The war in Ukraine, lessons learned

A few days ago I published an article on this subject in which, like many analysts, I referred to what happened in Ukraine as a conflict. Today I will try to continue along that path; but, given the continuity over time, the increasing involvement of more endogenous and exogenous elements and artists in the fighting in all kinds of theatres, as well as the intensification of the confrontations, I consider that the term “conflict” has been amply surpassed and in Ukraine - while the negotiations have not been entirely successful - it has reached the category of 'War'; some authors have even elevated it to the recently dusted-off concept of 'Total War'.

To begin to understand the reasons behind the events in Ukraine, we must go back a few years to when Lieutenant Colonel and KGB spy Putin returned home from East Germany with his tail between his legs, defeated in every sense of the word, to find a USSR in chaos, which at times was falling apart like a sugar cube in a glass of hot milk.

Gone were the years of propaganda and the fictitious splendor of Russian military might; a reputation that the West willingly helped to magnify because it was in the Americans' interest to keep the flame of threat in Europe burning, so that they could continue to dominate and live on the continent, applying their influences of all kinds and, because to counteract the fear that this phenomenon produced, it was necessary to spend a lot on defense, mainly on American material.

The army that remained in Russia was old, obsolete, demoralized, poorly trained, full of drunks and corrupt officials and, above all, very poorly armed. All these adjectives were true and became evident when they tried to fight in the war in Afghanistan (1978-1992), which they invaded thinking it would be a military walk in the park, and later in the first Chechen war (1994-1996).

Two conflicts and failures, from which everyone, but fundamentally the Russians with Putin at their head, drew numerous lessons learned; the first and most important being that, if Russia were one day to be able to recover all or part of its former glory, its armies would have to be the most effective and feared in the air-land field, and to achieve this they would have to be equipped with powerful and capable weaponry; battle tanks with great power, a large radius of action and resistance in the field; an overwhelming artillery force based on long-range guns and accurate missiles; and an air force capable of maintaining air dominance in any condition based on good, safe aircraft, drones and helicopters. 

Those who saw these needs also added that, once the expected and desired weaponry had been obtained, it should be tested in real warfare to check its effectiveness and robustness and thus be able to analyze the effects it had on the ground and against enemy resistance.

At the same time, these real-life exercises would have to be used to train the generals, strategists and middle managers of elite units in the use of the new weapons and how to get the most out of them.

In view of the need, Putin took a look at the world around him and found an old acquaintance and ally, Bashar al-Assad, the satrap president of Syria, who was in serious trouble, caught in a vice between the Syrians themselves, who were fed up and rebelling against him, and the famous Islamic State (IS), which had put down many roots and grown too fruitful in their lands.

Under the excuse of fighting IS and responding to an invitation from an ally to help him maintain his country, he came rushing to his aid with the blessings and approval, or at least the vile silence, of an increasingly accommodating and apathetic International Community (IC) that was reluctant to be splattered by 'foreign' conflicts, more or less far from its borders.

Syria was, therefore, the biggest and best training ground for the Russian armies and their new generation, high-powered weaponry. But it soon understood that, for that place of learning and real combat, it would have to rotate the maximum number of its generals and general staff to learn how to face an enemy, conventional or not, who always offered maximum resistance, despite the intense fighting and the dreadful bombardments prior to them, and even, some also, in an NBC environment.

Once its weaponry and command structures were tested and ready to direct the fighting and win the war. Everything was ready; so it began with accurate, almost bloodless strikes, to gradually eat away at Ukraine, starting with three important pro-Russian areas, which it got practically for free and with hardly any international reaction.

In view of this situation, he felt safe, but cautiously, he decided to wait, depending on the development of various and convoluted world events in progress, until the zenith of the weakness of the IC and its organizations was reached.

After many, too many head-spinning moments and some prolonged hesitation, he sensed the moment to launch a 'lightning war' against an often inferior enemy, with a president whom he and many considered weak because he had been a comedian until he came to power and a population that, for the most part, acclaimed him, spoke Russian and even used his flag and publicly asked him to come to their rescue.

His first big military mistake was that he seriously misjudged some of the factors that directly influenced the decision. Fundamentally, in the aspects of the difficulty of the terrain with this climatology, the scarcity of rail and land communication routes, the still insufficient logistical possibilities, especially if it were to be prolonged, the capacity for resistance and high morale of the civilian population and that their previous movements and actions of deception were not going to be able to deceive an intelligence, the American one, which despite the fact that it had recently accumulated certain major errors, on this occasion, it could, and in fact it was successful.

The previous movements close to the borders lasted too long and led to inexperienced and poorly trained troops becoming overly active and tired in appalling conditions, while a certain and camouflaged accumulation of military aid was taking place in Ukraine by the US, with which to be able to slow down, at least, the first Russian impulse.

The loss of surprise and with it, that of speed and freedom of action; the failure to make massive use of their air force - apparently due to a lack of training of their pilots given the previous fuel shortage, the lack of confidence in their anti-aircraft artillery and fear of the Ukrainian air defenses, much improved with shipments of specific material from abroad - broke the physical stamina and above all the morale of the overly young Russian soldier, who carried in his kit bag his dress uniform, to parade through Kiev in a few days.

Russia's weak and questionable logistical capacity to maintain combat for long periods of time and at a great distance and the unusual reaction of the Ukrainian population to maintain control and surveillance of their communications thanks to the defensive material that quickly reached them, quickly forced a change in initial plans and a search for external support - there is talk that they are working on it with China - a point that will soon be verified.

In any case, in view of the above, these changes of plans have turned the already unattainable blitzkrieg - they have been fighting for 22 days - into a long war of attrition, Aleppo-style; where the defender acquires a great capacity for combat due to the difficulty and the psychosis for the attacker of not being able to move freely among the rubble, traps and dangerous ambushes that large cities have become, as demonstrated by the high casualties on the Russian side.

Despite this, how Putin does not want to give in, it seems that he is preparing to fight in most of those bastions with all kinds of artillery resources and aerial bombardments to destroy the cities and then enter in force with ground units; fundamentally, based on special troops from Chechnya, Syria and other Middle Eastern countries, brought in specifically and trained in this type of combat for many years.

Putin and his strategists know that, for the defense of the populations to the bitter end, the fewer non-combatant civilians in the rubble, the better for the defender; hence, contrary to his recently published doctrine, he is trying, by all means, not to let non-combatants leave the cities, denying or attacking possible safe corridors; thus, by keeping them caged, they will undoubtedly hinder military defense operations. 

They constitute too heavy a burden because they have to be kept safe, fed and provided with medical care, especially at times when all resources are needed for those who take up arms. In addition, they constitute a point of concern at a personal level for the combatant because the protection and safeguarding of his immediate family is not assured.

With regard to foreign military aid to Ukraine, there has been excessive publicity and many clues to locate the entry points of the various external supports. Facts that help to know their entity and quality in advance and facilitate actions aimed at destroying them, before their distribution among the combatants. 

The lukewarm and almost schizophrenic military stance of NATO and the EU with regard to Ukraine has been limited to sending certain types of weaponry, not always cutting edge or really necessary; because apparently there is still no official 'shopping list' in this respect. This situation encourages support to be provided unilaterally or bilaterally and frequently based on the surplus of the reserves of each contributing country, which really provides the Ukrainians with somewhat limited real aid.

Entering into a long-term conflict is a serious problem for Russia because it is a fact that 'conquering, occupying and maintaining' a vast territory with many millions of inhabitants to watch over, feed, look after and provide with work is not the same as conquering, occupying and maintaining'.

On the other hand, to fully control a territory and population of such characteristics, with civilians armed to the teeth, a very large occupation contingent is required - larger than the current one - and one that is well prepared against acts of sabotage.

The use and abuse of fake news in this war, by both sides, is extensive and pathetic; the distorted information, in addition to being used to justify their own actions to national and international opinion, serves to boost the morale of the forces. 

The widespread use of cyber and electronic warfare to disable radar systems, drone flights and many command and control communications can paralyze combat for hours or even cause it to fail completely. 

The use of weapons banned by international agreements or conventions such as cluster munitions, thermobaric or vacuum bombs and the possible use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is not a good precedent for Putin and his generals. There are already initiatives to declare these actions as war crimes or crimes against humanity.

With regard to WMDs, there is too much hype about the possibility of their use by the Ukrainians in actions known as 'false flag' operations, which my great friend and colleague, Raúl Suevos, defines as 'those that consist of carrying out an action, generally on one's own side, with forces or elements that appear to belong to the enemy'.

In this context, Russia has even filed complaints with the UNSC accusing Ukraine of the possibility of using all kinds of WMD, including dirty bombs. These complaints have no basis except that the Russians have certain data on the chemical and biological weapons that remained in Ukraine after the fall of the USSR, without destroying or disabling them.

Many have labeled Putin's threat to NATO and the EU with the use of his nuclear weapons as a big mistake, even going so far as to put these units on pre-alert. Contrary to that theory, I believe this subtle threat was a great success on his part.

The Russians and the West should not be willing to go as far as what is known as 'Mutually Assured Destruction', an irrevocable situation that would be achieved if, after the first launch and explosion of this type by either side, both sides were to respond indiscriminately until such weapons were used on a massive scale; a very strong reason to think that they will never be used; unless Putin finally saw the possibility of losing the war and/or his reason, like many satraps in history.

But Putin also knows that WMDs, and more specifically nuclear weapons, are not just offensive or defensive weapons; they play a very important role in 'deterrence'; and in this case, it can be said that the threat of their use has been enough to make NATO and the US completely desist from entering into or intervening in direct combat with them.

But it has not stopped there, it has created such international panic that even NATO, in a possibly wise maneuver that shows a lot of nerve and a total lack of shame or trust in an alliance that should be serious and reliable with friends in need, has forced Zelensky to declare that Ukraine will never join NATO. Making Putin the first of his objectives on the shopping list, which he presented as demands in order not to go to war and which, apparently, he still continues to maintain .

In a war of resistance at all costs and in desperation, the defender must use all means at his disposal and this is where the so-called measures of deception or deception play a very important role, with which positions and strengths that are not really so are simulated, to confuse the enemy, as well as the use of tricks and ruses, taking advantage of the effects and capacities provided by the terrain itself or after a natural or forced modification by the hand of man. 

In this case, and not for the first time in the history of the place or in other European confines, the phenomenon known in the world as 'hydraulic warfare' and there as 'Rasputitsa' has been exploited or forced. This consists of taking advantage of the ease with which that terrain can be made impassable, even for chains, when it is properly wet naturally by rain or thaw, or flooded by human hand. It becomes a sticky and persistent mud, which paralyzes all movement of the columns of cars, trucks and logistics.

China can support Russia in armaments, communications and even intelligence; but if it does so, it will suffer serious economic consequences because its trade with the rest of the world is many times greater than its bilateral trade with Russia. Its role, for the moment expectant and ambivalent, is still to be deciphered.

The success or failure of this operation and the final action or position of the IC depends not only on the survival of Ukraine as a free country with a tendency towards full democracy; it can become the spur or, on the contrary, the brake on the spread of other examples that appear on the horizon and that from time to time, thunder with a certain intensity (all the European countries bordering Russia, Taiwan, India-Pakistan, Iran-Iraq, the Arctic, the China Sea and other minor conflicts in the Middle East).

With actors like Putin, it is worth remembering that despots and tyrants tend to end up in schizophrenic situations or ones bordering on madness; making it almost impossible for them to heed any advice from anyone, not even from their inner circle. 

The first and bad omens that I predicted when I started writing about this war seem to be coming true. Yesterday, Zelenski, anticipating what may come, showed himself to the world - through his videoconference with the US Congress, after his last and accurate attempt and speech, although totally useless in view of Biden's response - clearly frustrated, deceived and abandoned by the IC in general and by the US in particular. This was a first warning or even a serious omen of what could happen with such an ally and its capricious changes of direction in conjunction with successive presidencies. 

Some countries and organizations have been encouraging it and even sending weapons under the table and after so much feigned international 'solidarity' and great national heroism, the balance of real results has been achieved: it has entered the list of countries with the option of joining the EU, sine die, on the positive side.

But on the other side of the coin, problems are piling up as it remains alone and isolated except for the last formal visit of three presidents from Eastern Europe, thousands of dead and wounded behind it, more than three million Ukrainians scattered throughout the world and far from their broken families, a people in arms, thousands of mercenaries without a flag fighting for one side or the other, an almost destroyed country, the economy is bankrupt and we will see how it all ends when the negotiations are finalized.

Negotiations, if they are ever completed; I assume that Putin, if he is the one who finally wins this war - after so much attrition and problems created for him and his people and thanks to the change in the orientation of US foreign policy - in the final moments he will force the repressive machine to the maximum to occupy a position of strength as favorable as possible, because he will not be content with sweets or trinkets and, therefore, will want much more than what he has obtained to date, so he will most likely fill his basket with requests or demands and even ask for much more.

In the rather unlikely event that Putin lost, things would be very different and it would be Ukraine, which has put all the suffering on the line, that would have managed to defeat the Russian colossus with feet of clay; but I very much fear that too many fathers would come out of that victory, even if they did not want to be directly involved in it.