Zaporiyia, a plausible and disturbing scenario

Much has been said over the last two weeks about the situation at the Zaporiyia nuclear power plant (NPP).

This is a vital facility for Ukraine, supplying 50% of the country's electricity, and is also the largest nuclear power plant in Europe.

Located in the town of Enerhodar, it was one of the critical facilities captured by Russian forces early in the war. It should be noted at this point that the rapid loss by Ukrainian troops of the city of Kherson, as well as the NPP and large parts of this oblast and the adjacent Zaporiyia oblast, was the result of poor defence planning and execution, as well as the difficulties encountered by Ukrainian forces in exercising proper command and control (C2) during those confusing early moments. As a result, orders in some cases took more than 24 hours to arrive. As an example of the defence disaster, the general officer in command of the defence installation fled, and was recently located and arrested at the Bulgarian border.

The reason why this critical facility has been in the limelight is because of alleged attacks by Ukrainian troops in the vicinity (according to Russian sources). While it is not reassuring that fighting could take place in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant, it must be said that in principle there is no reason to panic. And that is certainly not the greatest danger posed by the NPP.

Nuclear power plants are built to impressive safety standards, and all kinds of incidents are taken into account. That is why a facility prepared to withstand the direct impact of an airliner against its structure is unlikely to be damaged by stray shots of any kind or even by a direct hit by artillery shells. Of course, if Ukraine, as the Kremlin accuses, intends to destroy the plant (which is completely absurd because the country needs the energy it produces), little success can be expected if it intends to do so with artillery attacks. And let's not forget that these alleged attacks have not been proven.

This being said, the question arises: what is going on around the Zaporiyia nuclear power plant, why the keen interest in putting it in the spotlight and announcing a possible catastrophe?

And it is here that a disturbing scenario emerges.

The current war situation, despite what it may seem, is not exactly favourable to Russia. In fact, one could almost speak of a stalemate. If attention is paid to a number of factors, one might conclude that the Russian position may be close to a point of desperation, and this could lead to a very risky but useful determination.

First, we have Russia's inability to cut off the flow of weapons systems and all kinds of equipment into Ukraine. Since the first day of the war, Russia has been unable to achieve air superiority, which has had a decisive influence on the ease with which it has been able to supply Ukraine with everything that is arriving. It is also this arrival of materiel that has partly facilitated the Ukrainian army's ability to hit targets deep inside Russian lines, even hitting targets on Russian soil at distances of more than two hundred kilometres from the front. Arguably, the increase in such attacks by Ukraine has been directly proportional to the decrease in similar attacks by Russia.

As a direct consequence of the above, the Russian army has been forced to move away from the front line the points where railways with ammunition and materiel are unloaded to transfer cargo to trucks that bring them to distribution points, greatly lengthening logistical routes and increasing the risk of ambushes. The impact on units fighting on the front lines is the increased time it takes to receive everything they need and the shortage of items such as artillery ammunition due to the destruction of countless magazines.

But the increase in the number and accuracy of Ukrainian attacks is having another fundamental and almost more serious effect. The morale of Russian forces is being affected, as is the sense of uncertainty and fear, as attacks are now daily and are occurring even inside the Crimean peninsula. The message is that they are not safe anywhere.

To this must be added the significant decrease in the use of Kalibr cruise missiles, and the use of other types of missiles such as the S-300 or S-400 anti-aircraft missiles to attack ground targets. This is a clear symptom of the shortage of this type of weaponry in Russian arsenals and the difficulty they are having in replenishing the stockpile.

Another factor is the difficulty of recruiting personnel to cover the casualties being suffered. In the absence of a general mobilisation decree, the Russian army relies on its capacity for voluntary recruitment, and this is becoming increasingly scarce. So much so that even the PMC (Private Military Company) Wagner, which together with the militias recruited from the Donbas population, in many cases by force, is carrying the weight of the actions on this front, is withdrawing troops from other scenarios such as the Central African Republic or Syria to move them to Ukraine.

The final factor, although in this case it affects both sides, is exhaustion. After six months of war, with difficulties in relieving units and facing an increasingly intense partisan movement in the rear, the forces are almost at their limits. And a good example of this is that increasingly, especially in the east, positions or settlements are changing hands several times. This is a clear sign of a stalemate.

These factors include the purely military side. But no one is unaware that Russia is playing on other planes that are probably even more important or decisive. Chief among these is the economic one. So far it is accepted by all analysts that the time factor can play to Russia's advantage. The more than likely (dare we say certain) total cut-off of gas supplies to Europe this winter is a sword of Damocles hanging over the future of the eurozone economy. The consequences of such a move could be very painful, and end up pushing Europe into a recession the likes of which it has not seen in decades. Russia knows this. And it also knows that this could be a destabilising factor that could put an end to the current "unity" in the face of its actions in Ukraine.

But the Kremlin's analysts are surely also assessing all possible scenarios. They are working with what is known as "WHAT IF..." or "What if...". This is done in order to draw alternative reaction scenarios.

And here it is time to pose one that is as disturbing as it is feasible. This is not to say that it is the most likely, but it should not be ruled out.

On the military side, an undeniable and objective fact, of which Russia itself is aware, is that in the event of an extension of the conflict beyond Ukraine's borders, no longer involving NATO, but involving some countries in the region (Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Romania, Finland...), Russia would inevitably be defeated in terms of conventional forces. As has been noted before, Russia's only deterrent capability today is nuclear.

Therefore, if we combine the blockade situation, the inability to make significant progress in the Donbas, the increased capabilities and effectiveness of the Ukrainian forces, and the exhaustion together with the possibility that the Kremlin must be considering that Europe will overcome this winter while maintaining its unity... we will have our "What if...". Because if so, the sanctions combined with the definitive loss of the European market, which will have found a substitute supplier, will turn the tables: time will then run against Russia, and there is no possible way out of this situation.

Against this backdrop, Russia needs a change of direction that will turn the conflict around, which will mean that the entire international community will focus on stopping it, but without intervening militarily, and which at the same time will help it to achieve at least part of the objectives set at the beginning of the war and consolidate what it has gained so far.

Such a scenario could be provided by an "accident" at the nuclear plant. Such an event would mean that all international efforts would be concentrated on containing the consequences of such an accident, almost certainly leading to a halt in hostilities. No one would understand why Russia or Ukraine would continue to fight in such a situation. But according to predictive models of how a radiation leak might affect the country, it would almost certainly spread westwards, affecting mainly Ukraine, crossing its borders, but creating a de facto no-fly zone within the country that would mark a clear separation of the territories gained by Russia from the rest of Ukraine. This, together with the gains in the Donbas, would create the buffer zone that Russia sought at the beginning of the war. Moreover, according to these models, it would leave the Odessa area isolated, leaving Ukraine without an effective outlet to the Black Sea.

Such an accident would be very difficult to attribute, and it goes without saying that Russia would place the blame on Ukraine (it should not be forgotten that the personnel still operating the plant are Ukrainian). In fact, and this is one of the elements that lead us to believe that this is a scenario that is being contemplated, for weeks now Russia has been preparing the story, creating the narrative to blame Ukraine for anything that happens at the NPP.

Some may think that the potential civilian casualties or civilian population will make this a distant possibility. Nothing could be further from the truth. History teaches us that Russia makes a cold "cost-benefit" calculation in these cases and it would be naïve to think that Russia's main concern is the inhabitants of a region conquered from Ukraine.

The consequences would therefore be a halt to hostilities, consolidation of what has been gained so far, disruption of any Ukrainian attempt to carry out an offensive in the Kherson area, materialisation for decades of a buffer zone between the Russian border and Ukraine, closure of the sea outlet and serious, almost irretrievable damage to the Ukrainian economy.

This would give Russia time to recover from the consequences of the war, rethink its conventional forces and disseminate for domestic consumption a narrative of at least partial victory.

It would be the first time in history that such a facility has been used for war purposes, yet this war is surprising us practically every day. And this scenario, which many will dismiss because their subconscious does not want to admit something so terrible, should not be ignored. In spite of everything, the bear is wounded, not mortally, but very seriously, and it is beginning to have few ways out.