Negotiating on the edge

On 10 January, the first bilateral meeting between Russia and the United States took place to discuss the proposal offered by Russia to de-escalate the conflict whose epicentre is Ukraine.

This first meeting, the outcome of which was marked by several significant events, served only for each participant to reaffirm its position or, in other words, for Russia to reiterate its demands and for the US to listen.

The first of these, of course, is determined by the significant increase in forces which, given their disposition, composition and location, lead all military analysts to believe that an intervention is imminent.

The second is the collection of statements by various high-ranking Russian officials, including President Putin¹ himself, justifying their position and constructing a narrative to support their position and justify any action taken. To these statements must be added the collaboration of sympathetic media and the dissemination of news such as the presence of elements of foreign PMCs (Private Military Companies) equipped with undetermined chemical substances, all clearly aimed at their own audience for domestic consumption. This is a clear attempt to position its own population on the side of armed intervention.

The third was the swift and forceful intervention in Kazakhstan. Although it was at the request of President Tokayev, it has served two very specific purposes: on the one hand, it has providentially contributed to "cleansing" the political landscape of the former Soviet republic of opponents, it has strengthened Russian control of a fundamental country within its orbit, and it has demonstrated the real capacity of the Russian armed forces to react and deploy. 

And the fourth is the clear position of contempt towards the European Union, which, in the event of a confrontation, will suffer directly from it, if not, and this is very significant, towards the government of the other main actor, Ukraine. This is indeed surprising, but it should not sound new either, as the United States itself recently negotiated a peace deal with the Taliban in Doha in bilateral talks at which the legitimate government of Afghanistan was not present. This is an analogy that, perhaps because it is uncomfortable, no one wants to remember.

Both facts have a clear intentionality. As far as the EU is concerned, it is a way of taking an irrelevant actor out of the equation while creating dissension not only internally, but also with the US, as it will be much easier for the latter to take its own position than one agreed with the EU. It is "divide and rule" at its best. As far as Ukraine is concerned, it shows contempt for its government and for a country it considers artificial and part of Russia despite its current status.

But let us get down to the bottom of the starting positions. Russia has made demands that can be considered impossible or at least illogical, and in part they are. This is despite the fact that the particular prism through which Russia sees the world, which is not the same as the West and which should not be overlooked, its historical vision and its idiosyncrasies, make perfect sense. But even so, they are aware that they will never be accepted. This should not be confused with an excuse to resort to military force.

Despite all of the above, the demands should not be understood as a pretext. It is a basic rule in any negotiation. Negotiators know, or should know, what their objective is. This seems obvious, but in these circumstances it does not seem to be so for one of the contenders, because Russia has presented a series of concrete demands, whether acceptable or not, which we have not found on the other side. Once the objective has been established, lines are drawn, lines to which to retreat during the negotiations, placing them as close as possible to this defined and achievable objective. At the same time, another line is established: the minimum acceptable line. This is the line that will not be crossed under any circumstances because what has been achieved does not satisfy the minimum previously established. From there, the starting point is always set at the maximum aspirations, even in the knowledge that they are unlikely to be met.

It is therefore striking that Russia's demands come as a surprise. They have simply established the starting point. Just as it is logical in these matters to reinforce one's own positions with tangible facts. And here the tangible fact is the deployment of forces. With this, Russia is simply sending the message that it means business, that it wants to negotiate a new state of affairs and that it is willing to achieve its goal. It can be understood as a threat, obviously in a way it is. But it is part of the "game". With this move he makes his opponent question whether or not and to what extent he is willing to use force. This creates not only uncertainty and weakens his negotiating position, but undermines the already weakened position of unity of all Alliance partners and the European Union.

Many media outlets seem intent on propagating the idea that Russia is threatening Europe and NATO. This, at least for the time being, is not true. To avoid suspicion, resorting to the use of force to obtain anything is never acceptable. But that said, NATO's involvement in the Ukrainian conflict is misplaced. Russia knows where it stands and is not seeking military confrontation with either NATO or the United States. Moreover, it is well aware that not only would there be no unanimity among member states, but that a public spectacle of such disunity would probably leave it mortally wounded, especially after the spectacle of Afghanistan. That is why the Alliance itself will not put itself in such a situation. Its eyes are on Ukraine, and more specifically on the area bounded by the Dnieper River to the west and the current border to the east. It is this strip of land that would provide the desired buffer zone from the Alliance's borders, as well as a land corridor to Crimea and probably Transnistria, thus unifying the entire area of strong Russian influence.

Recent moves and incidents further north (Sweden and Norway)² should be interpreted as a way of shifting the focus away from its main target and creating a sense of widespread alarm or fear. Such an action would only be possible if Sweden were to apply for NATO membership. If that were to happen, or, rather, if Russia has confirmation that it is going to happen, then yes, then the step would be taken, but for the same reasons stated above. If Russia were to occupy the island of Gotland, would NATO risk admitting a country whose entry into the Alliance would mean de facto entry into a military conflict with Russia? Would there be unanimity among current members?

We must therefore conclude that for now we are witnessing a textbook negotiating process where one of the contenders seems to have a winning hand, but it should not be forgotten that these kinds of "games" are very dangerous and you always know how they start but never how they end.

References:

1 - https://www.linkedin.com/posts/activity-6885673998114459648-R-4a

2 -   Overflight of two Swedish nuclear power plants by unidentified drones, movement of Russian amphibious assault ships and the cutting of a Norwegian undersea telecommunications cable.