Singing to Turkish-Qatari tunes in Syria

Two countries sit in the conductor’s seat of the Syrian train: Turkey and Qatar.

In fairness to the Saudis and others, no one in the Arab region could have predicted a scenario of the war sparked by the “Al-Aqsa Flood” misadventure and its leading to the destruction of the Assad regime as collateral damage.

There are several versions of the 1970s Syrian singer Dalal Shamali’s song, “From Mount Qasioun, I see you my homeland”. Mount Qasioun is the mountain overlooking Damascus.

I remember a version which used to be broadcast on Iraqi television when relations between Iraq and Syria were at their best. “From Mount Qasioun, I see you my homeland/ I see Baghdad embracing the clouds,” said the leading verse in the song’s lyrics.

Relations between Baghdad and Damascus did not remain warm for long.  Coolness seemed to last for a significant period of time until the concurrent rule by Baath parties in both countries ended. That was when Baghdad fell to US occupation in 2003. An updated version of the Shamali song went on to say “So I see Damascus embracing the clouds.”

It is too early to say whether one would choose Damascus over Baghdad. The Baghdad authorities seemed keen, quite soon after the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, to distance themselves from Damascus, echoing a decision by Tehran, which could be one of the most important strategic decisions in the history of the post-revolutionary Iranian state.

Dalal Shamali stopped singing a long time ago, otherwise there would have been a new version between 1980 and 2024 that would have said “So I see Tehran embracing the clouds.”

Syria’s strategic rapprochement with Iran during the rule of the Assad dynasty is no secret, or maybe it was just one of the least well-kept secrets in the region.

Syria fought Iraq on the side of Iran, and the first salvo of Scud missiles which fell on Baghdad during the Iran-Iraq war during the so-called “war of the cities” in the 1980s included missiles which Damascus had purchased from the Soviets and transferred to Iran. Gadhafi’s Libya did the same.

Iraq modified these missiles by reducing their explosive charge and compensating for the weight difference with engine fuel so the missiles could gain longer ranges and reach cities deep inside Iran, especially in the capital Tehran.

The missiles bore names not devoid of irony and painful religious connotations for Tehran. Official Iraqi statements used to proclaim that, “Iraqi surface-to-surface missiles of Hussein and Abbas models struck Iranian targets in the capital Tehran.” Imam Hussein and Imam Abbas are two of the greatest Shia martyrs, a symbol of martyrdom that became the basis of Shia version of Muslim faith.

The same models of these missiles struck Tel Aviv a few years later during Kuwait’s war of liberation. Even without checking the full list of the names of Iranian missiles, one can assume that Iraq preceded Iran in using the names of “Hussein” and “Abbas” for its missiles.

Western foreign ministers and senior diplomats met in Riyadh last Sunday to discuss the situation in Syria and seek a compromise on how to approach the crisis.

Saudi Arabia wants to adjust the order of things in Syria and leave its mark on regional developments, so as to come ahead of the Turks and the Qataris.

Saudi Arabia enjoys a privileged regional position and wields enough money and influence to be listened to by both the West and the Arabs.

But the Syrian train has been moving along for some time and the gathering of Arab and Western diplomats was a mere formality.

Two countries sit in the conductor’s seat of the Syrian train: Turkey and Qatar. Saudi Arabia is well aware of this reality. What happened overwhelmed its ability to alter the course of events. It did not matter whether it remained committed to the boycott of Bashar al-Assad’s regime or if it followed the Emirati advice that there was no point in letting Turkish initiatives as well as Qatari money and influence determine the outcome of the situation in Syria by resuming ties with Damascus a year before the fall of the regime.

Saudi disengagement from Arab issues had reached such proportions at the time that it was difficult to say that the kingdom could somehow reactivate its presence and influence in Syria. In fairness to the Saudis and others, no one in the Arab region could have predicted a scenario of the war sparked by the “Al-Aqsa Flood” misadventure and its leading to the destruction of the Assad regime as collateral damage.

The Western and Arab diplomatic participants to the Riyadh conference were likely to have been invited to any one of the music festivals crowding the venues of the Saudi capital these days. If so, we could have heard a new version of Dalal Shamali’s song saying, “I see Riyadh embracing the clouds.”

So let us stick for now with one of two other variations saying: “I see Istanbul embracing the clouds.”

The Turks were able to prepare meticulously for a large-scale exercise which threw the Syrian regime off balance, then dealt it a fatal blow without having to intervene militarily.

Ankara took advantage of the geographic situation of neighbouring Syria with Aleppo being squeezed into one corner and Latakia in another, while Idlib sat between them. Aleppo, ironically, is mentioned in Shamali’s song in the verse, “Oran kisses Aleppo up in the sky.”

The Russians were unable to impose a different reality after reaching a ceasefire deal that required imposing their control in Idlib, which remained a bleeding sore for Syrian forces.

This sore led to the emergence of an authority within the authority and of a nexus of military operations from which the major operation towards Aleppo was eventually launched, before the final push for the fall of the regime going through Hama and Homs, and then Damascus.

Hezbollah had been devastated in the war with Israel and had to withdraw its elite forces from Wadi Khaled and al-Qusayr, which constituted the strategic nexus connecting Damascus to the coast, a region having the highest Alawite ethnic/sectarian concentration.

The Syrian regime fell, and with its fall ended Iran’s influence as well as the role of its advisors and fighters from the region.

The Turks provided the logistical support and, before that, the necessary training for armed forces on guerrilla tactics both in Syria and elsewhere.

The Turks were aware of all the weaknesses of the inept Syrian army. With its worn-out tanks this army had no chance against advanced Turkish military technologies, which were tested in a similar combat environment in 2020 when Turkish drones launched continued strikes, 24 hours a day, against Khalifa Haftar’s forces in Libya.  The Libyan field marshal’s troops were no match to Turkish military technology which was one the best among NATO members and included sophisticated missiles and bombs that left the outdated Syrian armour with no chance of survival.

Assad’s soldiers had learned in the hard years of the war that it is difficult to survive deadly weapons of this type, which were later tested in the West/Russia confrontation during the Russian-Ukrainian war.

Syrian soldiers quickly packed their personal effects and light vehicles leaving all heavy equipment behind. The Turks prevailed and the Iranians knew that any attempt on their part to help Assad would have been futile. Merely dispatching local militias or Iraqi Hashed al-Shaabi forces to the battlefield would have just senselessly prolonged the war only provoking a bloodbath which Tehran sought to avoid. Four thousands of such troops were airlifted by the Russians back in Iraq or Iran.

The second variation in the song could be a Qatari version to the tune of: “I see Doha embracing the clouds.”

The Qataris have also prevailed over the momentum of Saudi Arabia’s effort as they sought to lend support to a select group of rebel factions. After a short while, the Saudis were exhausted while the Qataris continued to pump money and provide support propaganda to loyal forces.

Despite the many major setbacks suffered by Muslim Brotherhood affiliated factions, the Qataris did not relent and did not withdraw from the battle. They altered parts of their formula and media narrative, but kept the same approach overall. The Qataris knew also they could count on the sensitivity of the Jamal Khashoggi crisis for the Saudis and the potential for exploitation of the issue by Turkey.

When the Saudis reconciled with the Turks, and then reconciled with the Qataris, the Syrian issue was left unaddressed.

For a while, many were surprised by Qatar’s stubborn refusal to change course after the Arabs (particularly in the Arab Gulf region) reversed policy in favour of Assad. The Qataris had another card to play, and they played it shrewdly. It is difficult to say if they coordinated their moves with Israel. But they stood by and watched while the Israelis struck Hezbollah and Hamas and it became clear that Assad would lose ground politically by not lifting a finger as he let Hamas suffer alone under Israeli bombing, and when it became clear that Hezbollah would not emerge unscathed from the ongoing war.

Whether Assad, as well as his family, army, state, sect and people, were exhausted and hence let things spiral out of control or whether it is the Qataris who let chips fall where they lay, only history will tell.

Ahmed al-Sharaa (perhaps during the last days of his nom-de-guerre of Abu Muhammad al-Golani as a fighter in Hayat Tahrir al-Sham) stood with the Turkish Foreign Minister and former intelligence chief Hakan Fidan, the engineer of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Golani persona, in a region that I had previously visited and which includes one of the most beautiful places overlooking Damascus from Mount Qasioun. I think they stood in the famous “Ahla Tala” vantage-point and sipped tea or coffee. They were maybe listening to the song “From Mount Qasioun, I see you my homeland.”

Sharaa had in mind the song version whose lyrics said, “So I see Damascus embracing the clouds” while Fidan had other lyrics in mind saying: “So I see Istanbul embracing the clouds”.

The Qatari Al Jazeera broadcaster was probably humming “So I see Doha embracing the clouds.”

Haitham El Zobaidi is the Executive Editor of Al Arab Publishing House.