Western Sahara, in the triangle of interest between the United States, Morocco and Israel
When former US President Donald Trump announced on his Twitter account on 10 December 2020 that, in exchange for normalising relations with the State of Israel, the United States would recognise Morocco's sovereignty over Western Sahara, few in Spain were able to see the significance that this decision would have on Spain's relations with Morocco and, ultimately, also with Israel. The wave of diplomatic normalisation between Israel and the Arab states -the so-called Abraham Accords- of the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain (September 2020), the Sudan Agreement in October and the renewal of relations with Morocco in December are indicators of a significant change in the political and strategic dynamics of the Middle East that has been taking place over the last decade. Normalisation is the most visible aspect of an enduring confluence of interests between Israel and the conservative alliance of states in the Arab world seeking to counter the expanding influence of Iran and the challenges stemming from Turkey, the Muslim Brotherhood (including Hamas) and political Islam in general, in particular the Salafist jihadist vision. Close operational cooperation between Jerusalem and Sunni Arab capitals, including Rabat, has been deep and discreet so as not to undermine internal challenges to the legitimacy and authority of regimes that, for decades, have rested on ideological paradigms relying on Arab nationalism or socialist doctrines alongside fierce opposition to recognition of the state of Israel, which they see as a colonialist graft at the heart of Islam. There is no doubt that the recognition of Morocco's sovereignty over Western Sahara is a strategic victory for the Alawi kingdom, which has sought to consolidate control over this territory since it annexed it in 1975. Of all the recent normalisation agreements between Israel and the Arab states, this is the only agreement that includes a substantial change in the US's political-diplomatic stance towards a disputed territory officially considered non-self-governing and still under Spanish tutelage. The White House, under the personal imprint of Donald Trump, thus decides that the chances of an agreement outweigh the potential risk of initiating a new round of violence in North Africa, an unstable and vital area for the interests of Europe and the United States. This decision therefore puts an end to US neutrality in a conflict that remains latent between Morocco and the Polisario Front until October 2020, when the frictions of November ended almost three decades of a ceasefire mediated by the UN, an organisation that helped to some extent to maintain a certain calm and cool but acceptable relations between Morocco and Algeria, the latter being the main backer of the independence movement. The two countries - Morocco and Algeria - are also priority security partners for both Europe and the United States. However, in the US decision-making process there is an even more compelling reason, if possible, that directly affects Israel: Iran's presence in the region.
To understand this whole process, one must go back in time, as no Foreign Policy decision is casual or hasty, although it may seem so. As early as 2018, Morocco presented a document to the Iranian government in which it demonstrated that Iran, using a similar pattern of action to penetrate other territories on the African continent, was arming and financing the Polisario Front through Hezbollah via the Iranian embassy in Algeria. The accusation is serious and is met with the severance of diplomatic relations between Morocco and Iran. The matter transcends and reaches the UN in the second half of 2019, where images of Iranian anti-tank missiles used by the Libyan National Army, as well as documents indicating Iran's military infiltration attempts in Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco are already on display. The key question facing US intelligence now is whether it is possible to thwart the Polisario Front's aspirations in the north, taking advantage of the fact that it has also lost the support it once received from the African Union. In this context, the US administration is maturing its position on Western Sahara while, in the Middle East, in the face of Iranian forces moving into Syria, Trump recognises Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights in March 2019. By recognising the essential connection between Israel and the Golan Heights and Morocco and Western Sahara, the US administration -regardless of the political colour of its government- sends a powerful message to the actors involved in both conflicts: that the US will work to strengthen political moderation across the region and undermine the extremist axis. So much so that the new Biden Administration, despite statements by some officials at the start of his administration, including the UN representative, will neither withdraw from the Agreement nor revert to the original status, despite being aware that this Agreement complicates relations with Western countries and other actors who oppose Moroccan control of the region and show a preference for resolving the dispute by referendum, in line with UN resolutions. The referendum seems distant, if not unfeasible, at least in the terms in which it is proposed, and the area, under Moroccan sovereignty, is likely to move towards a regime of autonomy. Morocco has de facto controlled more than 80 per cent of the territory since 1974, including the phosphate reserves and fishing grounds, and it is neither foreseeable nor realistic to expect Morocco to give up a territory with potential for economic development. Nor should we forget this territory's internal and external security dilemma, as it is at the intersection of illicit flows from the Sahel, including transnational terrorism, which threatens the integrity of its national territory, the continuity of the monarchy itself, and the security of Europe and trade flows along the Mediterranean and the Strait of Gibraltar.
Morocco's relations with Israel are cold but pragmatic. The gap between the narrow confines of political cooperation between Jerusalem and Rabat and the depth and breadth of civil and cultural ties between the peoples illustrates the enormous potential inherent in restoring diplomatic relations, broken since the outbreak of the second intifada in 2005. But while political ties appear to have stalled and are moving forward cautiously, economic and cultural cooperation has continued to expand. Tourism is an important source of income for Morocco -of little significance for Israel- and the connection with Jews -rather than Israel as a state- is underpinned by the monarchy's traditional protection of a community that has been part of Moroccan society, economy, life and culture for centuries.
The perspective that other countries in the North African region, such as Tunisia or Algeria, will follow the path of normalisation of relations with Israel remains slim. Nevertheless, Israel has been conducting an active and very discreet diplomacy across the continent for more than a decade. In the face of Turkey and China's increasingly effective control over the African continent and the growing influence of actors moving into Africa, Israel cannot miss the opportunity to promote cooperation in fields where the viability of success is greatest, such as security, engineering, agronomy, rural development, economic development, social development, energy, health and the use of scarce water resources. These are modest commitments from a political point of view, but very profound in terms of the impact they leave in the communities where they are applied.
The fluid and fragile nature of regional alliances, partnerships and animosities across the African continent is no different from those common across the Eurasian landmass. Nor are the threats and spread of the Hambalite jihad across West Africa and the Niger Basin, where reality reveals the influence of the Islamic State and its unstoppable progression. Israel's attempts to block Iran's expansion in Africa and the need to undermine Palestinian diplomatic efforts in the international arena is reflected in a strategy focused on seeking political support from African states. Moreover, Israel's security interests on the African continent coincide with those of African states and the survival of their regimes: curbing the infiltration of global jihadist elements into their territory and alleviating shortcomings in communications, infrastructure, health, agriculture, intelligence and security. The new US Administration may need to calibrate whether the effort to invest in preserving and fostering normalisation of relations with Israel as a means of ensuring the very survival of relatively stable regimes is useful insurance for forging more stable ties with the United States, while satisfying the vital interests of all parties at the strategic, economic, military and political levels.