Putin's calculation

Vladimir Putin

Herodotus has told us history "so that time does not erase the memory of human deeds and great undertakings" and when he refers to the Persian invasion of Greece he goes further and in an exercise of imagination, novel as everything he does, he also asks what would have happened if the Persians had won at Salamis. It is an interesting exercise.

This comes in the light of the current situation facing Putin in Ukraine and what would happen if Putin is not mistaken in his risky geopolitical gamble. The Western version is that if he invades he will face international ostracism and also face the toughest sanctions to date for subverting the international order and the European security architecture by bringing war to the heart of our continent. Sanctions that would not only affect its leaders and key industrial, energy and banking sectors, but would effectively cut Russia off from the international financial system that is dominated by the US dollar. This would be a major blow that would have a direct negative impact on Russia's economy and the living standards of its citizens, with possible consequences for its domestic policy.

But Vladimir Putin is an intelligent man and should not be underestimated. He lived through the fall of the Wall and the subsequent demise of the Soviet Union in Berlin as a KGB agent, which left him traumatised, and he is determined to regain for Russia the global influence that the USSR once had. As a good nationalist, the first thing he needs is more territory, even though Russia is already the largest country in the world, territory that will give him strategic depth and security and allow him to establish a zone of influence around his own borders, which is precisely what Ukraine offers him, and that is why he cannot accept its rapprochement with the European Union, let alone NATO. Because just as the United States did not accept Russian missiles in Cuba, it does not want American missiles on its border.

And if he has to pay a price, he seems willing to do so if he thinks he can win in the end. Can he really?

We could analyse that possibility, as Herodotus did with Salamis.

First, its overwhelming military and cyber superiority guarantees it success in war. Russia can conquer Ukraine and reach Kiev in a few days to annex the country, as it did Crimea, or to install a pro-Russian government there in the style of the one it already has with Lukashenko in Belarus. Its military success is guaranteed in advance because the US and NATO have already said they will not intervene militarily. It would be a quick victory, similar to the one Bush had in Iraq in 2003. And, as happened there to the Americans, it is very likely that the Russians would then face resistance to the occupation in Ukraine with guerrilla warfare, attacks, citizen disobedience and instability that would take time and wear and tear to overcome. But which they would eventually succeed in crushing.

Second, Russia would have to face the tough sanctions we threaten it with. Those imposed for the annexation of Crimea it seems able to withstand and the population supports it. These would be much worse, but with disinformation, as he already does, and by titillating the ever-simmering Russian nationalism, Putin may think he can ride them out. It is a question of holding out for a while, and for that he has reserves of 600 billion dollars that give him a security cushion for a few years.

Third, Russian gas exports to Europe would be compromised, the Nord-Stream 2 pipeline would not be operational, and Moscow needs to sell gas and oil for food. It would therefore have to look for other buyers, and the only one that comes to mind is China, with which it has just signed another gas sales agreement and for the construction of another pipeline that will take a couple of years to complete. But Putin may also think that Europe needs Russian gas, which is abundant, safer and much cheaper than the liquefied gas it can receive from the US and Qatar, and that Europe will soon turn its eyes to Russia and buy its gas again. Because the pockets of its citizens, unhappy with their electricity bills and unwilling to stay cold at home, will demand it.

Fourthly, Putin must also be thinking that if the West is turning a blind eye to him, it will force him into the arms of China, which is not in Washington's or Brussels' interest - and which Moscow does not really want either. The rapprochement between the two authoritarian capitalisms, staged a few days ago at the Beijing Games, is bad news for democratic liberalism, which is already in decline in the world. And China might be interested in such a rapprochement, even if it were temporary, because there are objective reasons that make it difficult, since the worsening of the situation in Europe is preventing the desired "turn towards Asia" in US policy, and this would leave Beijing with freer hands in the Indo-Pacific.

Finally, it can be assumed that the invasion of Ukraine would dump a wave of refugees on Western Europe that would create many problems for us and make it easier for Moscow to try to foment divisions among Europeans and between us and the Americans, something it has been engaged in for some time now with little success.

The worst thing for Russia would be a revitalisation of NATO and the transatlantic link, but that has already happened and Moscow has long since discounted it.

So Putin may calculate that his ostracism will have an expiry date and that it will come down to gritting his teeth and tightening his belt and waiting for the dust to settle, as it did after Crimea. If he thinks this way, it would be bad news because he will end up invading Ukraine.

Jorge Dezcallar, Ambassador of Spain