Roots of radicalisation in Oman
There is this country which has long presented itself as a model of coexistence between religious sects. Although the ruling authorities there belonged to one particular sect that is considered to be a minority within the fabric of Islamic sects, the rulers of this country see themselves to be a fair arbiter between all, considering the balance they exercise within the sectarian make-up of the country.
In this country’s neighbourhood, developments led to the eruption of a civil war, which lasted for many years. The state found itself, at least by virtue of geography, becoming a party to that conflict. Over time, and swayed by considerations pushing it to favour one side over the other, this particular state moved to show its support for Iran’s regional positions and its ambition to exert its hegemony. It is a matter of debate whether it was driven to this position based on a reasoned decision or as a result of being swayed by what was happening next door.
After a while, the country became a passageway for weapons to the neighbouring country at war. Some of the parties to that civil war found a base in this country from which they sometimes led negotiation and in other instances engaged in political and media activities.
New regional crises subsequently emerged adding complexity to the regional situation. This reflected on the previously peaceful sectarian relations, as one began to hear complaints about the dominance of one sectarian faction over the other. The state aligned itself with a vociferous Iranian regime. Its media and political narratives nudged closer to those of Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and Iran-backed Hezbollah. One started hearing fatwas from senior clerics affiliated with the regime on the need to back Hamas and Hezbollah. Media discourse escalated, nurturing receptiveness among the public for the type of radical religious lexicon it contained. With this sort of environment emerging, extremist sentiment grew while moderate discourse eroded. Instead of aiming their rifles at their supposed enemy, that is, Israel, the radicals predictably targeted first and foremost their own country’s security.
Until about a week ago, the above paragraphs would have described Syria’s predicament, with its Iraqi neighbour, Iranian influence, regional escalation, and how the secular regime of Bashar al-Assad was dragged into becoming an apologetic ally of two Islamist organisations, Hamas (at least before 2011) and Hezbollah.
Today, the above paragraphs unfortunately describe well what is happening instead in what has been so far a rare oasis of peace and quiet in the Arab world: the Sultanate of Oman.
Months ago, I wrote about the danger of the rising sentiment in favour of Hamas and the Houthis. Such enthusiasm, which comes with religious overtones, no matter how hard you try to peel off its religious layers, fuels a climate beyond the mere expression of sympathy for a just cause like that of the Palestinians. The country’s politicians and security services can easily miss the signs that would allow them to detect how passionate discourse can breed an environment that is receptive of more radical and extreme ideas.
This is what happened in all past experiences having to do with Sunni and Shia political Islam. The sultanate of Oman could not be an exception.
The sectarian terrorist incident in Muscat last week was shocking to everyone. Of all the countries in the Arab and Islamic world, Oman seemed to be the one farthest from seeing ISIS’s flag raised and its bloody terrorist agenda carried out. The first impression of ordinary Omanis after the incident was that it was a case of imported terrorism, because in a country known for its calm and tranquillity like Oman, no one could expect the nationals to commit this kind of terrorist crime. Shock was later heightened among the public by the photograph and the video showing the three perpetrators, as well as the announcement by the security agencies that the culprits were Omanis.
Until now, Muscat has offered very few details about the operation and its perpetrators. One does not know much about them except that they are Omanis. There have been no names released, nor information about the place from where they hailed. Security imperatives and investigation constraints may be the reason for the authorities’ caution. But Oman is a country where people know each other. There is no doubt that many people in Muscat, assuming that the culprits were residents of the capital city, know the three brothers. Secrecy is not only related to the security aspect of the incident, but also to the ramifications related to their identities, their social and tribal connections, their backgrounds and where they were recruited into the ranks of ISIS. Many questions are still to be answered by the authorities.
What should be of immediate concern now is how this terrorist cell was born on Oman’s land of tolerance. One should put the economic factor aside, as no one believes the three individuals involved belonged to poor social classes, who could have been attracted by the promise of heavenly rewards after having lived in utter destitution. This has already happened in the Arabian Gulf, when children of financially well-to-do Gulf families streamed to conflict zones after being brainwashed by their recruiters. These radicalised young recruits even carried with them money which they donated to support their jihadist project.
Oman is a country of tolerance and peace, where there are no manifestations of sectarian strife. Occasionally, there are some frictions, as we witnessed in Buraimi or Salalah. But these are frictions stemming from the Sunnis’ wish to remind the ruling authorities, which consider themselves Ibadi, that Sunnis should be taken into account when it comes to religious events and holidays. In no way, can an objective Omani observer say that the sectarian affiliation of the Ibadi authorities is in conflict with the country’s Sunnis. The same can be said about how Sunnis and Ibadis deal with Shia, who represent a significant minority in Oman. Omanis belong to multiple sects, but they are not sectarian.
How could ISIS find a foothold in such a tolerant country? It is possible to evade the question by attributing the incident to a conspiracy by one or more regional countries, as a result of Oman taking a position on the Gaza war that is at variance with the rest of the Arab Gulf countries. But is it in the interest of any of the countries of the region, which have already suffered from al-Qaeda and ISIS crimes, to invest in sectarian strife and plots in Oman?
But it is also necessary to ask: how did ISIS find the proper environment where to plant a presence in the sultanate, and where did the Muscat cell receive its training so that it could conceal this presence, then to direct its strike by targeting worshipers, and subsequently resist security forces and kill and injure them?
There is no doubt that Oman’s radicalisation incubator is small and still in its infancy. It is legitimate to ask how did Oman’s enthusiasm for a just cause such as the Palestinian issue turn against the sultanate’s well-being and lead to the germination of the poisonous seed of ISIS. But this is all too familiar when it comes to the doctrines of political Islam, whether affiliated with Sunni extremism such as the Muslim Brotherhood or those stemming from Khomeini’s legacy. In the beginning, the Palestinian issue is presented as the motive, but soon thereafter such a justification disappears giving way to the fundamental objective of the political Islam project, which is control of the region’s riches to benefit the Muslim Brotherhood, ISIS, or Khomeini-type projects.
Perhaps dealing with the issue just from a security perspective will not prevent the recurrence of such attacks, under different circumstances and conditions.
A security response is needed to identify the underground cells and find out how its members were able to secure weapons and other assets. Concluding that is the case of an isolated family and that the terrorist incident is limited in scope, will not be enough. It is certain that whoever set up the terrorist cell worked on the basis of the family structure to carry out his plot in a country that is not very familiar with terrorist organisations. But as one has witnessed in Iraq, Syria and other countries, such organisation can quickly spread and expand their recruitment base based on enthusiastic support for such causes as the Gaza issue.
It is necessary to point out that the terrorism that struck in Muscat is still limited in scope, that the sultanate’s incubating environment is still small and nascent, and that Omanis have rejected such poisonous weeds in their land of tranquillity. But the intellectual protection of society must first start with preventing out-bidders and zealots from consciously or unconsciously, rendering Omani youth receptive to extremist thought. In a country whose foundation is tolerance, diversity and acceptance of others, any investment in zealotry for the sake of achieving the goals of political Islam will quickly pose an imminent danger to its security and peace. The Muscat attack must be the first and last of its kind, so that any attempt to create an incubator for terrorism stops dead in its tracks, and that temptation to compare Oman’s model with that of Syria model is forever discarded.
Haitham El Zobaidi is the Executive Editor of Al Arab Publishing House.