On France's exit from Mali

Since 2013 France has been fighting jihadist terrorism in Mali, first with Operation Serval and then with Operation Barkhane. However, jihadist terrorism has not been defeated during these years, and in the face of public discontent, Mali has opted for a military alliance with Russia. 

France has the Barkhane operation deployed in Mali and considers Wagner's presence incompatible with French troops, so that Russia's entry into Mali will most likely lead to the total withdrawal of its troops from the country, which could move to other countries such as Niger or Côte d'Ivoire. For the time being, French troops are still in Mali alongside Russian troops, but occupying different territories. 

It should be remembered that France currently holds the presidency of the EU and has made relations with the African continent one of the priorities of the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union. An EU-Africa summit will be held on 17 and 18 February, as relations in Paris with Mali and the Central African Republic have recently been strained. It also called for a UN Security Council resolution condemning the Bamako regime, which was opposed by Russia and China. It has also supported ECOWAS sanctions.  

Bamako has called for a review of the Defence Agreements with France. This request comes after France supported the ECOWAS sanctions and threatened to withdraw troops from the country. 

Officially, Mali has not yet asked either French or EU troops to leave, but there are plenty of messages of hostility, widespread anti-French sentiment and mass demonstrations. 

In the event of a withdrawal, Operation Barkhane, Operation Takuba and EU training missions would leave Mali. It would be a sad and failed exit of Mali from France after nine years of intervention and would have been a failure for France and ultimately for the EU. 

Ultimately what is perceived by the Malian population is that their country is a fighting ground for Western powers. For the Malian people, a return to security is set as a priority and for many, Operation Barkhane has failed to bring an end to the conflicts in the country. This leads to a rejection and mistrust of the French military presence, along with the idea that it only remains in Mali for its economic interests and as an occupying power. 

The conditions are not currently in place for France to stay in Mali. However, there cannot be a total withdrawal, so if it were to stay, it would be through air assets, intelligence assets and other means whose visibility is as low as possible. 

It is clear that France will not withdraw its troops from Mali three months before the elections because this would remind us of the disaster of the American withdrawal from Afghanistan and how it was an absolute defeat after 20 years of intervention in that country. Here the situation would be the same after 9 years in Mali. 

On the other hand, and in view of the withdrawal of French and EU troops, what is the situation of MINUSMA? MINUSMA should continue to play its peacekeeping role, but it would be left alone with Russia and France would continue to carry out its specific operations remotely, as would the US, and would become an easier target for both the Malians and the terrorists. 

Russia's entry into Mali would therefore be seen as a triumph for Russia over France, the EU and the US, which have been unable to establish security in Mali over the years. 

This exit from Mali would be a humiliation for France, which will also ask the EU and Takuba to leave so as not to leave alone. 

The latest episode of rupture between France and Mali was the expulsion of the French ambassador in Bamako in response to the French minister's statements. This episode could be the prelude to France's total exit, which will possibly be accompanied by the withdrawal of European troops from Mali, leaving the country alone in the fight against jihadist terrorism, hand in hand with Russia. 

It should be remembered that during these years France not only stopped jihadist terrorism, which began in earnest in 2013, but also achieved two major military victories with the death of the leader of AQIM and the leader of EIGS in 2020 and 2021, but nevertheless the economic cost to France in lives has been great, and the Malian population seems not to have seen the French effort made during these years either. However, France has not been able to prevent jihadist contagion and the destabilisation of the region's states, which has spread to other Gulf of Guinea countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, Togo and Benin.

France's strategy could be to continue in the Sahel without abandoning the fight against jihadist terrorism, leaving Mali if it finally decides to do so and moving to other countries in the Gulf of Guinea that are already beginning to be affected by terrorism, such as Côte d'Ivoire.  

We could find ourselves with a new international scenario in the fight against jihadist terrorism in the Sahel where both France and the US will move to countries such as Côte d'Ivoire or Niger to set up permanent bases.  

However, this displacement would worsen the fight against jihadist terrorism, as Mali is strategically better placed at the centre of several countries and France, the US and the EU would be displaced further away. 

From the lessons learned in recent years in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel, it is important to remember that there must be a coordinated strategy for the Sahel, and that this does not only involve military strategy. The leaders of terrorist groups can be eliminated, but these groups are still there.

Other factors must be analysed, such as economic factors, the lack of state control over their territory, a greater police presence at the local level, and various other elements that have not been taken into account. It is the absence of a state that allows these terrorist groups to gain territory. That is why these now failed states must be rebuilt in all areas, not just the military.  

A new strategy for the Sahel must be developed, not only from a military or Western perspective, but also taking into account the problems of the Sahel and how to combat them in all areas. Focusing on working more and better at the local level in all aspects and in the fight against jihadist terrorism, relying more on air and intelligence resources.   

The sum of capabilities and the coordination of all actors operating in the Sahel will be the only way to achieve stabilisation in the Sahel.