What will happen in Mali after the ECOWAS sanctions?

After the last two coups d'état in Mali and the entry of Russia into this scenario, which has led to the postponement of elections until 2026, ECOWAS has responded by strongly sanctioning this country, which has been plagued by poverty, insecurity, corruption, jihadist terrorism and organised crime for years.

The ECOWAS sanctions entail the suspension of borders, all trade and financial transactions of member states with Mali, excluding consumer goods and basic necessities. It also froze Mali's assets in ECOWAS Central Banks and member states' commercial banks and suspended all financial and aid transactions in favour of Mali from the organisation's financial institutions pending a new electoral timetable.

Bamako's radical stance risks bringing the country to total ruin and runs counter to the objective of the current military transition. While it is true that Mali is a sovereign state, it must also take into account the constraints it faces and to whom it is beholden.

The ECOWAS sanctions to force the Bamako government to set an early date for elections ultimately penalises the civilian population, victims of all the problems that Mali has been suffering since 2012.

We must remember that Mali is a poor landlocked country subject to all kinds of insecurities with the COVID and this embargo could lead to a humanitarian catastrophe.

We must also remember the government's conflict with Azawad and the Arab-Tuareg communities, which is a real handicap for the junta's aspirations to embody national unity and cohesion in the run-up to the elections.

Since 2012, Mali has been in chaos and no government has been able to address the ongoing challenges facing the country, including massacres and clashes between the various ethnic groups in the population, yet another stumbling block to national unity.

The Bamako government's response to the population has been to call for the mobilisation of the population next Friday, but it is also appealing for calm. For their part, civil society organisations have sided with the transitional government, considering the sanctions an attack on Mali's sovereignty and against the will of the Malian people.

We have already seen how the military's rise to power was caused by the inability of politicians to ensure the functioning of institutions. However, a return to normalised political life is necessary through the organisation of free and transparent elections as soon as possible.

Mali should follow the example of the Transition in Guinea where everything seems to be proceeding in a more orderly manner. Moreover, Guinea has already stated that its borders will remain open as it does not agree with the ECOWAS decision on sanctions against Mali.

One of the problems that ECOWAS will face will be enforcing its border blockade and embargo: more than half of Mali's 7,908 kilometres of land borders adjoin Guinea, whose government is unlikely to cooperate, or non-ECOWAS states such as Algeria or Mauritania.

In the case of Mali, we find that the army, which has come to power through a coup d'état, has the political power at its command, when the opposite would be correct, that the army should be at the command of the political power elected by the people.

For its part, the ECOWAS sanctions against Mali seem to have been orchestrated by countries such as France, which have been in Mali for many years fighting jihadist terrorism and which we have seen how they have had to leave in the face of Wagner's imminent arrival due to the popular discontent of recent years. Likewise, the United Nations, for its part, supports the decision of ECOWAS, together with the United States, which is calling for elections to be held in the country immediately.

Meanwhile, in this complicated scenario, Russia is present with the Wagner group in Bamako, Timbuktu, Mopti, Sévaré and Ségou, where more than 600 mercenaries are reportedly deployed.

All of this is evidence of France's almost total withdrawal from Mali in the face of the junta's attitude and Wagner's arrival. Barkhane, Takuba and FAMA are also currently operating in the country alongside MINUSMA.

In the economic sphere, an embargo in Mali would lead to economic suffocation, with Mali having to borrow from countries such as Russia, China and Turkey. 

Mali would be left alone at the regional level after having broken with ECOWAS and at the international level with France after its partnership with Russia.

However, it could maintain relations with border countries that are not members of ECOWAS, such as Mauritania or Algeria, or with Guinea, which has already expressed itself in this regard.

This could also have the opposite effect on the population, which could support the Malian authorities' decision not to comply with ECOWAS and the international community's demands and not to organise elections quickly.

However, the most sensible solution to this situation would be to quickly draw up a fairly precise timetable for the elections that would allow for a resumption of dialogue with the ECOWAS heads of state, because Mali can no longer live in chaos and increasing isolation.

The problem is that this situation will not only affect Mali, but will also affect the other Sahel countries: poverty will increase due to the economic embargo, insecurity and clashes will increase, there will be more internal and external displacement, and the opportunity will be seized by terrorist and organised crime groups operating in the Sahel region.