COVID-19 and the Middle East

Coronavirus in the Middle East

The COVID-19 pandemic is as much a threat to the human species as we have known since World War II. It does not distinguish between races, religions or income levels and does not stop at that artificial human invention that is borders. Consequently, there is no reason for it to treat the Middle East differently from other regions of the planet, even though there are very different situations there, as the United Arab Emirates and Yemen bear little resemblance to each other.

In general terms and trying to systematize, it could be said that the risks that the coronavirus causes in the Middle East are of three types: health, political and economic. From the health point of view, the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, with a preventive and well-coordinated reaction, are responding better than others because they have more economic muscle and more effective institutions: more hospitals, more doctors and more respirators per capita, and also more money (a $100 billion package) to acquire what they need at any given time to better combat the epidemic. Also, Israel is in better conditions than other countries in the region, although it shows a strong weakness that are the Orthodox Jewish neighborhoods (Kharidis) that constitute 10% of the population, but give 30% of infected. And next to it is the Gaza Strip, which, with one of the highest densities on the planet, could be a time bomb waiting to go off. In this regard, a recent survey shows that the majority (2/3) of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and Jerusalem, with a very poor health infrastructure, are in favour of closer cooperation with Israel to combat COVID-19, as enemies unite in the face of a more powerful adversary. In the Maghreb, too, the rapid and seemingly effective response of Morocco, which has closed borders, isolated cities and imposed strict home confinement, is noteworthy.

The country where the health situation is worst is undoubtedly Iran, which has become one of the epicentres of the spread of the virus due to its close relations with China, despite the fact that its very high death toll probably does not reflect the true magnitude of the problem. Tehran has asked for a credit of 5 billion dollars from the IMF, receives tons of aid from the WHO and has worthily rejected the offer of the United States, which has not relaxed its policy of sanctions despite the pandemic. It was worrying that Iranians were fleeing to Afghanistan (Herat region), which had no capacity to combat the pandemic and could become another focus of dissemination. Other places where the situation could get out of control are countries at war like Syria (think of the terrible situation in Idlib or the existence of three administrations - governmental, Turkish and Kurdish - that do not talk to each other), Libya or Yemen, and the overcrowded refugee camps that host millions of people who have lost everything but their lives. They are undoubtedly among the most vulnerable in the world.

From a political point of view, the COVID-19 has an impact on several levels: firstly, the epidemic makes strange bedfellows, such as the one already mentioned of the rapprochement of Israelis and Palestinians with the common enemy; it can further undermine the legitimacy of regimes that are not very transparent and that are also incapable of responding effectively to this calamity; a wave of repression can also be unleashed if protest demonstrations take place in these countries that endanger their stability. It would not be the first time, as you know in Iraq, Lebanon or Iran. In the case of Algeria, the peaceful Friday demonstrations (Hirak), which have been calling for democracy for a year, have been suspended because of the COVID-19 and this gives President Tebboune a break, which he needs very much.

Daesh shows signs of some activity a year after the physical destruction of his last bastion in Baghuz and five months after the death of his self-proclaimed caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The latest issue of his magazine Al-Naba calls for increased attacks on “crusader nations” taking advantage of their occupation with the pandemic, as shown by the withdrawal of French and British soldiers and the drastic reduction in activity by the American contingent from the Ain al-Asad base. Their resurrection at this time would be very bad news.

Iran deserves special mention because the political consequences could be greater there too: Foreign Minister Javad Zarif has called the epidemic an example of “American economic terrorism” and blames the sanctions for the difficulties the Islamic Republic has in combating the virus.

The U.S. has not taken this accusation lightly and, in what they call a “policy of maximum pressure”, has reacted by sending another aircraft carrier to the Gulf (the Roosevelt, which has had to rush back to Guam because of numerous cases of coronavirus infection on board), and has also deployed Patriot missiles to defend its bases in Iraq. The U.S. fears that the Iranian regime is seeking “distractions” for an outraged population that has lost confidence in what its leaders are telling it after the disastrous management of the downing of Ukranian Airlines Flight 752. This is a serious credibility problem that adds to the many others the country already has. And, on the other hand, neither can we trust the promptness of a man like Donald Trump, who is mishandling the coronavirus crisis in his own country and who has an unexpected rival in Joe Biden for the elections of next November 3, in which the economic recession that is upon us will undoubtedly play an important role. And it is well known that a nervous president is unpredictable, especially if he is the current tenant of the White House.

On the third level, the economic one, the low commercial activity, the fall of imports from China, the decrease of activity in Europe, the increase of unemployment, the global recession... will affect us all, although in a different way. We are facing a huge crisis that is both supply and demand and no one is spared from it. The dispute between Russia and Saudi Arabia, which has caused oil prices to plummet at this inopportune time, is doing a lot of damage to producers like Libya, Iran or Iraq, who need it at a much higher price than the current one to balance their accounts. But it also hurts others like Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman, even though they have greater defenses. Iraq will have a hard time because it has a $40 billion budget deficit and was planning to cover 95% of its $100 billion budget this year with oil sales (at no less than $56 per barrel). Saudi Arabia itself will have to draw on its reserves and postpone the partial privatization of ARAMCO and Plan 2030, which is Mohamed bin Salman's flagship project to diversify the economy and make it less dependent on oil. Between COVID-19 and the low price of oil, all the Gulf countries will have difficulty finding investors to inject liquidity and relieve their debt.

On the other hand, the decline in tourism will greatly affect Morocco and Tunisia, but also Egypt and the powerful Gulf airlines (Emirates, Etihad, Qatar); likewise, the drop in exports to China and Europe will damage fiscal balances and increase the debt and public deficits of almost all countries. But, apart from the financial muscle of each country, and each one is different, in this there will be no difference between the passes of the Middle East and those of the rest of the world. In a globalised economy, we will all suffer, and suffer more the longer the health emergency lasts. It is therefore very important to always bear in mind that we are all in this together and that it is not worth overcoming the epidemic in one place, because nobody will really be safe until we defeat it everywhere.