A spoke in the wheels

Israel is trying to make it difficult for the United States to return to the Iran nuclear deal. After four years of idyll between Donald Trump and Bibi Netanyahu, everything seems to indicate that, at least apparently, the interests of the United States and Israel are drifting apart with Joe Biden, albeit without exaggeration. This is shown by the recent undisclosed Israeli attack on the Natanz nuclear power plant, in which Washington claims to have had nothing to do with, and which is intended to complicate ongoing negotiations to bring both Iran and the United States back to their obligations under the PIAC (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) signed by the international community to prevent - or at least delay - the eventual nuclearisation of the Islamic Republic.

Israel has never concealed its opposition to this agreement, which Donald Trump unilaterally denounced in 2017 in order to put in place a policy of "maximum pressure" with harsh sanctions that have suffocated the Iranian economy by preventing it from selling oil and isolating it from international financial markets to the point of significantly reducing the standard of living of its citizens. But this has not succeeded in breaking them or making the region safer, as Iran has continued with its missile policy and its interference in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, as well as failing to fulfil its contractual obligations and enriching uranium beyond the permitted limits. And now, after this attack, Iran has informed the US Atomic Energy Agency that it will enrich it to 60%, which violates PIAC and brings it closer to the dreaded bomb that would unleash an arms race across the Middle East, which is something Israel cannot allow because it would jeopardise its own survival as a country in view of Iran's persistent rhetoric against what it disparagingly calls the "Zionist entity". Netanyahu has just recalled these days, after the attack on Natanz, that “In the Middle East, there is no threat that is more serious, more dangerous, more pressing than that posed by the fanatical regime in Iran”. And he said this in front of the US Defence Secretary, who limited himself to reaffirming “enduring and ironclad” American commitment to Israel.

Israel and Iran are not at open war but skirmishes and "incidents" between the two countries are constant. Israel stole half a ton of documents in 2018 that would prove Iran maintains a covert nuclear programme, has damaged the Natanz nuclear power plant last year and again these days (whether with cyberattacks or accomplices on the ground is still unclear), and has assassinated Iran's top nuclear scientists, most recently Mohsen Fakhrizadeh last November. The port of Bandar Abbas itself was cyber-attacked, rendering it inoperative for weeks. Bombings of Iranian military installations in Syria and Iran are also constant, and earlier this month explosions of unknown origin hit the ship Saviz, which is anchored in the Red Sea as a permanent observation and intelligence-gathering post. No fewer than a dozen Iranian ships carrying oil and weapons destined for Syria have been attacked by Israel in the past eighteen months. The Iranian response is minor due to lack of capacity, although earlier this year a couple of Israeli ships have also been hit by strange explosions, and last year there was a cyber-attack on Israel's water distribution system. So far there has been some restraint on both sides, although there is nothing to prevent the intensity of the confrontation from escalating at any time.

Recent Israeli attack on the Natanz nuclear power plant affects talks in Vienna to revive PIAC. What is not clear is how. On the one hand, Iran has not responded (for now) to the Israeli provocation, calling it a "stupid act of terrorism", indicating its desire to do nothing to prevent an American return to the agreement and the consequent lifting of sanctions. But on the other hand, it takes pressure off the American negotiators by giving them more time and delays the possibility of Iran getting its hands on the nuclear bomb. This is all positive. But it also makes Iran a victim and makes it harder for Russia or China to pressure Iran to comply with the provisions of the deal, and it also has a negative side by deepening the differences that exist between Republicans and Democrats in the United States on how to deal with the Iranian problem, while strengthening the radicals in Tehran ahead of Iran's June presidential elections because it fuels the sense of injustice among the population and increases their support for nuclearisation. And because, in the end, whatever happens now, the Iranian radicals always win: if there is an agreement, they have not given in to Trump's "maximum pressure"; if there is no agreement, they have always said that the Americans cannot be trusted and that this Israeli attack and the lack of condemnation by the US show that US policy in the Middle East is influenced by Tel Aviv. Not to mention that the lack of an agreement will allow them to increase uranium enrichment, as they are already doing, and that this will bring them closer to the nuclear threshold that North Korea has already crossed.

In any case, European-hosted negotiations in Vienna are very complicated. They are actually indirect contacts between Iranians and Americans and many issues are on the table because Washington wants to build a "stronger and longer" agreement, with additional understandings that close some of the loopholes in the PIAC and extend its so-called "sunset clauses" over time, to allow for constant inspections, to restrict Iran's policy of missile development, which has ever-increasing range, to curb Iran's interference in neighbouring countries, and to further limit Tehran's research and development of nuclear technologies. Washington knows that should Iran get its hands on the bomb, its regime will be as untouchable as Pyongyang's. And Iran knows it too. That is why these are very difficult goals to achieve, especially given the atmosphere of bipartisan non-cooperation in the US and on the eve of elections in Iran. Neither wants to make the first move or project the image of giving in to its rival.

For the moment and despite all this, negotiations continue and, according to Chinese and Iranian sources, in a positive atmosphere, which is a good thing because, should there be no agreement, as Israel admits it wishes, the only way to prevent Tehran from acquiring a nuclear weapon would be war.  And that conflict would not be local.

Jorge Dezcallar, Ambassador of Spain