The Turkish Way

At the end of last year Turkey signed an agreement with Libya, or to be more precise, with one of the two contenders fighting for power in Libya. This gave Turkey de facto control of Libyan territorial waters, while establishing a sea corridor in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. Control of these waters allows the Ottoman country to control all movements of ships in the area, natural gas reserves and pipelines passing through it.
The agreement caused great discomfort in countries such as Greece, Egypt, Cyprus, Israel and France. Even the United Nations was wary of not approving the treaty. This is in spite of the fact that both Turkey and the United Nations support the NAG, the other signatory of the agreement in the Libyan war.
A global vision, both of this fact and of the Turkish movements during the last months, shed light on the Turkish intentions of becoming a regional maritime power that controls that part of the Mediterranean. Turkey's movements in the Aegean too, as well as its involvement in the conflicts in Syria and Libya, are but different but complementary parts of an ambitious plan carefully drawn up by Ankara a few years ago to gain maritime control of the eastern Mediterranean and adjacent areas. The ultimate aim of this strategy would be to give Turkey an economic and energy independence that would ensure the country's growth in all areas.
The father of this plan is Admiral Cem Gurdeniz, and it was first presented in 2006 under the name of "Blue Homeland Doctrine".
To understand this doctrine we will begin by defining its final objective. This is to achieve control and consolidation in the three areas surrounding the country and thus exercise its influence both regionally and internationally, taking over the energy resources necessary to sustain economic and demographic growth without having to depend on third countries. But behind these objectives lies something else: ending what the Treaty of Lausanne, which Turkey was forced to sign in 1923, meant for Turkey.
This treaty, which invalidated the Treaty of Sevres signed by the Ottoman Empire and the Allied powers at the end of the First World War, established the borders of the Turkey we know today. In practice, it meant the fragmentation of the Empire.
The Treaty defined not only the borders of Turkey, but also those of Greece and Bulgaria, concluding Turkish sovereignty over the islands of the Dodecanese, Cyprus, Egypt, Sudan, Syria and Iraq. Kurdistan ceased to be a unit and was divided among several countries, and Armenia was divided between Turkey and the USSR. The conditions limited the capacity of action of the Turks by placing the country under the umbrella of the Western powers, a situation that has been maintained for almost 100 years since the signing.
But at this point, a series of circumstances have arisen that can be interpreted as the starting point for the current situation. On the one hand, the fall of the communist block and the period of weakness of Russia have provoked the development of the idea that the protective shield of the West is no longer so necessary (it cannot be forgotten that this was also seen as a corset). This fact coincided with a period of great economic and demographic growth in the Ottoman country, which according to forecasts will reach 90 million inhabitants in 2030, and both parameters imply a notable increase in energy needs. If these demands are not met, it will not be possible to sustain that population or to develop the industry adequately.
The Turkish economy has so far been based mainly on the development of its local markets, financed mostly by foreign investment. Energy needs are covered in the same way, by supplies from third countries. The main exporters of energy resources to Turkey are Russia, Iran, Iraq and Libya. This external dependence is one of the reasons for the spectacular development of Turkish military capabilities in recent years and its direct involvement in various unstable scenarios: ensuring that this energy supply is not disrupted. And hence the interventions in northern Syria, northern Iraq, Libya…
However, this is not the only reason for such interventions; there are other political motivations, commitments that oblige Turkey to take sides in one way or another.
But in spite of the possible political motivations, the "Blue Homeland Doctrine" takes as its main axis the need to achieve energy independence, and for this it is necessary to take control of energy resources and achieve freedom of action in this field. To achieve this end, the doctrine in question establishes two areas. The first, which would make up the area of security and immediate control, is formed by the seas surrounding the country: the Mediterranean, the Aegean and the Black Sea. The second, of a strategic nature, includes the Red Sea, the Caspian Sea and the Arabian Sea, including the Persian Gulf.
Turkey's dominance of the maritime space indicated includes control over the gas and oil reserves in those waters. This position of maritime dominance is strengthened by establishing alliances with the countries in the area, providing them with support, establishing military bases on their territory and providing military equipment and training to their armies, thus ensuring their assistance. This is a fact, and Turkey already has bases in Somalia, Sudan, Libya and Qatar, countries to which it supplies weapons systems of its own manufacture and with which it has military agreements of various kinds.
The Turkish Naval Force had as its regular area of operations the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Aegean, with the latter two being centred off Bulgaria in the former and the islands east of Greece in the latter.
However, it has recently expanded its area of operations to include the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf, and has even operated in close collaboration with Pakistan.
This strategic vision centred on the control of the sea, apart from the reasons previously mentioned referring to the control of energy resources, has its explanation in the conviction that Turkey has its special orography, very mountainous, which offers a natural and dissuasive defence against any aggression by land.
On the other hand, the maritime borders, which extend across three different seas, are perceived as the nation's weak point. This view has its historical roots in the former Ottoman Empire, which led Erdogan, shortly after coming to power, to initiate a comprehensive program of development and modernization of his naval force known as "Milgem". In this project, strong investments of all kinds have been made and no effort has been spared, because in order to achieve the development of an armed force that supports the objective of establishing itself as a regional and international power, it is key that a technological growth independent from Turkish industry.
The Turkish defence industry has undergone a spectacular evolution, developing high-quality warships, UAVs and advanced weapon systems. Here again we find two tracks. On the one hand, to reach a leading technological level in its armed forces that supports the achievement of the objectives previously indicated, and, on the other hand, to position itself as a reference in the field of arms exports, in order to achieve income and be able to influence the countries of its interest and its policies, in the same way as the USA, China and Russia do.
Within the framework of the "Milgem" programme, four anti-submarine corvettes, an intelligence-gathering vessel, four frigates for surface warfare and four anti-aircraft frigates have been built. The programme also includes four state-of-the-art corvettes for the Pakistani Navy in a further step in the close cooperation between the two countries.
Similarly, 33 new landing barges with capacity for transporting both troops and armoured vehicles have been delivered to the Turkish Naval Force. The development and improvement of amphibious assault capabilities by Turkey is a factor to be taken into account in a hypothetical scenario of tension with Greece, especially with regard to the islands located to the east of the country.
The development of naval warfare capabilities is completed with the production of six new German-built submarines under licence from HDW in Turkey itself, specifically the U-214 model. These new submersibles are equipped with an AIP System that allows them to remain for long periods without going to the surface, and join the ten that the Ottoman country operated until now.
But the star of the programme is undoubtedly the amphibious assault ship or LHD "Anadolu". This ship, which is very similar to the Juan Carlos I operated by the Spanish Navy, provides very advanced capabilities, since it can not only transport landing barges but also operate different types of helicopters, UAVs and, if necessary, vertical take-off fighter planes from its deck. Currently the only aircraft of such characteristics feasible is the F35B VSTOL, but recent decisions by the Turkish Government to acquire Russian anti-aircraft equipment such as the S400 system have led the USA to veto the continuity of the F35 acquisition programme. In fact, the first devices destined for the Ottoman country have been sold to the USAF. However, Turkey's intention was not to acquire the VSTOL version.
The project will be completed with the construction of a second amphibious assault ship, the "Trakya", giving Turkish forces far superior capabilities to those of their neighbours in the region and providing them with the ability to project their force in strategic operations and in two scenarios simultaneously. In turn, the deterrence capability they represent is more than evident.
Turkey's involvement in the conflicts in Syria and Libya has provided its Armed Forces, and among them its naval force units, with enormous and valuable combat experience that has served to update and improve their doctrine and operational capabilities. This, together with the training that its units have and the technological and armament development described, are the three necessary pillars for the implementation of the "Blue Homeland Doctrine". The big question is how the other regional powers will react to the progress of this strategic plan.
The interests are multiple and often crossed, affecting not only the countries bordering that area of the Mediterranean, but also powers such as Russia and France and international organisations such as NATO.
Incidents between initially allied nations have already occurred, even leading to France withdrawing from the NATO operation in the Mediterranean because of the problem between a French and a Turkish frigate and resulting in an attack on Turkish positions by Rafale aircraft, whose nationality remains unclear.
There is no doubt that Turkey's attitude and the implementation of its plan puts the Alliance in a weak position, since one of the reasons behind the plan is Turkey's perception that it no longer needs the umbrella of the West to defend its interests.
On the other hand, Turkey plays with the trick of holding the key to the gateway to the flood of immigrants from Syria, Libya, Somalia and Eritrea into the European Union, and will use it as a measure of pressure in the face of any reaction or positioning of Europe against its interests.
The eastern Mediterranean has regained the leading role in world geopolitics that it had in the 16th century, and curiously enough with the same main actors and the same objectives. Only this time we have new powers like Russia that also claim their space and their need for a permanent and strong presence in that area. We cannot ignore the relationship that this need has with the conflict in the Crimea and the strategic need to be able to control both sides of the Bosphorus to a certain extent and to ensure that the Black Sea fleet has an exit to the Mediterranean.
All these economic, energy and political interests are creating a very complicated situation where, in addition, the "internal" conflicts in Syria and Libya come together, creating an "overpresence" of military units, combatants, weapons systems, planes, UAVs, etc., which at any moment, and through an unexpected error, can give rise to one of those insignificant incidents that slide the world, or in this case, Europe, down the path of confrontation.