Iran: a political earthquake in the offing?
- ‘The war of the wolves’
- Dismissal of senior officials: cracks in the cabinet
- The mega-crises in Iran
- The rise of the resistance units
- A change of era
- A historical precedent?
Without legal authorisation, they blocked the roads to demand the strict application of the law on the compulsory wearing of the hijab. In response, some factions of the regime considered these demonstrations suspicious, claiming that the participants had been paid to take part.
Mahmoud Nabavian, an influential member of the Front for Perseverance (Jebhe-ye Paydari), a party within the government, described these protests as part of an ‘enemy plan’ aimed at sowing chaos in the country.
Further complicating the situation is the increase in internal tensions within the regime, which could erupt and lead to a major crisis or even a popular uprising.
‘The war of the wolves’
Unlike other countries, the Iranian political structure is not based on traditional factions. Instead, the regime is dominated by mafia groups engaged in a bitter struggle for power and personal enrichment. These internal rivalries, known among Iranians as the ‘war of the wolves’, have reached such a level of violence that even the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, seems unable to contain them.
These crises reveal deep fractures within the regime and an unprecedented situation that directly threatens its survival.
One of the dominant factions, led by a former presidential candidate, believes that the only way to prevent the collapse of the Islamic Republic is to strictly apply repressive laws such as the compulsory hijab. For this group, given the imminent social explosion and the regime's repeated failures on the international scene, greater repression is essential to maintain control.
However, the Supreme National Security Council, the country's highest security authority, believes that the immediate application of these laws could trigger an uprising and prefers to postpone them. This divergence shows that even Khamenei's directives are no longer systematically respected in the circle of power.
Dismissal of senior officials: cracks in the cabinet
The dismissal of the Minister of Economy, Abdolnasser Hemmati, as well as that of Javad Zarif, vice-president (and former minister of Foreign Affairs), is another indicator of the internal crisis of the regime. These key figures, who occupied strategic positions in the economic and diplomatic management of the country, have been expelled under the growing pressure of rival factions.
Khamenei had kept Zarif in the government in order to maintain diplomatic openness with the West. But now, under pressure from ultra-conservative factions, and while Zarif is considered ‘outdated’, he has been removed. At the same time, an influential group of deputies, challenging Khamenei's authority, is demanding the strict application of laws on the hijab and Islamic morality.
These events illustrate a crucial reality: Khamenei no longer has total control over his own government.
The mega-crises in Iran
Afterlife of internal political struggles, Iran is facing multiple and serious crises:
- Two thirds of the population now live below the poverty line.
- The national currency is collapsing, accelerating runaway inflation.
- Corruption is spreading through all sectors of the economy and the Administration.
- Electricity cuts have led to the closure of schools and factories.
- Tehran, the capital, is on the verge of a serious water shortage crisis.
According to the former Minister of Economy, more than a million litres of diesel are illegally exported every day. The increase in poverty and warnings from media outlets close to the regime about a ‘hunger uprising’ are of great concern to the authorities.
In addition, the regime's strategic failures in the region are aggravating tensions within the power structure and further weakening Khamenei's position. However, in his speeches, the latter continues to claim that ‘we have become even stronger’.
The rise of the resistance units
Over the last decade, the resistance units, created by the People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK), have become the regime's main challenge. These thousands of units, spread throughout the country, played an active role in the major revolts of 2019 and 2022.
The regime has done everything possible to prevent the international community from recognising their existence. But despite brutal repression and the mass execution of their members, these units continue to expand and gain influence.
Regime factions are debating the best strategy to contain these movements:
- Direct and brutal repression.
- More selective and strategic repression to preserve the regime's image on the international stage.
But, in all cases, the main fear remains the same: that an uncontrollable uprising will mark the fall of the regime.
A change of era
Iran seems to be entering a new phase. The regime's failure on several fronts — from the weakening of Hezbollah and affiliated armed groups to the worsening of internal crises — is increasing the pressure on the government.
At the same time, the West's policy of complacency towards Iran has changed: the international community is no longer turning a blind eye to the regime's crimes, at least as far as its nuclear programme is concerned.
The conditions now imposed for any interaction with Iran include:
- The total and verifiable suspension of the nuclear programme.
- The abandonment of support for armed groups in the region.
Faced with this, the regime is at a crossroads:
- Continue with its nuclear programme and its support for the militias, as it has done until now.
- Negotiate with the international community and abandon these projects in exchange for a gradual lifting of sanctions.
Until now, Khamenei has stubbornly stuck with the first option. He has publicly stated that negotiating with the United States ‘is neither rational, intelligent nor honourable’.
A historical precedent?
However, there is a historical exception: in 1988, after years of war against Iraq and despite his promises to fight ‘to the last house in Tehran’, Khomeini was forced to accept a ceasefire — and not peace — in the face of the threat of the National Liberation Army of Iran (the military branch of the PMOI, then based on the Iraqi border).
But today, with Khamenei's extreme weakness and the fragility of the regime, it seems unlikely that he could back down in such a strategic way, even if his survival depended on it. Unlike Khomeini, Khamenei might be unable to save his regime from imminent collapse.
Article published in La Dépêche du Midi, entitled ‘Séisme politique en vue en Iran’:
https://www.ladepeche.fr/2025/03/17/tribune-iran-un-seisme-politique-en-vue-12575093.php