China and USA seek allies

The pandemic takes up all the space in the newspapers and on the news and it is natural that it does because it directly affects our lives, our economies, the return to school and the very mental health of people who are confined or afraid to go out to dinner and catch planes. In addition to all this, the aforementioned virus is accelerating pre-existing trends that are going to change many things in world geopolitics, such as the demystification of globalisation, the (induced) crisis of multilateral organisations such as the World Health Organisation, the rise of China as a result of its success in combating the pandemic and the equivalent loss of American influence, which has not only deprived the world of the leadership to which we have become accustomed since 1945 but has also managed the current health emergency very badly.
Jealousy and mistrust between Chinese and Americans have not ceased to grow, based on reciprocal and sometimes unfounded accusations, and there is nothing to suggest that things will change after the November elections in the US or next year's Congress in China. In China the United States is thought to be sickly intent on preventing its development, and in Washington the rise of China is believed to be a strategic danger of an existential nature. If these ideas continue to grow, they will lead us into a major conflict between two nuclear powers and this is of no interest to anyone.
And since the economies of both superpowers are closely linked, it seems more likely that the new Cold War that is approaching will focus on issues of armaments and cutting-edge technology, where American dominance remains overwhelming, while unhealthy but fluid relations continue in other areas such as politics and trade. At least when the virus is brought under control. Where I believe battles will be fought between Americans and Chinese is in winning allies and here Beijing is moving fast, particularly in the Middle East.
While the US sponsors the strategic rapprochement between Israel and the Emirates with the aim of shaping a common front against the fears aroused by the Islamic Republic of Iran's regional ambitions, some Gulf monarchies such as the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain are taking advantage of the occasion to approach it with a $400 billion macro agreement that offers clear advantages to both sides. For Iran, because it brings it out of its isolation and gives it a major injection of capital and technology in a period of very weak cows owing to US sanctions, and for China because it ensures it a gateway to the Middle East and a quarter of a century with abundant, guaranteed and low-priced oil, which is no small thing.
It is an agreement that furthermore gives a foothold to the most intransigent sector of the Iranian political spectrum, which could be left hanging on the brush if Donald Trump loses the presidency in November. It should not be forgotten that it is his radical opposition to the Nuclear Agreement signed in 2016 with the international community that has pushed the radicals beyond a moderate sector (these terms are always relative in Iran) to which the economic hardship stemming from the sanctions regime has left no trump card.
Another issue the Chinese are currently addressing is Afghanistan. While the Americans are negotiating a difficult three-way agreement between themselves, the Taliban and the Kabul government, Beijing has presented itself in Afghanistan by offering a kind of Silk Road adapted to the country's needs with a vast network of infrastructures such as motorways and railways, which also includes an oil pipeline to Central Asia to bring it the gas and oil it needs. And unlike the Americans or, on their modest scale of Europeans, the Chinese do not bother with questions of governance, human rights or criticising the degrading role reserved for women in Afghan society and even less so in the Islamic Emirate that the Taliban wish to impose following the withdrawal of the American soldiers. The irony is that this will be the first government in Afghanistan that is not the result of the imposition of warlords, invasions, coups d'état, etc. state, or foreign intervention... although it will not be democratic either.
Something, however, that is not going well for China is its relationship with India, another giant with a similar volume of population (1.4 billion) and which is under pressure from China on the common border of the Himalayan mountain range (where incidents have been repeated since this summer and have already caused deaths, at least on the Indian side), is leading it to revise its policy of neutrality, which has given it a very significant role in the Non-Aligned Movement since Nehru's time.
Now that the USSR has disappeared and with it the great ideological confrontation of the 20th century and the importance of this movement, India is attempting to maintain a position of neutrality in the face of the growing enmity between China and the USA, endeavouring to avoid being drawn into any of the camps that clash. India is a democracy, the biggest in the world, and this is why it is so keen to be a member of the Western camp, while the growing Hindu nationalism of President Modi and his party, which harasses and violates the rights of the important Muslim minority (which sets it against Pakistan), together with the strong trade links with China, advise it not to break with this country while meeting Washington's demands with measures on TikTok and the penetration of cutting-edge Chinese technology. Bobbin lace that has worked so far but is becoming increasingly difficult.
Rather than signing up to America's policy of "containment" of China, which is characterised by its negative tone of rejection and isolation crystallised in the Quad alliance with Australia and Japan, New Delhi flirts with the idea and lets itself be loved but seems to favour another more nuanced policy that allows it to enjoy the advantages of such a powerful neighbour while trying to moderate its more hostile or bellicose attitudes. In other words, making the best of both sides is an option that is not within Putin's reach, who is being pushed against his will by reality to become the junior partner in a relationship dominated by Beijing and perhaps for this reason is venting his frustrations in Belarus and poisoning political opponents.