Drones in Ukraine

On 16 July, White House security adviser Jake Sullivan told a press conference that the US has information indicating that Iran will supply several hundred UAVs to Russia. He specifically mentioned the "Shaded-129" and "Shaded-191" models, both of which are capable of attacking ground targets. In particular, the 129 model is similar in size, weight and appearance to the RQ-170 Sentinel, (in 2011 a Sentinel was shot down by Iran and the knowledge gained from its wreckage was used for that development) and is the most capable model of what Iran has in service.

The information provided was supported by a visit by a Russian delegation to the Kashan airfield south of Tehran, where the IRGC (the Revolutionary Guards) operate the Sentinel systems. At least two visits are believed to have taken place during which various demonstrations were carried out. If the intention to supply/acquire UAVs is confirmed, this would be of great significance not only for the capabilities it would bring to the Russian forces, but also for what can be discerned from this move. However, it is not yet clear, should it materialise, whether it is a request from Moscow or an offer from Iran. And this detail is very important, as the implications are different in one case or the other.

First, the poor performance of Russian-made UAVs in the Ukrainian conflict is an established fact. The most commonly used model has been the Orlan 10 for intelligence gathering. A large number of them have been shot down or have fallen to the ground due to various failures. 

At the beginning of the invasion, estimates indicated that Russia had approximately 1,000 of these aircraft in service. Russia's current ability to replace those lost is not known, but on 19 July President Putin himself, in an unusual statement, said that Russia was facing a difficult time due to the difficulty of access to technology products. This difficulty will undoubtedly sooner or later affect Russia's ability to produce new UAVs or to make up for the losses it has suffered. 

Russia's use of other UAVs can be considered almost testimonial, limited almost entirely to what are known as 'suicide drones'. The study of those that have either failed to reach their target or have not worked properly has revealed the low quality of their components and the use of obsolete technology.

Currently, the main headache for Russia is the HIMARS and M270 MLRS rocket launchers. These platforms operate at a great distance from the front line, are highly mobile and can move in and out of position very quickly, which makes it difficult or almost impossible for them to be hit by counter-battery fire. 

The best option would be to locate them and beat them from air platforms, which is practically impossible to do with conventional aircraft. Ukrainian air defence has proven to be very effective and the combat zone in depth is infested with MANPADS (man-portable air defence systems). Added to this is the shortage of precision-guided munitions, which forces aircraft to use conventional ammunition, forcing them to get much closer to the target and with a flight profile that makes them even more vulnerable to anti-aircraft missiles.

This leaves the use of UAVs as a more suitable option, both for ISR (intelligence gathering) and attack. But the situation of the Russian armed forces in this regard has already been described.

The addition of such Iranian UAVs would provide Russia with a capability it does not currently have and the opportunity to increase its options to defeat the systems that have recently been doing so much damage to its logistical and command and control deployment.

At the same time, they would allow Russia to engage targets at depth without the need to put at risk aircraft such as the SU-34 and SU-35, which remain a critical asset.

All of the above could support the possibility that it was Russia that requested the supply of these devices from Iran. 

If this were the case, what would be the main implications?

• Russia's inability to upgrade its UAVs or even to replace lost ones would be confirmed. This means that, while the economic sanctions are not being effective, those affecting the import of technological components are having a significant impact. This makes perfect sense.
• Turning to Iran may also mean that the Chinese option is out of the question. China would have refused to supply devices or components for their manufacture. This would confirm that China is still not getting involved in the conflict. China is all about economics and maintaining its trade relations, and supporting Russia in such an explicit way would be counterproductive to its interests, which are mainly focused on the Asia-Pacific area.
• Both Russia and Iran are competitors in the oil market under sanctions, whose market is mainly focused on Southeast Asia, including China, India and Pakistan. Russia may be taking the opportunity to try to create a common front in which both countries benefit rather than competing for customers for their oil.
• Such a move would put Iran back in the crosshairs of the US and Europe and risk further sanctions. Even negotiations on the nuclear issue could be jeopardised. This would increase instability and tension in the region, force the West to turn its attention to one more scenario and have an impact on oil prices. It is in Russia's interest for the price of oil to rise as much as possible for two reasons: the higher the price, the more profit, and the higher the price, the more problems for Europe. Any move that helps to increase the consequences of the energy crisis in Europe and puts European economies in check will be exploited by Russia. It can be argued that the war is already being fought mainly on the economic level and not on the battlefield. 
• As part of the attempt to create instability, Israel cannot be left out. If negotiations on the nuclear issue fail, it is very likely that Israel will intervene on its own, at the very least causing discomfort for its new partners under the Abraham Accords. And again, such a scenario would have an impact on oil prices.

But what if it was Iran that offered Russia its UAVs?

• For Iran, using its UAVs on a large scale in Ukraine would be an opportunity to show the muscle and capability of its military industry, as well as a good way to send a message to the US about their effectiveness, for example against its ships.
• This would help it find customers for its developments.
• This move, or rather the hint of it, could be intended to provoke a US reaction and Iran to try to get better terms in negotiations in exchange for withdrawing its offer of aid.
• Similarly, Iran could use this as a bargaining chip so that in return for not going ahead, the US would lower its intentions to return to supporting Saudi Arabia (the possibility of withdrawing the embargo on the sale of offensive weapons has been mentioned).

Notwithstanding the above, and assuming that getting hold of Iranian drones is better than nothing, they will not be decisive in the conflict by themselves, just as the Turkish-made drones used by Ukraine have not been decisive in the conflict, although they have played an important role. Having the option of eliminating Ukraine's main fire support asset is very important, but Russia will still not be able to solve its main problem: the difficulty of recruiting enough troops to rotate the units on the frontline, cover the casualties it is suffering, sustain further operations and hold the occupied territory. We cannot fall into the "miracle weapons" trap. It would be short-sighted to rely on the resolution of the conflict on a particular type of system, no matter how impressive it may be.

The fact that the US has rushed to announce the possible agreement between Russia and Iran is indicative of an attempt to pre-empt events and abort the operation. Although it has never been made clear who has taken the initiative, in the light of events everything seems to point to Russia, which makes for a very interesting scenario. We will have to keep an eye on US moves to thwart the operation against the backdrop of the nuclear deal.