Has France's strategy in Mali been a failure?

France's exit from Mali was the chronicle of a death foretold, but it should be noted that, although France is leaving Mali, this does not mean that it is leaving the Sahel or that it has lost the fight against jihadist terrorism. 

Certainly, France's withdrawal from Mali after nine years can be considered a failure, but if it had not intervened nine years ago with Operation Serval, not only would there no longer be a Malian state, but jihadism could have reached Europe's doorstep.
 
To be true to reality, we must thank them for the great successes achieved in recent years, such as the death of jihadist leaders like Abdelmalek Droukdel and Adnan Abu Walid al-Saharaoui. 

It should also be remembered that the French army is a great army and it is necessary to remember its 53 soldiers who died in the Sahel in the fight against terrorism, as well as all the military, economic and human deployment during all these years of presence in Mali. 

However, it must be said that what began as a quick mission with Operation Serval turned into a never-ending mission with Barkhane. Possible factors contributing to this failure could be the lack of a state presence in Mali in all its institutions, especially the police and judicial institutions, the differences between the government in Bamako and France, or the lack of an ultimate military objective in addition to the fight against jihadist terrorism. France's exit from Mali has reminded us of the sad departure of the US from Afghanistan. 

Elements to take into account would be the Malian population's perception of France as an occupying power that fights to defend its own interests and not those of Mali, or the fact that the fight against jihadist terrorism is focused on overthrowing their leaders, forgetting the factors that lead people to join a terrorist group. More and better work should have been done at the local level to prevent new recruitments and detect these terrorist cells.

There have also been shortcomings in prevention, in the police and judicial sphere, as well as in the economic and social sphere and in governance itself. Other mistakes have been the failure to establish alliances with non-state armed groups and to prioritise the protection of civilians, as jihadists take advantage of community conflicts to recruit more people.

The Sahel is a very complicated scenario and the approach must be military as well as non-military. On the military side, greater priority must be given to intelligence operations coupled with joint operations with other actors in the area, and this must be done in a coordinated manner. 

France has focused its strategy in the Sahel on the military sphere and in the case of Mali has supported an unpopular president like Keita and opposed the new junta that had the full support of the Malian population.

He has also failed in the area of ethnic conflict, which has been exploited by the jihadists, and in opposing dialogue with terrorists, which at the local level is essential to reduce the escalation of violence. 

Possibly Barkhane's mistake was to use this operation to maintain his rank as a power and not to have presented himself as a support and service force for the Malian army, which was seen as an occupying force by the population, especially when many years have passed without seeing significant successes in the security sphere in the country. The model of military intervention should be reviewed as a joint action carried out by all actors involved in the fight against terrorism.

The element of social media communication and disinformation that has spread anti-French sentiment throughout the population has also failed. It is very important not only what your friend says about you but also what your enemy says about you, and here the strategy has failed. 

Strategically, it was a mistake to leave northern Mali without a state presence, with the jihadists occupying the vacuum. Similarly, the lack of governance has led to major political and social problems among the population. Mali's big problem is that it is a state that has never really exercised its social or sovereign functions, and this lack of a state has also caused the French military mission to fail as the only way forward.

If there is a lesson to be taken into account, it is the need to take into account all the actors involved in the area, the protection and perception of the civilian population and local realities, a lesson that so far does not seem to have been taken into account.

The ultimate reason for France's exit from Mali is because of anti-French sentiment among the Malian population and problems with the military junta. 

The strategy in the Sahel would involve what has been called the 3D strategy: Defence, Diplomacy and Development. While France has focused all its capabilities on defence, it has failed in the areas of diplomacy and development.

Equally devastating has been the belief among the population that France was helping the jihadists to prolong its military presence in Mali or that its presence was prolonged to steal the country's natural resources. 

Possibly France's greatest failure has been to believe that both the Malian government and the population agreed with everything France did in the country. This is where France's communication strategy has failed.

Similarly, the military solution alone cannot address the problem of jihadist terrorism in the Sahel and the problem of radicalisation. The strategy must be regional and multi-sectoral, based on the idea that African solutions must be offered to African problems. 

Military intervention must be accompanied by other types of interventions aimed at development to prevent radicalisation and extremist violence, and dialogue with violent extremist groups must also be considered at the local level in order to offer an effective counter-narrative against them.

More work needs to be done at the local level linked to the regional level as this can often be different from the national level. It is also necessary to improve the state's presence at the level of public authorities and services, providing greater protection to the civilian population and restoring the administrative system, especially the police and judiciary, once the military operation is over, otherwise we will find ourselves facing the same failed state with the same problems.

France has understood that it is necessary to change the model of strategy in the Sahel and that it must stay in the Sahel because the existing violence poses a serious threat to security, because of the links with France and the interests in the area, and because of the recent arrival of Russia and Turkey. 

We must always thank France for its intervention in the Sahel over the years. Although it produced great results during the first years of Operation Serval, the current strategy is not adapted to the current situation in the Sahel. Factors that have changed include the spread of the jihadist threat to other countries, especially those in the Gulf of Guinea, the recent coups d'état, the anti-French sentiment of the population and the disinformation created by Russia as a new international actor that has entered the Sahel. 

This is why we are facing the end of a cycle that must be managed with a new strategy that entails a new intervention model in which, based on the lessons learned, we begin to work effectively in the Sahel, starting by rebuilding states in all areas and not only in the military sphere, and dedicating special attention to the civilian population and local action, otherwise we will be making the same mistakes again.