Falklands War: strategies, successes and mistakes
This year marks the 40th anniversary of the Falklands War, an armed conflict that pitted Argentina against Britain. This analysis aims to address some questions about their respective strategies, pointing out successes and mistakes.
The Argentine military government, which lacked popular support as a result of a deep economic and political crisis, was, from one day to the next, cheered by millions of Argentines after announcing its desire to recover the Falklands, after 150 years of British occupation. On the other hand, Margaret Thatcher needed to recover from the growing negative public opinion of her government.
When diplomacy failed, a military confrontation began between a nuclear power, the third most powerful navy in the world, and a South American country. It was argued that Britain's overwhelming technological superiority would be matched by the courage of a much weaker army. It is worth bearing in mind that the Cold War was raging worldwide between the Western bloc (US) and the Soviet bloc (USSR).
The Task Force, made up of 100 ships, including two aircraft carriers, and several state-of-the-art ships and destroyers, whose arsenal included 31 nuclear devices, faced a major operational difficulty: the theatre of operations was more than 10,000 kilometres from any UK base.
Buenos Aires's main strategy was to defend the reconquered archipelago like a fortress, forcing a war of attrition that would generate a very high political, economic and public opinion cost for London. The intention was to force negotiation. At the same time, the best troops had to be mobilised to the Chilean border, which stretches more than 5,000 kilometres long, because the government of Augusto Pinochet provided logistical support to the UK. One of the hypotheses was Chile's involvement in the war, opening two fronts.
The UK's numerical and technological superiority gave it rapid and efficient naval superiority. At the same time, the US and NATO provided satellite support from space. In the Harrier-Mirage confrontation, Sidewinder air-to-air missile capability was key to Argentina's loss of air primacy. The British combat scheme, which provided for a system of 6-hour shifts at the front, was remarkably successful, to the detriment of the entrenchment of Argentine soldiers who had no possibility of refuelling or logistical supply.
"No Picnic", said Juliam Thompson, a Royal Navy officer, describing the conflict. Despite the huge military inferiority, the Argentine air and naval forces achieved unquestionable successes, circumventing the naval blockade with more than 500 raids. The effects were devastating: numerous ships were sunk or seriously damaged, both combat and logistical, and 70 % of the British force had its operational capability reduced to a minimum or rendered useless.
The "Rattenbach Report" assesses that the main blunder was strategic. There was a total lack of coordination between air, land and naval forces. This led to each branch fighting its own war. However, exceptional work can be noted at the operational and tactical level, where with very few resources, a vastly superior enemy was dealt with. The proven effectiveness of the use of missiles by the weaker side has been of interest for use in subsequent conflicts. For their part, British analysts and officials confirmed that the Task Force was 72 hours away from withdrawal, faced with the need to replace troops and refit damaged ships.
Politically, the Argentine government ended in dissolution and the end of a regime; the popularity of the Iron Lady and her Conservative party grew thanks to her tenacity and determination.
Today the Falklands are a highly strategic location, not only because of the large hydrocarbon resources in the area, but also because of their proximity to Antarctica, home to the world's largest water reserve. The current military presence allows the UK to take advantage of its position in the region.