The PJD into the abyss?

The approval by the Moroccan government, led by the Justice and Development Party, of the draft law on the medical and industrial uses of cannabis last Thursday and the subsequent suspension of Abdelilah Benkirane, the party's former secretary general and former head of government, the country's most popular political figure, has exacerbated the serious political crisis that the country's leading party has been suffering for years. How has a party that clearly won the legislative elections five years ago come to this situation?

All was jubilation and joy at the PJD headquarters in Rabat in the early hours of 7 October 2016. At midnight Abdelilah Benkirane appeared, surrounded by the party's top brass, to announce a historic event: the clear victory, the second in a row, of the PJD in the disputed legislative elections. A few minutes later, Interior Minister Mohamed Hassad announced the preliminary results confirming the PJD's victory. Benkirane's PJD won 125 of the 395 seats in the lower house of the Moroccan parliament and 1,600,000 votes. 18 seats and 600,000 votes more than in the 2011 elections.

Mohamed VI put Benkirane in charge of forming a new government, but Benkirane was unable to form a government in five months. He failed to reach an understanding with Aziz Akhenouch, a millionaire and close friend of Mohammed VI and minister of agriculture and fisheries since 2007. Akhenouch became president of the RNI (National Rally of Independents), a monarchist liberal party that became the fourth largest force in the country with 37 MPs in the 2016 elections. Akhenouch first managed to veto the entry into the government of the historic Istiqlal, the third party with 46 seats, and then wanted to include two of his political partners, the Constitutional Union and the Socialist Union of Popular Forces, in the government. This unwavering demand led Benkirane to end the negotiations. Had Benkirane accepted Akhenouch's demands, the PJD's power in the government would have been greatly diluted. Faced with the stalemate in the negotiations, Mohamed VI relieved Benkirane on 15 March 2017, removing him from the formation of the new government in favour of Saad Eddine el Othmani, the PJD's second in command. El Othmani accepted Akhenouch's demands, which Benkirane rejected, and a six-party coalition government was formed in which the PJD's weight was reduced. The PJD lost important ministries such as Justice, Foreign Affairs and Economy. The PJD's loss of power in the new coalition government provoked internal protests and marked the first internal crisis of the PJD.

Despite losing the government, Benkirane continued to lead the PJD, and a debate broke out within the party over the possibility of a third term as Secretary General. This debate caused a deep division within the party, as the party's statutes prohibited a third consecutive term of office for the Secretary General. Benkirane had served two consecutive terms, eight years as Secretary General. The debate was bitter and intense, involving the most important leaders of the PJD, with the frontal opposition of most of its ministers who did not want Benkirane to have influence in the government and control over the parliamentary group, the largest in parliament. The debate ended in the PJD's National Council, the party's parliament and second decision-making body after the congress. The National Council debated the proposal and voted against the third term, 126 votes against, 101 in favour and four null votes, out of a total of 231 members. Benkirane was defeated and the party split in two. At the end of 2017, the eighth party congress was held and a new secretary general, Saad Eddine el Othmani, was elected. He formed the party's leadership (General Secretariat) with like-minded people and removed from the leadership both Benkirane and prominent supporters of the former secretary general, such as Abdelali Hamidine. The Congress did not close the cracks in the party.

The Organic Law on Education

The Organic Law on Education, passed in the summer of 2019, was a divisive and tense issue for the PJD. The law passed by the government, at the behest of the Higher Education Council, included a highly controversial and sensitive point in Morocco, which was the return to teaching scientific and technical subjects in French in primary and secondary education. Benkirane, via his official Facebook account, called on PJD MPs to vote against the law, considering that the Arabic language is a question of identity and that the law "promotes the language of the coloniser"¹. The PJD was divided into two camps, one led by Benkirane and the vast majority of MPs, who considered the new law to be detrimental to the Arabic language, a language that represents the country's identity. Meanwhile, the head of government, Saad Eddine el Othmani, along with PJD ministers and part of the party's General Secretariat, defended the law on the grounds that it was necessary for students to master French in order to reduce student failure and increase job opportunities for recent graduates. The debate ended with the abstention of the PJD parliamentary group on the introduction of French as the language of scientific and technical subjects. The abstention made it easier for the law to go ahead and eventually be approved by the Moroccan parliament. 

The announcement last December of the normalisation of relations between Morocco and Israel and the signing of the normalisation agreements at the Royal Palace by Saad Eddine el Othmani, together with Jared Kushner, Trump's son-in-law, and the Israeli delegation, in the presence of King Mohammed VI, provoked great discontent in the ranks of the party, to the point that on social networks supporters and members of the PJD called for Saad Eddine el Othmani's resignation. Benkirane supported normalisation with Israel, considering that Morocco's interests were paramount, while coming to the defence of Saad Eddine el Othmani this time. But Benkirane's support was not enough to calm tempers within the party. An extraordinary National Council was convened at which Saad Eddine el Othmani had to explain himself to party members, again assuring them that normalisation was a matter for the king and that his party had not changed its views on the Palestinian cause². 

Parliament's final approval of the law on the medical and industrial use of cannabis will put the party at a crossroads. If the PJD MPs support the law, Benkirane will leave the party, as he himself has stated, and the rupture within the party will be consummated, with unpredictable short- and long-term consequences for the party. If, on the other hand, the MPs reject the law, they will overrule the secretary general, El Othamani, and the party leadership. The party is expected to hold an extraordinary National Council in the coming days where, if there is no consensus on the law, the PJD may be headed for the abyss.

Both the PJD's vice-secretary, Slimane Omnrani, and prominent party members assume that the PJD is in an internal crisis^{3 4}. Resignations have begun with the resignation of National Council President Idris Yazami al-Idrissi, former Deputy Minister of Economy and close to Benkirane.

The PJD's deep crisis is pitting two currents against each other, the one led by Benkirane and part of the PJD's deputies and the party's youth, who consider that the party has renounced its ideals and identity, and that such resignations have separated it from both the grassroots and society. Meanwhile, Othamani, along with a large part of the PJD ministers and the General Secretariat, defend a pragmatic and possibilist path in which the interests of the state and consensus with the other political forces that make up the government coalition take precedence over the party's ideology, and justify the PJD's concessions on the grounds of the "national interest"⁵.

The PJD's internal crisis is very deep in a year of legislative, regional and local elections. If the crisis is not resolved, which is highly unlikely, given the short time remaining before the elections, and the fact that Parliament has passed an electoral law that punishes the PJD, plus the ravages of the pandemic among the working classes, the PJD's electoral prospects are, if not uncertain, then very negative. 

Mohamed Douief Merras, PhD in Contemporary History from the University of Barcelona.

References:

1. Declaración de Benkirane recogida por el diario Hespress. Disponible en: https://www.hespress.com/%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%AE%D9%84-%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%81-513358.html
2. Declaración de El Othamani en el Consejo Nacional del partido. Disponible en: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WM2SgcXiaS4&t=123s 
3.  Declaración de Slimane Omrani recogida en el diario al Ahdath.  Accesible en: https://ahdath.info/652759. 
4.   El diputado y dirigente Abderrahim Sheikhi: “Hay una crisis dentro del PJD”. Disponible en: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nYrlpAf6em4. 
5. Slimane Omrani en declaraciones recogida por el diario Hespress. Disponible en: https://www.hespress.com/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d8%af%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a9-%d9%88%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%86%d9%85%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d9%8a%d8%a8%d8%b1%d8%b1-%d9%85%d9%86%d8%b7%d9%82-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%86%d8%a7%d8%b2%d9%84%d8%a7%d8%aa-794051.html