At the turning point
Joe Biden warned the Americans and the world on 20 October that Hamas's terrorist offensive against Israel placed the international order and US foreign policy at a turning point. The Economist interprets this in its editorial this week: "This moment will define not only Israel and the Middle East, but America and the world" because the turning point, according to the Economist, goes beyond Gaza and the borders of the Middle East.
The war in Ukraine and support for the resistance to Russian aggression, the mobilisation of two aircraft carriers to reinforce Israeli security and that of the region as a whole, and the watchful eye on Taiwan in the face of Chinese threats to increase pressure on the island, project a US strategy diversified on three fronts, revealing a chessboard of confrontation and rivalry where the apparent disorder is less and less uncertain. A series of divergent interests - Iran's to lead the Middle East and Islamist fundamentalism; Russia's to regain dominance in Central and Eastern Europe; and China's to disrupt US superiority in the Asia-Pacific - complement each other through actions of varying magnitude aimed at undermining the Washington-led Western order.
The near-unanimous condemnation of the brutal Hamas attack, and US support for Israel and allied governments in the Arab world to halt the escalation of violence in the region and the rise of radicalism, have reinforced the idea that without the US a regional order is inconceivable. The value of American leadership has not been limited to military support, but diplomatic efforts and the demand for proportionality have given Biden's foreign action greater credibility. The inflection has begun as an active and comprehensive political strategy is projected that must ensure that the Israeli response does not exceed the limits required of any government, even in its right to use force to defend itself against aggression. And, in parallel, American and European leadership must lead to a political process to advance the resolution of the Palestinian conflict, involving the main actors in the Middle East.
Washington and regional governments have experience of navigating the complexity of the region and of being overwhelmed by it. Egypt and Jordan stand firm in their governments, but demand respect for Palestinian civilians and political rights. Saudi Arabia is trying to measure its policy, aware that the turning point referred to by Biden has to be linked to the inflection point in Saudi Arabia's external image, which has improved after long years of Wahhabi influence. Iran, with its anti-Semitic messages and support for Hamas's indiscriminate terrorism, has missed an opportunity to move up a rung in regional influence, while Qatar and Turkey attempt to climb the ladder.
The complexity of the Middle East remains. But it is different from the complexity that existed during the Cold War because, at the moment, there is no alternative to the United States in the region. And it is also different from the complexity that has followed, driven by the presence of jihadist fundamentalism. Netanyahu has in his hand the choice of either moving forward in Gaza and losing international credibility, or fighting Hamas terrorism, but moving forward in political coexistence with the Palestinians and with the main actors in the region.
But the turning point also now lies in building a domestic political climate in the United States that acts from bipartisanship and external engagement in transforming the liberal order rather than weakening or destroying it. One that incorporates traditional and new allies to confront aggressions against global stability and human rights. And also to the deconstructive and radicalised narrative that for more than a decade has undermined liberal values at the social and political heart of democracies.