50 years after the Green March: the end of an unfinished story

On that day, when more than 350,000 Moroccans crossed the border with flags and copies of the Koran, a journey began whose beginning of the end came just a few days ago: international recognition of the proposal for autonomy through the resolution approved by the UN Security Council. 

The Green March was not an invasion in the pejorative sense of the term, as many would have us believe, but the legitimate exercise of a historical right. This territory is an integral part of Morocco's heritage, seized by European colonial powers during the partition of Africa that began in the 19th century, a fact that is often deliberately omitted.Spain administered Spanish Sahara for almost a century, but this colonial administration, however much it tried to legitimise itself, never altered the nature of the territory or that of its indigenous inhabitants, who were ancestrally linked to the Kingdom. 

It is fair to recognise that during the Spanish administration of the territory there was relative integration between the colonisers and the indigenous population. Native Sahrawis received Spanish national identity documents and participated in administrative structures such as the Yemáa, the regional assembly created in 1967. This institution was designed as an instrument of self-government, albeit with obvious limitations. The chiujs, the traditional chiefs of the Sahrawi tribes and factions, exercised genuine authority based on community consensus and accumulated wisdom. 

When Spain abandoned the territory in 1975—amid the political uncertainty generated by Franco's death throes—the Polisario Front had already presented itself as the vanguard of Sahrawi aspirations. But this narrative contains a fundamental falsehood: the Polisario was not an authentic expression of the will of the native Sahrawi population, but rather an organisation forged mainly by elements from outside the territory. 

Founded in 1973 in the Mauritanian city of Zouérate, the Polisario brought together young people from Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania and what was then Spanish Sahara. Its main leaders came from contexts outside the territory under Spanish administration, replacing and marginalising the traditional authority of the chiujs with a centralised structure, ideologically oriented towards revolutionary pan-Arabism, Nasserism and Marxism. It was massively financed first by Gaddafi and then by Algeria, in a context linked to the national liberation movements of the time. This rebellious romanticism had a profound impact on the left and various independence movements in Spain, with Francoism still latent. Hence their sympathy and unconditional, uncritical support for decades. 

Although the initial reaction of the Sahrawi population to Spanish colonial policies was peaceful and centred on the chiujs, the events of Zemla on 17 June 1970 culminated in one of the great mistakes of colonial Spain, creating an insurmountable rift with the indigenous population. The subsequent emergence of the Polisario betrayed that original desire for self-determination in 1970, exploiting it as an extension of the interests of other regional actors. Its success in becoming the hegemonic representative of Sahrawi nationalism was a subsequent external political construct, rather than an organic expression of the will of the people. 

On the other hand, for fifty years, Algeria has used the Sahrawi cause as a tool of geopolitical power, confining the population to desert camps where they remain under Polisario control, deprived of freedom of movement and access to economic opportunities. The thousands of native Sahrawis who wish to return to their land under Moroccan administration are forced to remain in exile, perpetuating suffering that benefits only the Polisario's ruling elites and their Algerian sponsors. 

Thus, Algeria abstained in the 31 October 2025 Security Council vote legitimising Morocco's autonomy proposal, a revealing gesture of diplomatic isolation that tacitly acknowledges the defeat of its obstructionist strategy.

The resolution recently approved by the Security Council consolidates what historical, geographical and political logic already indicated: Western Sahara is an integral part of Morocco, and its administration through autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the only viable solution. This closing of the cycle represents the restoration of historical normality after a colonial and post-colonial interlude. 

Finally, a reminder to the Spanish military personnel who served in the Spanish Sahara during the last years prior to the withdrawal. They faced a responsibility that went beyond the conventional terms of military duty. From 20 May 1973, when the Polisario Front launched its first attacks against Spanish posts in the territory, Spanish forces were the target of a systematic campaign of hostility. The terrorist attacks perpetrated by the Polisario caused casualties among Spanish military personnel and significant material damage. 

When the order to withdraw came at the end of 1975, many officers and soldiers felt that they were betraying the native Sahrawi population with whom they had lived, shared experiences and, in some cases, forged personal ties. However, strictly speaking, the recent resolution passed by the UN Security Council shows that the current solution—autonomy for the Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty—is the one that best serves the interests of the Sahrawi population that concerned those soldiers. If it is any consolation, their concern for the Sahrawi population is now materialising in a real solution that will restore their present and future.

However, those same soldiers have the right to remember, without any benevolence, those who truly caused them suffering: the Polisario Front, which harassed them from its founding in 1973 until they left the territory, inflicting casualties and fatalities among soldiers who, ultimately, were not enemies of the Sahrawis but guardians of a territory that was returning to Morocco. 

Fifty years after the Green March, history has come full circle. Morocco will retain its southern provinces, the native Sahrawis will regain the right to return to their land, and the international community finally recognises the obvious: there is no realistic alternative for the future of this territory other than the broad autonomy that we hope to see developed soon.