Myanmar, dissecting a conflict

Burma gained independence in 1948. Between 1962 and 2011, the country was ruled by a military junta that ruled with an iron fist. After that long period, a timid and gradual process of democratisation began, culminating in the election of Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi in November 2015. On 8 November 2020 she won a new victory in an election that she won with an eighty percent majority, an election that was deemed free and fair, despite the fact that more than a million members of ethnic minorities were unable to vote due to security concerns. However, the Myanmar Army (also known as the Tatmadaw) did not accept the results of the elections, even though they had been confirmed by the country's election commission. The situation deteriorated very quickly, leading to a coup d'état on 1 February 2021 that has left the country in turmoil and chaos ever since. 

To understand the role of the military, one has to start from the fact that Myanmar is what historian Thant Myint-U called an "unfinished nation". By this term he meant to highlight the lack of collective feeling, or national identity, due to the difficulty of finding unifying elements among the hundreds of ethnic groups that make up its population. 

Much of Myanmar's modern history has been a struggle between the forces of Burmese nationalism (or Bamar), which represent the majority of the country, and the many ethnic minority communities who demand autonomy or some form of federalism that would somehow safeguard their rights and cultures. 

For more than fifty years, the armed forces have exercised power in a ruthless manner and with manifestly negative effects in all areas: social, economic, etc. The Tatmadaw has been and remains, in the words of David Mathieson, an "Army of Darkness". 

The immediate reaction to the February 2021 coup was the formation of a Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) which was followed by almost forty percent of all civil servants announcing that they would not work for the military regime. Similarly, almost from the moment of the coup, and in view of how the situation evolved, it became clear to most analysts that in Myanmar there was, and unfortunately is, little or no room for dialogue or neutrality, with all that this means. For the military, the CDM is a serious obstacle that threatens its political power and its coercive and centralised rule, and this leads them to continue to crack down harder on the movement and its supporters. 

The consequences of the conflict are more than evident. In absolute numbers, a report by the Peace Research Institute Oslo indicates that at least 6,337 civilians have been killed since the coup; internally displaced persons, according to the UN Office for Humanitarian Affairs, number approximately 1.8 million; and there are some 18,000 political prisoners in jails, according to the Political Prisoners' Aid Association, which keeps track of the number of dead and detained. These figures are incredibly high for a small country like Myanmar, and the trend is clearly upwards.

Ethnic minorities comprise several dozen groups representing more than thirty percent of the country's population, many of them Christian or with large groups of Christians. As is often the case in such cases, it is the minorities, ethnic or religious, that suffer most from violence and, in the case of Myanmar, the Christian minority is one of those that bear the brunt of the attacks, with even those historical communities located in predominantly Christian states not being spared. Christians are part of the generally peaceful resistance movement, but fighting has increased throughout the territory and, although not all ethnic minority armed groups are involved, some Christians have joined the armed resistance. 

Government forces continued to attack Christian villages and churches, killing pastors and aid workers, while leaving Buddhist monasteries largely untouched.  

Converts to Christianity are further persecuted by Buddhist, Muslim or tribal families and communities for abandoning their ancient faith and being forced to withdraw from community life, resulting in reduced access to basic resources. Communities that claim to remain Buddhist-only, with the acquiescence of the government, make life miserable for Christian families by not allowing them to use community water resources. Although Buddhist monks are somewhat divided over the February 2021 coup, many of the more radical monks support it.

All talks and discussions with ethnic minority groups about their place in the country, trying to achieve peaceful coexistence, have been paralysed by the coup, and the consequences of inter-ethnic violence and human rights violations (including crimes against humanity and even genocide) do not provide a good basis for resuming these talks in the short or medium term. One of the largest refugee crises of modern times, that of the Rohingya, has taken place in Myanmar as a result of what happened almost four years ago and remains unresolved today. Indeed, the intensification of civil strife has not only pushed it into the background, but intensified it. This crisis, which had its moment in the limelight for a few weeks and with global repercussions, is seriously affecting Bangladesh, the country that has received the largest influx of Rohingya refugees, but repatriation is currently not possible because the Rohingya refugees have no guarantee of safety, and fighting in Rakhine state, where most of them come from, continues. 

There is a commonly overlooked aspect that lies at the root of much of what is happening: a pattern we have seen in other civil conflicts and in other parts of the world. Both members of the military and some insurgent groups are involved in the production and trafficking of synthetic drugs, and there is too much money at stake to let a civil war disrupt such good business. According to the United Nations, opium production in Myanmar has almost doubled since the military coup of 1 February 2021. This only reaffirms the conviction that there is much more behind the situation in Myanmar. On the one hand, a government whose elite is probably profiting from the profits of this illicit business, and on the other, insurgent groups that either do the same or use the profits to finance their struggle. At the same time, it should not be forgotten that the situation of misrule and chaos in some areas makes them hotspots for human trafficking and the proliferation of organised crime. The consequences of all of the above have repercussions around the world and especially in the bordering Asian countries. 

Both China and Russia have shielded Myanmar from criticism in international fora. China in order to maintain a strong bilateral relationship with economic and commercial interests on both sides. Beijing has long been the largest investor in Myanmar and sees the country as an important player in its Belt and Road strategy in mainland Southeast Asia. 

Myanmar provides China with access to the Indian Ocean, which is seen as strategically very important given the challenges it faces in the South China Sea with other major powers such as India, the United States and Japan. It is important to note, as a sign of the importance Beijing attaches to Myanmar, that the Asian giant has had a permanent special envoy in the country for some time. 

At the time of writing, Myanmar is in the midst of a deep conflict. The evidence so far is that morale is high in the opposition to the government and among members of the diaspora abroad who support and fund it. For the first time in the country's history, the army faces a major armed opposition in Kachin, Kayah, Kayin and Chin states. The Magwe and Sagaing regions are also areas of strong resistance to the army, along with parts of the Shan states. Citizens do not want to live under authoritarian military rule and those who have taken up arms are learning to cooperate with ethnic minorities, something unthinkable until recently. 

Most members of the Myanmar diaspora believe that the military junta, better known as the SAC (Special Administration Council), will try to stay in power at any cost. Unless the results on the ground are an overwhelming military defeat in the fight against the insurgency, the SAC will not abandon its policy of achieving its goals through armed violence, especially as long as it has the diplomatic and logistical support of China and Russia behind it. 

Another new development is the involvement of members of the ethnic majority in the resistance to the military regime, which has not occurred since the failure of the student revolt in 1988.  

There appears to be little incentive for either the SAC or the National Unity Government in exile to cooperate in reaching a politically negotiated settlement of any kind. Both sides are sticking to their position of pursuing their objectives at all costs through armed confrontation. This irremediably leads the country into a situation of generalised civil war that may last for several years. 

For the time being, it seems that, for all intents and purposes, the outcome of the conflict can only be determined by the people of Myanmar. If the conflict comes to an end, then it will be time to consider concepts such as sovereignty and the integration of all ethnic groups in the territory by bringing them together. 

The Myanmar case confirms that the transition from authoritarian military rule to democratic rule is not unilateral and is subject to all sorts of setbacks. And it also reminds us that in such scenarios there is always much more behind the scenes than what we see, and usually it is usually obscure economic interests. In this sense, the trajectory is familiar in countries such as Nigeria and Pakistan, and this should make us reflect on what is happening much closer to our borders in countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso or Niger. The similarities are very disturbing.