The new Arab Spring that will not come

Syria's newly appointed president for a transitional phase Ahmed Al-Sharaa welcomes Qatar's Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani in Damascus, Syria January 30, 2025 - PHOTO/AMIRIRI DIWAN via REUTERS
So, not much will happen through street agitation and popular demonstrations. If anything is to occur it will be with the mobilisation of armies or militias and their use of the weapons and influence they wield.

Where has the rest of the world been when these complex preparations were taking place, before Sharaa’s battalions pounced on Aleppo and other major cities of Syria before entering Damascus? 

Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani stood next to the recently-appointed Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, both looking down at the capital Damascus from a high vantage point, on the first visit by a head of state to post-Assad Syria. 

There has been no ambiguity about Qatari sponsorship of the events which brought Sharaa to the remarkable position where he is today. There is no room left for any illusion about this and Qatar has no qualms about flaunting its achievement. The Turks were smart enough to make room for Sheikh Tamim so that no one else shared the limelight of victory with him. 

Qatari money was the first means which allowed the toppling of the Assad family. Money and determination made Turkish coordination and back-up possible, with Ankara doing what was required. 

One did not see any Qatari intelligence officers taking part in the celebrations with Sharaa and his men after the collapse of the Assad regime. 

Entering Damascus was a moment of great achievement from all perspectives. It was the culmination of many small but continuous achievements. Somewhere in Doha or Istanbul, there was someone counting and enumerating these achievements and saying: Be patient … Wait … Be patient. It does not matter who was doing the counting. What mattered is that he was accurate in predicting the outcome, which is now embodied by the sight of two young leaders treasuring the moment on which they had bet. It is not true that Sheikh Tamim was himself under no pressure, simply because he only spent money and suffered no casualties among his countrymen.

The political bet was huge and took many years to materialise. It all goes back to the time the then-Qatari Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani, knocked on the table of the Arab League meeting in Cairo as he conveyed the wish of the Emir (now the Father Emir) Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani that Syria be expelled from the League. The young emir picked up on that later, and despite the return of Bashar al-Assad to the Arab League, Qatar continued to boycott his regime, contrary to the wishes of others. Eventually, the process ended with the overthrow of the regime in Damascus. 

The same can be said with some variations about Sharaa himself. Aside from the number of Syrians killed, there was a process of change which Abu Muhammad al-Golani (the nom de guerre of Sharaa) went through. Everything about Sharaa points to adventure. His appearance is reminiscent of the leaders of the Bandita liberation movements (Latin American liberation bandits) or the leftist communist leaders of Southeast Asia who achieved what they wanted from their “mission impossible”. First, Sharaa had to remove the worst stigma that can plague anyone in our modern era: that of having been an al-Qaeda leader. 

What is important is that Sheikh Tamim and Sharaa were telling each other: “Here we are and we have made it”. 

Where has the rest of the world been when these complex preparations were taking place, before Sharaa’s battalions pounced on Aleppo and other major cities of Syria before entering Damascus? It is difficult to find a convincing answer to that question. There must now be post-mortems within political establishments and intelligence agencies in many places in the region. It is not clear how much of what happened was due to neglect and how much was due to intentionally looking the other way. 

For many reasons, nothing and no one can be excluded. The place was teeming with spies and special agents and all kinds of people volunteering to provide information. But somehow all failed to spot the hundreds of four-wheel drive vehicles and small trucks carrying medium and heavy machine guns, from the moment of their purchase from local Japanese and Korean car dealers in countries next to Syria (especially in Turkey), before their delivery in Idlib. Nor did they see the training, the electronic devices, the small kamikaze-drones or the sniper-drones that exhausted the Syrian regime’s soldiers and sapped their morale. 

If the Gulf and Arab intelligence agencies failed to detect all that, regardless of the abundance or scarcity of financial means at their disposal (depending on the agency for which they worked), then where were the Iranians and Russians? 

No need to wonder about the location of the Israelis whom the Iranians continued to underestimate until they saw them in action not far from the hallways of their Tehran guesthouses gathering intelligence about Ismail Haniyeh’s bedroom. No one is asking questions about the Russians who understood that there was nothing to be expected from Bashar al-Assad. He was hopelessly weak and unwilling to listen or understand. 

The “Al-Aqsa Flood” has almost changed everything on the ground allowing the Israeli factor to enter the equation. One of the ironies of this decisive factor is that Assad did not want to exploit it in any way. His reluctance to do so arose either because of personal considerations having to do with Assad’s stance on the Muslim Brotherhood or because he felt that the time had come to move away from the Iranian axis. In any case, the Israelis could not see in the Syrian regime anything but an Iran proxy with which they had long delayed dealing, especially since the country had become the gateway for Iranian weapons to Hezbollah. 

Apart from the bragging aspect of Sheikh Tamim’s presence in Damascus, there is no doubt that he and Al-Sharaa are looking ahead at the next stage, and scrutinising the developments that we see unfolding before our eyes today. The latest and not the least event is Sharaa’s visit to Riyadh and his meeting with the Saudi leadership.

The Riyadh outreach was certainly to be expected, and it was important for Doha and Ankara to anticipate it. Doha will not prevent the open door policy with Riyadh, and the high-level Saudi-Syrian coordination currently taking place. 

Saudi Arabia, with its regional political and financial weight, can remind everyone of Sharaa’s al-Qaeda past, which they seem to be trying to forget. With the exception of Iraq, perhaps because of its Iranian connection, no Arab country will stand in the way of Arab normalisation with any regime that replaces Assad, and allows Syrians to emerge from their years-long crisis. 

The Qatari-Turkish investment in Syria is bound to bear fruit for Doha. And if the strategic land route or railway connection are opened or gas pipelines are extended between the southern Iraqi ports on the Gulf ultimately connecting Qatar to the Mediterranean, everyone will benefit, including Iran, which will not shed many tears over Assad. 

Iran is still going through the shock of the disintegration of its alliance, but it will soon recover and regain its composure. The Iranians themselves have a lot to think about. 

The Turks, for their part, want solutions, and they have learnt quickly from their many mistakes in the region. They are to be credited for the Syrian achievement, at least from the perspective of Saudi Arabia, especially after Hayat Tahrir al-Sham destroyed one of the most important regional alliances: that between Syria and Iran, which is ultimately an alliance with Hezbollah and a supporting actor called Hamas. 

Turkey did not dwell too long on its strategic gains and losses. It has realised that Hamas remains a marginal entity which can be re-built any time and when necessary. 

There are other side-battles taking place or being re-ignited. Perhaps the Sudanese fray, and those behind it, is one such a side-battle. The stalemate in Sudan was meaningless and now the two main camps, especially the army and its Turkish backers, have intensified their moves towards confronting the Rapid Support Forces. 

One can only imagine where things would lead in Libya if the two protagonists there were to decide to turn their “political” confrontations into a military crisis of the type we witnessed years ago. 

What is happening today is a preparation phase for what is to come. The Egyptians and Jordanians are loudly voicing their fears, and the Yemenis outside the Houthi alliance also want guarantees. The eyes of both sides seem to be on the Emirates, and the test will be the next Syrian move, and how close or how far it will be from Abu Dhabi. All the protagonists are waiting for opportunities for change which they could turn in their favour. 

Such opportunities cannot happen without Western interventions, such as those which could come with US President Donald Trump’s initiatives. This is a man who is ready to shake the region many times over as long as this could generate money or influence for the United States. The different local protagonists do not mind going along with him, as long as they remain immune from change. 

The region’s streets are quiet, and change could happen without the need for popular agitation. The “Al-Aqsa Flood” has caused major shifts, but these did not occur through demonstrations or with an Arab Spring unfolding. 

People simply watched satellite channels, empathised with the suffering of the Palestinians or listened to the chants of activists on their platforms on social media, including YouTube. 

So, not much will happen through street agitation and popular demonstrations. If anything is to occur it will be with the mobilisation of armies or militias and their use of the weapons and influence they wield. 

Sheikh Tamim and Sharaa are watching from a mountain overlooking Damascus and there is no doubt that they have an idea of what is to come. Let us wait and see. 

Haitham El Zobaidi is the Executive Editor of Al Arab Publishing House.