The revolving door of Arab satellite television channels

Alhurra TV has dropped out of a race in which, to begin with, it was not even registered. US President Donald Trump decided that US self-promotion through the media was not necessary. His decision was part of a broader set of decisions restricting US public spending, which have impacted even more vital aspects of public spending, particularly those related to humanitarian aid. During its two decades of existence, AlHurra never managed to beat others in the competition for satellite television audiences. It has always been aware that any attempt to alter the media landscape would have meant facing formidable Arab media powers, led by Al Jazeera.

This does not mean that the departure of AlHurra is not a loss. There is always something new that the media can offer. The truth is that reaching millions of people, as stated in AlHurra's farewell statement, is a fierce competition. However, the reality is that this task is costly, especially for satellite channels, no matter how hard they try to reduce overheads.

In addition, alternative wide-reaching platforms such as YouTube and TikTok offer an adequate communication infrastructure even for beginners. While a full satellite station broadcasting 24 hours a day would need a dedicated team to produce a report of just a few minutes for a 24-hour television channel, similar content could be posted on YouTube at no cost. It is not known what calculations Trump made in making this decision, but the end result was the withdrawal of AlHurra. 

Perhaps Al Jazeera will mention the closure of AlHurra in its broadcasts or on its website. It will probably mention it with the tone of compassion it usually reserves for worthy humanitarian causes. Al Jazeera is a politically ruthless tool. For decades it has demonstrated its lethal power in the Arab media landscape. The Qataris were quick to realise the power of this weapon, although the Saudis were the first to use it when they launched MBC immediately after the Kuwait Liberation War. In the mid-1990s, the media coup that Al Jazeera pulled off was part of a broader political manoeuvre orchestrated by the Qatari rulers just after the coup they carried out at the royal palace in Doha. 

Qatar benefited enormously from Al Jazeera. In this sense, the centralisation of decision-making in Doha was key, despite the presence of a ruling duo, made up of the emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani and the prime minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani. Once the roadmap had been established, or to be more precise, the limits of what was permitted for Al Jazeera, its implementation began with a barely concealed mass recruitment campaign aimed at the entire Arab team of the BBC, who had just been dismissed. There could have been a banner saying ‘Now under new management’ as the Arab world witnessed the tremors of the Qatari media-political earthquake that, among other things, triggered the ‘Arab Spring’. 

Whatever anyone says about Al Jazeera, no one can claim that it was a failure. Even in its decline, the channel managed to retain its followers, if only by appealing to their sympathy for emotive issues in the Arab world, such as the Palestinian cause, or by using the Palestinian cause itself to suggest that Al Jazeera sympathised with Hezbollah and its causes, for example. 

Sympathy for Hezbollah effortlessly won it the loyalty of a large segment of the audience and a tangible presence in North Africa, to cite just one example. Al Jazeera paid attention to Iraqi problems, suggesting sympathy for the country, even when US fighter jets took off a short distance from its studios on raids against Iraq during the 1990s, which culminated in the US invasion of Iraq, the occupation of Baghdad and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime. 

In fact, that regime remained convinced until the end that Qatar and Al Jazeera were on its side. But Qatar only had one ally: Qatar.

The most important weapon that benefited Al Jazeera was the Muslim Brotherhood environment in which it developed. The channel excelled in using that weapon, while the Brotherhood even managed to organise an internal coup to overthrow a director affiliated to the Brotherhood and dismiss his ‘Arab nationalist’ predecessor.

Subsequently, the Qatari leaders attempted to regain control of the channel, and it is not certain that they succeeded. However, the result continues to favour the Qatari project, first from the perspective of media competition and second from a political perspective. The channel's media advantage is demonstrated daily by the stumbles of its competitors. 

The most important competitor has been and continues to be Al Arabiya. It was launched after the invasion of Iraq, and its managers adopted an editorial line of support for the invasion, both implicitly and explicitly. Under the leadership of the veteran and renowned journalist Abdulrahman Al-Rashed, Al Arabiya managed to carve out a niche among viewers dissatisfied with the Muslim Brotherhood or the leftist tendencies of Al Jazeera, after left-wing Arab activists began frequenting the luxury hotels of Doha. 

The division in the audience continued for years despite the fact that viewers of Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya represented, according to opinion polls, the same ethnic groups, ideologies and religious orientations. 

When Qatar broke away from the Bashar al-Assad regime, Al Jazeera followed suit. The Palestinian and pro-resistance audience, which supports Iran in its Palestinian discourse and Hezbollah's narrative, shifted its allegiance to the Hezbollah-run Al Mayadeen TV channel.

Both Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya adjusted their course when necessary, without major changes to the fundamentals. Even those who opposed Hezbollah, for example, began to say: ‘I support what this or that channel says about the party and its media spokesperson for this particular reason, but I don't support it in everything’.

For some reason, Al Arabiya has split twice. The first was with the launch of Al Hadath TV, in what seemed to be an attempt to differentiate between the breaking news of the new channel and a more relaxed format offering more time for discussion with Al Arabiya. The second, curiously, occurred when Abdulrahman Al-Rashed launched Al Sharq TV, which, once again, took some of the audience away from Al Arabiya without affecting Al Jazeera's audience. 

Al Sharq is a solid channel, but it failed to change the content equation or alter the polarisation of the audience. It may have sought greater alignment with Saudi Vision 2030 during its preparation phase, but like any project of this kind, events change so quickly that it is difficult to predict where things begin and end.  

The other serious attempt came from Sky News Arabia. Abu Dhabi acquired a recognised brand in the media world and, at first glance, it appeared to have incorporated the English-language format along with the brand. However, Sky News Arabia spent many years in limbo during the launch phase, relying on an overly technical team that lacked political acumen and an understanding of the sensitivity of the moment. These considerations were lost in the details of the launch phase, which lasted many years. Abu Dhabi initially sought support in print and digital media projects, which it quickly abandoned or scaled back for various reasons. It subsequently decided to renew the management of Sky News Arabia. It is still too early to tell whether Sky News Arabia will succeed in its efforts to make itself noticed or will settle for a small share of the audience. The ‘Al-Aqsa Flood’ incident was significant as it drastically shook up the media landscape and gave other media outlets the opportunity to compete with Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya. So far, the audience does not seem to have changed.  

The editors of AlHurra stated in their farewell communiqué that others are taking advantage of the media's contempt for the reputation of the United States. Perhaps this is an accurate description, but the United States has not been the only target. The Arab public began to take sides many years ago. Saudi Arabia is under attack, despite Al Arabiya's numerous contributions, and the United Arab Emirates is in the same situation, despite the fact that Sky News Arabia now presents celebrity talk-show hosts from Tehran or analysts who talk naturally about Hezbollah and its support for the militant party and its Iranian sponsor. 

Listening to what the Arab street is saying, including segments of the public living in the West and influenced by Western media messages, one discovers that satellite channels reflect what is happening and what is being said, and are almost incapable of bringing about change. 

However one analyses the issues, it is striking how large a percentage of Palestinians still regard the ‘flooding of Al-Aqsa’ as a victory and believe that the price paid so far, at least in Gaza, has been worth it. At the same time, the Palestinians are trying to distance themselves from events outside Gaza and leave the evaluation of those events to Iran, which undoubtedly knows the magnitude of the strategic setbacks it has suffered. 

Ironically, the same Palestinians who avoid addressing the situation of Hezbollah and Iran's allies in the region, whether the Popular Mobilisation Forces of Iraq or the Houthis of Yemen, continue to support, for example, the continuous attacks on commercial ships crossing the Red Sea, despite the fact that Egypt, and not Israel, is the main victim. It is the same Egypt that is being asked to facilitate access to goods, commodities and food for the Palestinians under siege in Gaza. 

Once again, it is safe to say that AlHurra's exit from the satellite television competition will not have much of an impact. Just as it failed to change the situation when it entered the fray, its exit, and that of others before and after, will fall into the same category. 

What can make the difference? It is difficult to say. The Qataris acted from the outset to win the hearts and minds of viewers, and not only that. But successive generations of viewers have changed over the last few decades. The television channels could have prepared for the arrival of the new generations. But the reality of the crucial problems in the region refuses to change, or for those who govern them, acceptance of change is difficult to achieve.  

It can be said that the odds of survival in the foreseeable future favour Al Jazeera. The Qataris embrace their enemies and exchange courtesies with them, but they do not abandon their weapons. Their entire media arsenal remains on standby, whether or not it is used. When the need arises, it is used without hesitation. They even allow themselves to launch trial balloons from time to time, even when it is not necessary. Al Jazeera employees do not see their livelihoods threatened; on the contrary, they operate on the premise that Al Jazeera is a job for life. This implies a high budget, of course, but it is rewarded with the loyalty and dedication that media professionals in the Arab world perceive on a daily basis. 

The Al Jazeera archive is always on the desk of the Emir of Qatar and no one can access it without his permission. This is what makes Al Jazeera a formidable media force. It will remain so as long as it is protected and financed, and as long as there are enough ‘masses’, to use a Marxist description, who believe that it is possible to combine gas money and Qatari political propaganda with the crucial problems of the Arab world.

Until these convictions change, the satellite television market will always be willing to welcome and dismiss new competitors, even if they are not even registered in the race.

Haitham El Zobaidi, executive editor of Al Arab Publishing House.