A look at Syria
HTS forces advanced, encountering very little resistance from the Syrian army and security forces, who quickly retreated, abandoning their positions in large numbers.
In early December, the HTS-led onslaught was joined by militant groups from southern Daraa, who captured Daraa and Suwayda provinces and advanced north towards Damascus. On 8 December 2014, the Al-Jolani group and its allied groups entered Damascus and announced that they had overthrown the Al-Assad government, who fled the country to seek exile in Russia.
Almost four months after the events described in the previous paragraphs, the arrival in power of a group with links to al-Qaeda in a country as important as Syria in the geopolitical landscape, and the uproar and fear it aroused in the initial moments, seems to have become a matter of little or no importance.
After Al-Assad's flight, the HTS unilaterally proclaimed itself in command of the country, and its leader, Ahmed Al-Sharaa, suspended the Constitution and announced himself to the world as the new president of the country.
After the initial shock, news relating to Syria disappeared from the front page until a little over a week ago, when reports began to arrive about the repression of the country's Christian minority, something which, although it was one of the main causes for concern after the arrival in power of a group formerly affiliated to al-Qaeda, once the fears materialised we cannot say that their actions caused too much consternation.
But what has happened in Syria since the end of last year?
Shortly after capturing Damascus, HTS began to extend its military control over territory previously held by the Al-Assad government. One of the first measures was the formation of a provisional government composed exclusively of the HTS Salvation Government, which was established in 2017 as a de facto government in Idlib. It also began replacing most of the executive and judicial officials at the national and local levels, as well as the army, police and security forces, with all positions being filled exclusively by HTS officials, militants and jurists. This measure, in itself, should have served as an indicator of what has come before and what is to come, as it is signalling the radical Islamic ideology that is going to become the basis, not only of the Government, but of the life of Syrian society, with all that this entails.
In an attempt to emulate the style of government previously implemented in Idlib, the HTS leaders have assigned government posts to their members based on their links and loyalty to Al-Sharaa and his inner circle. In this way, the HTS has begun to replace the business networks of the former Al-Assad regime with its own. It is clear to everyone that, among many other things, now is the time to repay favours and loyalties, with all that this entails.
In an interview with the Saudi news channel Al-Arabiya on 30 December 2024, Al-Sharaa stated that the organisation of elections in Syria might not be possible in 2028, while the drafting of a new constitution could be delayed until 2027. In response to criticism that the new government is composed exclusively of HTS members, Al-Sharaa stated that uniformity in appointments was necessary to ensure consistency during this critical phase.
On 29 January, Al-Sharaa announced himself to the world as the new president of the Syrian Republic, reporting the annulment of the current constitution and the dissolution of political parties. He also stated that he would form and lead a constitutional committee charged with initiating the drafting of a new constitution. In an interview with Syria TV on 3 February, Al-Sharaa stated that it was unlikely that popular elections would be held before 2030, thus hinting at his intention to maintain control of the state leadership for at least half a decade. This only goes to show that the intention is not to relinquish power and to try to have enough time to establish and consolidate an Islamic regime.
On 12 February, Al-Sharaa formed a seven-member committee charged with organising a national conference in Damascus. The conference was organised less than two weeks later, on 25 February, and welcomed attendees personally selected by the HTS committee, while excluding numerous representatives of other political and religious minorities, as well as Kurdish and QSD (Syrian Democratic Forces) leaders, who were not invited. The real objective of the conference was none other than to legitimise his presidency, and during the conference a constitutional committee was appointed to draft a provisional constitution. Al-Sharaa also announced that he would appoint a 100-member legislative body until new elections could be held.
Quite a few analysts agree that political factors in Syria almost certainly contribute to the very high risk that the HTS government will face an escalation of political instability leading to a disorderly collapse of the government, fragmentation of state power and a forced transfer of power, which will almost certainly cause social unrest and violence in the short and medium term.
The long-term objectives of the HTS are focused on consolidating and monopolising the group's dominance over the Syrian government. To ensure success, Al-Sharaa will try to consolidate its control over the direction of the state at all costs, while attempting to project the appearance of a normal and democratic political process leading to the formation of a new government and a new transitional constitution. However, the exclusive and arbitrary way in which the HTS has been directing this political process since December 2024 makes it very unlikely that the process can be considered legitimate or pluralistic, especially for Syria's minority communities or those closest to the former Al-Assad regime. In fact, since February, what can be considered as revenge operations, if not ethnic or religious cleansing, have been observed against both groups.
At the beginning of that month, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported various actions against alleged loyalists of the former regime, counting at least 218 deaths in various areas of the country during the first month of the year.
Likewise, at the beginning of March, various massacres of members of the Alawite community in Latakia, Tartus, Hama and Homs were also confirmed. Various sources reported a figure of close to 1,700. Although the interim president, Ahmed Al-Sharaa, denied the new government's responsibility in these attacks and promised to hold those responsible for the shedding of civilian blood to account, there is little doubt as to who was behind these events. Added to this is the murder of a religious leader, Sheikh Shaaban Mansour and his son, on 7 March, in Salhab, Hama province. Again, the perpetrators are believed to be government security forces. There have also been reports of multiple massacres in Baniyas and other locations, where the SOHR reported the deaths of at least 162 civilians, including an unspecified number in Baniyas.
Although the available sources focus on the attacks against the Alawite community, it is a fact that the Christian communities are also being subjected to the repression of the new jihadist-style government. In Maaloula, a Christian-majority town known for preserving the Aramaic language, its residents have reported harassment, looting and vandalism. In total, so far, an estimated 7,000 Alawites and Christians have been killed in the wave of sectarian violence that broke out between February and March.
It is important to emphasise that the instability and the feeling of widespread conflict create a risky environment for all minorities, and the lack of specific reports does not necessarily imply the total absence of isolated incidents or potential threats. The situation is really serious, and one of the main problems is the difficulty of accessing reliable information. However, the reality is that it seems that what many feared, that Syria would follow a path parallel to that of Taliban Afghanistan, is beginning to become a reality.
In a gradual, silent way, taking advantage of the international geopolitical context, where the focus of attention is on other scenarios, the HTS is taking steps in a direction that does not bode well. A Syria with an increasingly radicalised government could lead to a new failed state, causing new mass migratory flows which, in the current situation, would cause very serious destabilisation in the European Union, as this would be the desired destination for all those trying to leave the country. On the other hand, powers such as Turkey, with enormous interests, including territorial interests in Syria, will not miss the opportunity to take advantage of the new government's weakness, thus contributing to increased instability.
Once again, what is happening in a key scenario for the EU is being overshadowed by events which, despite their relevance and seriousness, should not distract our attention from the southern Mediterranean, where Europe's future will truly be at stake.