North Korea, the common thread

North Korea is an extremely useful asset for China, and its importance in this role has been growing, leading the Chinese government to increase its support almost unconditionally in order to maintain the status quo. This makes the North Korean leadership less likely to experiment with economic reforms and less sensitive to external pressures, as well as to the potential benefits of negotiations with the ROK, the US and other international actors. The immediate consequence is that Seoul now has even less leverage in dealing with Pyongyang and, given the current scenario, this situation is likely to last longer than desirable. 

On 24 February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered his troops to begin the invasion of Ukraine. For a long time, the West in general, and Europe in particular, believed the utopia that a scenario with an armed conflict between two modern states fighting for control of territories was an obsolete part of the international landscape of the early 20th century. 

The outbreak of conflict on Europe's eastern border, as well as the rapid deterioration of relations between China and the United States, abruptly marked the end of a period in the history of international relations that began in 1990-1992 with the collapse of the USSR and the disintegration of the communist bloc. This period was marked by the relatively benign hegemony of the United States, growing interconnectedness around the world, the gradual emergence of a truly global economy and, for a time, the seemingly unstoppable advance of liberal democracy. 

Whether we are facing the end of globalisation and these dreams of widespread liberal democracy, or only their temporary decline, is still difficult to determine. Even if the final scenario is the latter, it is likely to take a long time for this decline to be reversed. It could be decades before the ideals of a global, democratic and interconnected world become dominant again. 

The consequences of this new situation for Korea are not exactly positive. The ‘world order’ that prevailed in the period 1990 - 2020 was remarkably beneficial for South Korea, whose mainly export-oriented economy has been one of the biggest beneficiaries of the globalisation phenomenon. Moreover, its alliance with the United States seemed to guarantee the Republic of Korea's security in the face of external threats from its northern neighbour and brother, even if they lacked credibility. 

In this context, younger generations of Koreans have grown up accustomed to living in a seemingly stable and secure world, and Korean foreign policy focused primarily on economic issues, while security concerns, despite all the noise around the North Korean nuclear issue, took a back seat, the threat perception was not apparent. 

For centuries, diplomacy's primary concern and occupation has been security issues, effectively acting as a continuation of war by other means. Diplomats worked to reduce the likelihood of external attack on their country or, conversely, to create the conditions in which it could effectively attack and subdue its neighbours. In recent decades, however, this traditional approach has been seen as out of context and has been dismissed by some as paranoid. However, the old situation is gradually returning, with its full battery of traditional priorities. And in the new, or should we say, recovered reality, North Korea operates in pursuit of a new set of objectives, rendering the old approaches to Pyongyang useless. 

In the current context, North Korea can be seen as an existential threat to South Korea, Japan, Northeast Asia and even the United States, as well as a destabilising element for the Western world (we only have to recall the ongoing and almost permanent cyber attacks from North Korea or its direct involvement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict). We are at a critical turning point with a nuclear and belligerent North Korea. If a peaceful solution to the nuclear issue is not found, which now seems unlikely, the possibility of a nuclear or conventional conflict, intentional or accidental, on the Korean peninsula and beyond becomes real. Similarly, given the drift of the North Korean regime's actions, the possibility that nuclear weapons and/or fissile material for dirty bombs could be sold or supplied to third actors, whether states or non-state terrorist organisations, to be used for destabilising purposes cannot be ignored and is becoming increasingly likely to materialise. 

Against this backdrop, the need for greater vigilance over Pyonyang and increased diplomatic contacts in dealing with the regime becomes imperative, while, particularly for the US, maintaining close relations with South Korea and Japan is inexcusable. 

But if anyone is in a position to mediate and help with North Korea, it is China, which has already hosted the Six-Party Talks. However, given the tense scenario with the United States, it has decided to stay on the sidelines for the time being. China's position should not be forgotten. It is unique in this conflict, as the country's economic survival depends entirely on Beijing: more than ninety percent of its foreign trade and the crude oil and derivatives it receives come from China. This is probably one of the reasons for the Korean regime's closer ties with Russia and its involvement in the conflict in Ukraine. North Korea has seen a window of opportunity to diversify its foreign dependence to some extent and to obtain counter-returns that it cannot obtain from Beijing. 

Underlying North Korea's actions is an aspiration to achieve a ‘normal’ relationship with Washington in which it is accepted as a nuclear power, and thus gradually free itself from its dependence on China, which basically regards it as a vassal state. 

North Korea's secret uranium enrichment programme, and its determination to have nuclear weapons, was responsible for the termination of the ‘Framework Agreement’ in force between 1994 and 2002 and the ‘Six-Party Talks’ held between 2003 and 2009, as well as the Trump-Kim summits in Singapore and Hanoi in 2018 and 2019. Today, North Korea refuses to talk to the United States while exponentially increasing its nuclear weapons arsenal and delivery vehicles for them, capable of reaching South Korea, Japan and the United States. In 2022, North Korea launched more than 100 ballistic missiles and, since December 2023, there have been at least 20 more launches, including three intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). These include a solid-fuel ICBM, on a road-mobile transport, capable of travelling more than fifteen thousand kilometres and reaching targets anywhere in the United States. Yet as North Korea has increased these capabilities and persisted in its illicit activities, the response from the United States and its allies and partners has been incoherent and inconsistent to say the least. This has helped the regime to feel itself in a position of relative strength, also increasing provocations to Seoul. Its strengthened ‘alliance’ with Moscow follows this line and produces the same effect. 

The scenario that the new occupant of the White House will have to face is very different from the one he encountered during his first term in office and, in light of events, the moment he decides to tackle the problem of the war in Ukraine (we shall see whether he fulfils his campaign promises or not), he will not be able to separate it from the Korean problem. This leads us to sense that there will be no simple or easy solution and that, on this occasion, moving from words to deeds will require a great deal of subtlety. For Trump, the centre of gravity of his foreign and security policy will be in the Asia-Pacific region, where China is his rival. Hence his determination to disengage from Europe and the implications of the war in Ukraine. However, it will have to deal with a common thread that links both scenarios, and that is North Korea, which in one serves the interests of China and in the other those of Russia. A scenario, as can be seen, that is far from simple and full of bad options.