the state and level of its armaments, combat morale, degree of its own or externally acquired instruction and training, current or potential support, as well as its logistical and personnel and materiel replenishment capabilities.
The terrain is a very important factor in terms of whether or not it can be transformed by human hands, the effects of the prevailing climate during the operation, the degree of fortification of the battlefield, natural or unusable elements such as large cities, watercourses, mountain ranges, reservoirs, airports, roads and sea outlets.
The section on means covers, logically, one's own means in order to compare them with those of the enemy, in terms of their quantitative, qualitative and proportionality, combat morale, the degree of weariness of the troops, the influence of other factors on their usability, as well as their level of maintenance and effectiveness.
After this brief review and enumeration of each of these factors, we can get down to the nitty-gritty. First of all, the mission assigned to the Russian troops, at least the one that has reached us, has not been at all clear, it is totally confusing, masked and full of changes depending on the evolution of events; very appropriate for a blitzkrieg and not for a guerrilla war of an urban and asymmetric nature that can be prolonged over time.
The environment is perhaps the factor that Russian military staffs have studied least adequately. The Ukrainian population, considered by themselves and the Russians to be the ancestors of Greater Russia and the soul of its spirit.
A population that, despite having areas full of Russian-speakers, when defending their land, honour and dignity, has given the world a lesson in how numb it has shown itself to be, surprising all and sundry with its capacity for suffering and predisposition to martyrdom, if necessary, regardless of rank, sex, age or condition.
In contrast to other recent conflicts, it can be said that the Ukrainians' confidence that this conflict will be short-lived and will be resolved in their favour is reflected in their great desire to return home. As was the case in Kosovo, most of the refugees fleeing the fighting for the time being are hurrying to stay close to their borders in order to return as quickly as possible.
As for the enemy, in this case the Ukrainians, although their regular army is not officially well-armed and most of their "known" means are quite obsolete, of Russian origin and with many years of service, it is clear from the way they are fighting in the cities that their strategy of confrontation is not combat in the open, but guerrilla warfare in large and medium-sized cities.
The example and generosity of civilians in Ukraine and beyond has boosted the morale of the fighters themselves, both civilian and military, and they may have a lot of specific courage ahead of them.
There is a sense that in the months leading up to the armed conflict, more than one support in sophisticated and effective means, as well as training in such equipment and types of fighting, may have come from outside, apparently undetected.
Similarly, I believe that deception and simulation measures have been used to deceive the selective Russian attacks in the first forty-eight hours, which has prevented them from achieving the necessary total air superiority.
The terrain and the winter factor, though familiar and similar to Russia's, has once again proved, for the time being, a major difficulty if not the death knell for large-scale military operations, as it was for those carried out in those lands by Napoleon or Hitler. It remains to be seen whether we are not facing a third edition of the same event.
As for the Russian media, although they seem to be many and apparently quite decent and powerful, the free images show that quite a lot of that material has been dragging on its wheels and chains for many triennia.
This situation, together with the fact that they have been hanging around the borders or in Belarus for several months, playing cat-and-mouse manoeuvres, means that it is quite possible that much of it is in need of proper maintenance, which, I imagine, they are not going to receive, with all that this implies for their performance and effectiveness.
The Russian Armed Forces have traditionally and recently never been noted for their great logistical capabilities to adequately fuel the battle. There are images of Russian soldiers exploiting local resources to feed themselves, which proves that their forces are becoming less effective because they are tired after several months of constant movement, without proper rest, poorly fed and because the lengthening of operations suggests that, with such deficient resources, they will soon be short of food, fuel and ammunition.
To this must be added the fact that the Russian troops are soldiers of forced conscription among a youth that, thanks in part to the internet, no longer follows Putin so blindly and that finds itself in a war they do not understand, against their brothers and friends, which is bleeding both countries dry and which, if it continues over time and if all the published economic measures and some more are applied, will lead the Russian popular economy to extreme situations or even bankruptcy.
The launch of the peace talks today is nothing more than a diversionary manoeuvre and a way to gain time to reorient its strategy, to accumulate more forces, because the forces committed so far in this operation are not enough to maintain strict control over all Ukrainian territory without being harassed, and also to give the West time to reflect; for the unexpected measures of all kinds taken by all or individual countries have taken everyone by surprise and are intended to make our societies realise that, in reality, as may be the case, they could be harmful for everyone.
The demands put on the table today by the Russian side are the same as they were at the beginning or before the start of hostilities, but it is quite clear that they are at the peak of their ambition; although, if they persist over time, with a high degree of probability, some of it will end up in their shopping basket.
Putin's nuclear threat is no more than a toast to the sun, though it is one to watch out for, by whom it may concern. A return to the times of Mutually Assured Destruction is not only a mistake, it is so serious that it would make it impossible to continue on the path to recovering the great Russia dreamed of by the satrap.
Finally, we must have a clear vision of what is intended on our side as well. Legislating or adopting very drastic measures that could have serious repercussions on ourselves is not the best way out of such an impasse.
In the same vein, I am relatively doubtful as to how much, how effective and how far the announced shipments of offensive military equipment will be used in a timely and appropriate manner by the Ukrainians who are ready to fight.