The foreign policy of today's Turkey: the return of the sultan

Turkey is one of those countries whose gaze towards the rest of the world is studied in geopolitics as a paradigmatic example of a multidimensional, multifaceted and geographically diverse foreign policy. Rising from the ashes of the former Ottoman Empire, the modern Republic of Turkey founded under the auspices of Kemalism has based its foreign relations on the famous motto 'Peace at home, peace in the world', in the light of different backbone principles: secularism, humanitarianism, Atlanticism, Europeanism... Throughout these almost one hundred years, Ankara has consolidated itself as a middle power with transcontinental reach, due to its geographical location, which is as strategic as it is volatile. Thus, the Eurasian country (although this definition is controversial to some extent) is the world's fifth largest diplomatic and consular power, a member of major international fora and institutions, a mediator in various multilateral conflict resolution initiatives, and one of the largest donors of humanitarian assistance globally... Not to mention that Turkey is one of the few countries with which both Israel and the Arab countries have maintained close diplomatic relations, which is not to be underestimated. Many analysts have described Turkey's foreign relations as the clearest example of 'enterprising diplomacy'.
In recent years, however, Turkey's foreign policy seems to have taken a different path, and this is largely due to the personalism of the current President of the Republic, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. After winning the elections and becoming prime minister at the beginning of the 21st century, Erdogan led Turkey through a modernising process with a view to EU integration, with a very extensive reform programme and under the prism of moderate Islamism. This pragmatism was also evident in foreign policy, where the conflictuality and aggressiveness of Turkey's foreign policy in the 1990s gave way to a more consensual diplomacy with its neighbourhood and with economic, humanitarian and socio-cultural overtones. Why do we say that Turkey has turned a corner in its foreign policy and that neo-Ottomanism now permeates Ankara's diplomacy? Why do we speak of the return of the Sultan? Let us point out three aspects in this regard.
First, Erdogan has turned the personalisation of foreign policy into an art, a way of governing, a management style that mixes large doses of populism with a tactical and strategic exploitation of the context in which we find ourselves. Erdogan has strengthened personal ties with his Chinese and Russian counterparts, which is no mean feat, and the Turkish foreign ministry apparatus has given way to the president's personal team when it comes to outlining the what and how of Turkish diplomacy.
Second, Turkey has broadened its range of diplomatic relations and has done so by looking south and east, seeking to expand its influence in sub-Saharan Africa and the Mashreq, as well as strengthening cultural ties with the Turkic republics of the Caucasus, the Caspian and Central Asia. Turkey is seeking to regain its old laurels, and here the historical argument and the cultural and linguistic argument are used in equal measure.
Third, Turkey aims to be on an equal footing with Washington and Brussels, and to some extent to go beyond that geopolitical characteristic Turkey has always had since the end of World War II, that of being NATO's southern flank. Ankara wants to show that it has more power than it really has according to a textbook of political geography and history, and this may eventually take its toll.
Only time will tell what Turkey and its foreign policy will look like in the coming years, but surely, we will always have to start by considering the following: modern Turkey has always been, and has always felt, a very strong actor in a very weak regional context, and it is this leverage from which it wields its diplomacy. We will remain vigilant.
Miguel Ángel Medina, Deputy Director of the Antoni de Montserrat Chair of Global Studies at the Universitat Abat Oliba CEU/The Diplomat