The G20 in 2023: a prism of a correlation of forces

The G20 met on 9 and 10 September in New Delhi in a celebratory mood. As the grand host in 2023, India organised the majestic event, which was not without controversy, especially when it became public knowledge - and in a hurry - of the dismantling of shantytowns in the country's capital, at the same time as a dinner of succulent dishes was scheduled for the leaders to be served on luxurious tableware. In the contrasts of an emerging economy, India now ranks fifth in the world in terms of GDP, ousting the United Kingdom from that position, while its GDP per capita is a long way from the top, at 142nd in a list of 196 countries. India undoubtedly embodies the dynamics of rapidly growing economies, seeking their place on a fast-moving international stage. India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi has understood not only that the biggest challenges are global in nature, but also that it is necessary to give a voice to the "Global South".

With this in mind, the Indian government has designed an agenda for the G20 that would provide continuity with the issues discussed at previous summits, but with a strong focus on the global South. Specifically, climate finance, the acceleration of the SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals), technological transformation, inclusive economic growth, as well as emphasising the importance of Multilateral Development Banks, with special emphasis on the need to speed up support for low- and middle-income countries, the most disadvantaged, would be discussed. These are the lines of dialogue that the host presidency would share with its G20 partners, a group whose power is overwhelming, representing 85 per cent of world GDP, two-thirds of the population and 80 per cent of international trade. These figures reflect great power, but also great responsibility, given that these twenty or so members emit 80% of the planet's carbon dioxide.

It should not be forgotten that the G20 lacks ideological uniformity. It is home to democracies, autocracies and even monarchies. This is precisely the richness of the G20, a rebalancing of power that is tinged with different colours where Western hegemony no longer seems to be the guiding principle. It also lacks a permanent secretariat and does not have a founding charter. However, leaders are comfortable with this informal, flexible format, which brings them closer to dialogue and where the role of the rotating presidency is to seek consensus. Those leaders who met in haste in the autumn of 2008 in Washington, summoned by G. Bush to find formulas for cooperation and financial regulation at a time of systemic financial crisis, are today a consolidated group. Thus, after fifteen years, this platform of developed and emerging economies continues to sit at the table on an equal footing, thus illustrating a more accurate picture of the new international dynamics of the 21st century.

This new picture raises the question of what is the G20 demonstrating in 2023? The anchoring of this grouping reveals a correlation of forces characteristic of a new stage in international relations. The G20 summit in New Delhi a few days ago revealed certain limitations on the part of the West, at the same time as the "global South" made some symbolic progress. Suffice it to note that, although the leaders' meeting was proceeding as planned, at the same time, Russia - a G20 member represented by its minister Sergei Lavrov - was sending numerous drones to Kiev. An atmosphere of clear tension that did not overshadow the summit, as India, as host and voice of the South, would not allow the war between Ukraine and Russia to permanently intrude on the sessions. A line that is materialised in the New Delhi Declaration, which agreed to call on all states to refrain from resorting to the threat or use of force to seize territory, without explicitly pointing to Russian military interference. There was no overt condemnation of Russia as the West had wished, thus admitting that the G20 is not the body for resolving this problem. It is, however, capable of discussing and bridging positions to pave the way for a peaceful resolution.

The G7 sees its power eroded in the face of a G20 that is much more representative of the new international economic and political reality. So much so that one of the consequences of the war in Ukraine, the export of grain, is a major concern for Westerners, which has also failed to gain the necessary support. Westerners, especially Europeans, have expressed concern at the G20 that the agreement between Russia and Ukraine to allow grain exports across the Black Sea will be abandoned in July 2023. This situation affects both within and outside Europe, especially the countries of Africa, which are in a state of vulnerability, becoming a food security issue. Turkey, a member of the G20, and the United Nations have worked together to relaunch negotiations between Russia and Ukraine to make it possible to export grain across the sea. Russia is reluctant to negotiate, arguing that it would be necessary for the West to halt the sanctions imposed as a result of the conflict. This seems unlikely to be feasible.

The G20 is trying to avoid condemning a member of the group, but rather to find formulas that are more balanced. This is stated in the declaration. Despite constant complaints from the Europeans about the grain issue, members of the group agreed only to recognise the efforts being made to renegotiate the agreement, underlining the importance of both 'Ukrainian grain' and 'fertilisers and other foodstuffs from Russia'. The consensus has been based on establishing a degree of neutrality, something that has provoked discontent from the Ukrainian government, which had hoped for more forcefulness at the G20. This issue continues to be a point of tension in Europe, as only a few days after the G20 summit, the European Union decided on 15 September 2023 not to renew the existing veto on the import of Ukrainian grain, which would only concern neighbouring countries (Poland, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Bulgaria). This measure was adopted in May 2023, due to complaints from these countries about the alleged "flood of Ukrainian grain" that would harm farmers in these European countries, giving rise to social unrest. The non-extension of the veto has caused unrest, with all countries - with the exception of Bulgaria - announcing that they would unilaterally extend the restrictions. These are complex circumstances for the EU, which has a common trade policy with shared rules.

On the issue of climate transition, Westerners once again found little echo for their demands. Although the declaration states that it was agreed to triple renewable energies by 2030, the methods are not stated. Nor is there any mention of oil and gas and their importance in reducing dependence. The statement is rather open-ended, without a defined roadmap, creating some frustration among G7 members, who had already raised - a few months earlier in Japan - the possibility of reaching a compromise within the G20 not to build more coal-fired power plants. This idea is particularly aimed at China, which has recently been engaged in building coal-fired power plants due to restricted access to energy. This displeases rich countries which, while acknowledging having temporarily "reopened" coal plants (France, Germany) in order to generate electricity, have never intended to perpetuate this energy source.

India has been the protagonist in the G20 2023 process, which has generated some symbolic advances for the voice of the South. This was evidenced by the host's insistence on emphasising MDB (Multilateral Development Bank) reform to improve, consolidate and make the MDBs more effective in order to strengthen their operational models, supported by reports outlining recommendations. The declaration notes the importance of this in order to mobilise financing for the development of the most disadvantaged countries. However, the most striking media success of the summit was the insertion of the African Union into the G20. A more symbolic than tangible success, given that the AU has been attending G20 summits for more than a decade. Its 'official' presence in the group does not seem to change the group's modus operandi. It should be recalled that as early as 2010, the Korean presidency felt that more African members needed to be included in the summits, so it was agreed to always invite at least two countries from Africa. However, the New Delhi declaration does not indicate any specificity to this new incorporation, as it states that the subsequent presidencies will be Brazil in 2024 and South Africa in 2025, with a consensus already emerging for the US to organise the summit again in 2026, thus restarting the rotation of presidencies that the Americans began in 2008. Neither the European Union (an initial member of the G20) nor the African Union seem to have this privilege. What does the presence of this actor change in practice?

Without a doubt, the voice of the South has been omnipresent in the G20 2023 process. However, the absence of Chinese President Xi Jinping from the annual event is striking. There does not seem to be any official justification or announcement from his government to explain his non-attendance for the first time. Perhaps it is a discourtesy to the host because of looming tensions between China and India over the Beijing government's publication in August 2023 of a map covering territories in the Himalayan region. Or perhaps it is an open expression that the G20 is no longer of interest to Beijing, thus avoiding any possible meeting with President Joe Biden, in a context of political and commercial tension. Hypotheses that try to understand why the leader of the world's second largest economy refrains from participating in the G20 and if he travels to Johannesburg for the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) summit held last month.

The BRICS, which held their fifteenth meeting, welcomed the enlargement of the group to include six new countries. These countries aim to be a counterweight to the West, but lack ideological uniformity. It is worth recalling that the BRICS originally emerged in 2001 thanks to an acronym formulated by private sector economist Jim O'Neill. It is a rare example of diplomacy whose shared value is the clear manifestation that the West is not only responsible for wars and crises, but is incapable of finding solutions to them. This is the side on which Xi Jinping seems to be betting, an enclave where he seems to feel more comfortable and where he intends, perhaps, to erect a new political option.

Ivette Ordóñez Núñez is an analyst of international politics, specialising in global governance, G20 and the EU; she holds a PhD in International Relations from the Complutense University of Madrid.