The conflict in Ukraine: hybrid warfare and conventional military intervention
The war between Russia and Ukraine represents one of the Kremlin's most significant challenges in recent history. Undoubtedly, one of the main objectives of Moscow's power game is to occupy geographical spaces on its western border in order to repel any action that contravenes its geopolitical interests. Russia's use of military and non-military means - whose actions are defined as "hybrid warfare" - become the main strategy to confront any Western advances on its near borders. The analysis of the war in Ukraine must therefore be approached not only from a military perspective, but also from the perspective of communicational strategy, where propaganda and disinformation become useful tools for contemporary tactics. "Hybrid wars" therefore go beyond the military terrain and are complemented by attacks in cyberspace to destabilise governments, such as what happened in Ukraine.
The development of hybrid warfare - in the context of the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine - shows that the use of military force and other means (such as cyber-attacks) disrupts European collective security and contravenes the 'world order' established after the Second World War. In this sense, the use of strategic means contributing to deterrence and disinformation, as well as cyber-attacks, denotes a clear axis of action by Russia to undertake its military projection in Ukraine. Thus, new forms of warfare, beyond the conventional, are becoming the primary link in 21st century conflicts.
Russia's strategic thinking recognises that hybrid warfare is the basis - or the new form - for confronting the adversary to the detriment of its interests, becoming the prime line for expanding military manoeuvre. Undoubtedly, the aim of Russian hybrid warfare implemented in Ukraine, beyond the fusion of conventional and non-conventional means, is to avoid direct military confrontation with the West. If - as Clausewitz mentioned - "war is the continuation of politics by other means", it is noteworthy that these "other means" have been transformed into a digital architecture that contributes to new modalities - such as cyber-attacks - being the tools of choice today. Similarly, economic and financial sanctions are part of a new modality of hybrid warfare, creating counterweights to Moscow's objectives in Eastern Europe, particularly in Ukraine.
To understand the reality of the ongoing crisis between Ukraine and Russia over the past few years, one must first analyse the concept of 'hybrid warfare'. According to this concept, Russia intervenes in Ukraine through two types of forces: on the one hand, through unconventional armed groups (the spy service) and, on the other hand, through military forces. The popularisation of the term "hybrid warfare" can be attributed to US military theorist Frank Hoffman, who in his famous work "Conflict in the 21st Century" made an attempt to conceptualise the evolution of the battlefield environment that transcends the commonly accepted linear division between regular and irregular types of warfare. As Ofer Fridman explains in his book "Russian 'Hybrid Warfare': Resurgence and Politicisation", in his original interpretation, hybrid warfare was a tactical-operational concept aimed at improving the performance of military units in the complex battlefield environment of the 21st century.
Over time, however, this theory was reconceptualised, encompassing additional dimensions to those contemplated in the original concept. The first comprehensive attempt to reconceptualise hybrid warfare was made by NATO in its 2010 "Bi-Strategic Command Capstone Concept", which stated that "hybrid threats are those posed by adversaries with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means in an adaptive manner in pursuit of their objectives". Additionally, this document noted that "hybrid threats are composed of and operate across multiple systems/subsystems (including economic/financial, legal, political, social and military/security) simultaneously".
It is therefore striking that hybrid warfare, with the adoption of new forms of warfare and a series of actions to destabilise a country, shows a Russian strategy capable of deterring any Western country from intervening and becoming directly involved in the war in Ukraine. In that sense, the Gerasimov Doctrine underpins the concept of hybrid warfare applied by Russia and shows a very particular strategic vision. The operational concept is developed through what Makotczenko refers to as "the adoption of military and non-military measures". On the one hand, military measures are the same as those applied in conventional warfare, based on a nation's relative combat power. On the other hand, non-military measures are shown operationally through actions in the form of coalition and coalition building, political and diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, economic blockade, cessation of diplomatic relations, and seeking media support, among others. However, the greatest criticism comes from those who fear that hybrid warfare risks losing its explanatory value as it has been popularised to understand Russia's interventions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, arguing that it is simply the embodiment of the Gerasimov Doctrine or that Moscow has adopted the precepts of hybrid warfare.
Contextualising the way in which the conflict in Ukraine has evolved highlights those war scenarios that were not immediately envisaged. Vladimir Putin's government's discourse that an attack on Ukraine was not possible was, however, the tactic for launching one of the most risky geopolitical strategies of post-Cold War Europe. The launch of offensive operations on 24 February 2022 highlighted the Kremlin's intention to continue to maintain its sphere of influence in the heart of the European continent, to the detriment of any conception of sovereignty and territorial integrity. In this way, hybrid warfare was accompanied by military intervention, considering - finally - that the traditional military strategy is the one that allows it to gain ground. In this sense, missile attacks on Ukrainian military installations, electronic warfare and disinformation made aggression the way to demonstrate Russia's real power in Ukraine.
President Putin's imperial vision, in his quest to revive Russia as a global power, encouraged the use of classical geopolitics. Russia's war moves show Moscow's desire for Ukraine to remain a buffer state to prevent NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe and its borders. However, despite Ukraine's aspirations, it was the United States that rejected Ukraine's NATO membership at the time, precisely because of its lack of interest both in stopping the ongoing hybrid war and in getting involved in Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, as Russian troops began their offensive actions in the early hours of 24 February, cyber-attacks were simultaneously launched against Ukraine, damaging important government websites, including those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Infrastructure and others.
According to Mason Clark, an analyst at the Institute for the Study of War, "Russia sees itself as waging an ongoing hybrid war against the United States and is shaping its military and non-military tools of state power to win this war". In September 2020, Clark stated that the Russian military was actively focusing on preparing to increase its capabilities to win hybrid wars in future conflicts.
However, both opposing sides have their own hybrid warfare tactics. On the one hand, since early February 2022, there has been evidence of Russian cyber attacks against the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence and two of Ukraine's largest credit institutions, PrivatBank and Oschadbank. Also, on 21 February 2022, President Putin recognised the two self-proclaimed Independent Republics of the Dombash region, Donetsk and Luhansk. In addition, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz suspended the authorisation of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, echoing the sanctions imposed by Western countries against Russia. In the same context, US President Joe Biden was presented with options to define technological blocking measures against Russia (such as blocking internet connection, cutting electricity supply and collapsing the railway system, among others), while it was announced that the G7 had agreed on "devastating sanctions packages" against Russia. In addition, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson ordered the exclusion of Russian banks from his country's banking system, thus affecting Russia's procurement of sovereign debt on the British market. Similarly, the United States, the European Union and Canada decided to close their airspace to commercial flights from Russia, so Moscow did not lag behind and, by reciprocity, applied the same measure.
Even so, it is not ruled out that more conventional military methods, such as bombing and intervention in Ukraine, could be used in the hybrid war. In this regard, on 28 February 2022, the Russian Defence Ministry announced victories in the Crimea and Dombash axes, as well as claimed that Russia had achieved air superiority over Ukraine, reinforcing misleading perceptions of an easy military operation in Ukraine for the Russian public. Russian state television channels claimed that the Russian military could no longer retreat, especially after gaining control of Ukrainian airspace, which has been misleading and has shown the information narrative for future Russian escalations in Ukraine. In addition to Russia's military tactics, the Kremlin largely froze currency trading and raised interest rates to halt the free fall of the rouble, which - as of 28 February - had already fallen 30% against the dollar. Meanwhile, the US and its European allies imposed new sanctions against Russia's central bank, strangling its ability to prop up the rouble. Tax havens Switzerland and Monaco joined the EU sanctions, breaking the Swiss tradition of neutrality.
In the UN framework, on 2 March 2022, the General Assembly approved the condemnation of Russia and called for a cessation of hostilities against Ukraine. The resolution was endorsed by 141 of the organisation's 193 member states, in accordance with territorial integrity and the humanitarian effects the war is having on Ukrainians. Days earlier, on 26 February 2022, Finland and Sweden had expressed their sovereign right to decide to join NATO, despite Russia's threats. This announcement provoked the annoyance of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who warned that Finnish or Swedish membership of NATO "would have serious military and political repercussions". Indeed, the convergence of factors in the current hybrid war, from Russian deterrence to Western economic sanctions, has serious implications and disrupts the 'world order' established after the Second World War.
The creation of NATO in 1949 implied the establishment of a military and political link between the United States and Western Europe, whose vital spaces were defined to repel any influence from Moscow on the European continent. In this sense, NATO's extensive security ring - close to Russia's borders - generates great frictions for the Kremlin, considering that in the 1990s NATO had 16 members, while now it has 30. It is evident that the escalation of the armed conflict in Ukraine and the involvement of the main international actors generate a distortion or, at least, a shift in the established 'world order'.
In this respect, Argentine political scientist Natalia Peritore argues that before delving into the issue, it is first necessary to define the concept of "world order". In this sense, it could be said that the "world order" is a set of rules of the game, principles and institutions agreed between the dominant powers, which govern relations between the different actors on the international stage. In formal terms, Russia - by invading Ukraine - violated international norms. However, has Russia been the only state to do so in recent decades? The answer is certainly no, with the United States being a clear example. Therefore, the supposed legal equality of (sovereign and independent) states often turns out to be a fiction. So, would it be necessary to change the rules of the established world order? Undoubtedly, in the event of an eventual Russian victory, alarm bells would go off with respect to the structure that has governed the world since the end of the Second World War.
However, in these circumstances, what would be the cost of a Russian victory? In this highly globalised and interdependent world, being considered a 'pariah' (acting outside international norms of behaviour) would not be a viable option for Russia. In this context, some analysts argue that the People's Republic of China (PRC) could 'win' from this contest by strengthening its relationship with Russia, given the strong economic sanctions imposed on Moscow. However, it must be understood that the PRC is not in a comfortable position, as its economic interests outweigh its relationship with Russia. This is where European states come into play, given the significant weight of their trade relationship with China. It is these same states that should also analyse their security architecture with and without the United States, which for some years now has been focusing intensively on the Asia-Pacific region.
In this regard, Irma Argüello, president of the NPSGlobal Foundation, argues that the real global contest is between East and West, but she believes that the actor representing the East is the PRC. China is an actor that must be taken into account, because it seeks global expansion by other means. The PRC's expansionism is at odds with Russian military expansionism, as evidenced by China's abstention from voting in the Security Council and the UN General Assembly. The PRC has realised that it is not in its interest to go down the path of war, but rather economic expansionism. So, even if it cannot be shown concretely, this situation represents a certain rift with the East, at least with President Putin's decision to invade Ukraine.
The Russian-Ukrainian conflict brings together multiple aspects that involve relevant actors in international relations, thus generating counterweights in international public opinion. For the past eight years, Russia has been blaming Ukraine for the outcome of this situation through a mixture of fake news and historical revisionism of the former Soviet Union. The Russian narrative justifies its actions due to the alleged Ukrainian genocide in the Dombas and NATO's constant advance on Moscow. These facts have served as a pretext for President Putin to justify an invasion of Ukraine in 'self-defence'.
The Russian president claims that Ukraine is an inseparable part of Russia. Therefore, he does not care what the majority of Ukrainians think, as the only thing that matters is Russia's greatness and its place in the world. However, President Putin's goal transcends Ukraine. His war is aimed at the entire European system, which is based on the inviolability of borders. With his attempt to redraw the map by force, Putin aims to reverse the European project and re-establish Russia as the leading power, at least in Eastern Europe. The aim is to erase the humiliations of the 1990s and make Russia a global power again, on a par with the US and the PRC.
In addition to the geopolitical, military and economic actions surrounding the conflict in Ukraine, it is worth highlighting the way in which the communication strategy is capturing the world's attention. The war of disinformation has become one of the main objectives of the conflict. The game of hybrid warfare and the implementation of powerful linguistics denote a character that is sometimes not subjective, but rather appeals to the power of conquest that Russia has been yearning for. On 21 February 2022, the Russian president claimed that Ukraine was a 'failed state', blaming Ukrainian nationalism for the country's problems. Subsequently, on 24 February 2022, Putin ordered the start of offensive operations by Russian military forces against Ukraine, bringing about the largest invasion in post-war European history. According to the Russian president, the official aim of the attack is to 'denazify' Ukraine and stop the 'ongoing genocide of Russian speakers' in the country.
Moreover, the announcement that Russia's strategic nuclear forces would be raised to a higher alert status was a clear attempt to deter direct Western military action. But while politicians are right to take nuclear escalation seriously, they should not discount the risks of conventional war between NATO and Russia. Indeed, if the economic damage in Russia becomes severe enough, Putin may decide it is worth retaliating through non-military means, such as cyber attacks. Likewise, the Russian president might appreciate that things are bad enough that it is worth forgoing energy revenues and shutting down some pipelines to Europe, which would drive up energy prices.
Presumably, Russia would use these actions to gain leverage over Western policy, but cyber attacks could easily backfire, triggering consultations under article 5 of NATO's founding treaty, which states that an attack on one member state will be considered an attack on all of them. This could lead to retaliatory cyber attacks against Russia and an escalation of tension. However, public opinion in the United States sees cyber attacks as a very different means than conventional warfare. Thus, one might predict that the United States and European countries involved in the Ukrainian conflict would resist some level of damage caused by a Russian cyberattack, thus removing the possibility of a direct conventional confrontation.
The war in Ukraine disrupts the stability not only of Europe, but also of the 'world order' established after World War II. On the one hand, the use of strategies in the context of hybrid warfare shows forms of non-linear warfare, through the use of military forces on conventional battlefields, as well as the use of the other instruments of Russian national power in different geopolitical arenas, through the Gerasimov Doctrine. On the other hand, Western sanctions against Russia become a counterbalancing tool - through non-military power - to prevent the achievement of Russia's strategic objectives.
The military, economic, technological and diplomatic challenges faced by the United States, the European Union and NATO - during the Ukrainian conflict - are disrupting the Western status quo in the face of unconventional wars, which are becoming more competitive and in which cyber-warfare is becoming a stepping stone to military offensives. In this sense, the implementation of military and non-military strategies is a game that Moscow has adapted to maintain its power and influence on its near borders. Disinformation is the Kremlin's main tool to justify its expansion in conventional military terms in Ukraine. However, on all other fronts (political, economic, financial, media, digital, cultural, among others) it has become a global war implemented by Russia after its intervention in Ukraine, the effects of which are being felt in all fields of human activity.
Josías David Valle Guerrero
Internationalist. Master's degree in International Studies from the Institute of International Studies of the University of Chile. Graduate in International Relations from the Catholic University of Honduras "Nuestra Señora Reina de la Paz". Studied Diplomacy and International Relations at the Diplomatic Academy of Peru, "Javier Pérez de Cuellar".
This article was originally published in the journal Seguridad y Poder Terrestre.
Vol. 1 N.° 1 (2022): Julio – Setiembre
DOI: https://doi.org/10.56221/spt.v1i1.7