Italy: Meloni, a leadership that is more apparent than real

Although some may have the impression that the Roman Meloni, President of the Council of Ministers since 22 October, has a strong leadership at the moment (both in her country and at the EU level), the reality is that this leadership is much less strong than it seems. And the evidence is clear.

Let us begin with the first reality that has brought Meloni to political "stardom": her two rivals, who are none other than her generation mates (Matteo Salvini, born in 1973, and Matteo Renzi, born in 1975, compared to Meloni, born in 1977), are at their lowest ebb. In the case of Salvini, once a winner in the 2019 European elections (where up to 34% of the electorate voted for him), in the last general elections he barely reached 9% of the votes, and in the last elections for the region of Lombardy (13 February), he took 17% of the votes when in 2018 his party, with him also as leader, exceeded 29% of the votes. 

Now, the Lombard politician and leader of the Lega, has managed to become deputy prime minister and head of infrastructures thanks to the fact that Meloni needs his votes to govern, but that does not hide the fact that the Lega has been looking for a replacement for some time now, but they have not found one. Salvini has already been "head of the ticket" twice (2018 and 2022) as far as "political" (legislative) elections are concerned (we would say here), and it does not look as if they are going to let him be a candidate a third time. He is about to turn 50, his lack of education (he left university at the age of 20 to go into politics) often leaves him in a bad light, and he is no longer the politician on the rise of the previous legislature. Paradoxically, he may end up becoming Meloni's successor when she resigns (something very possible given that with interest rates at 3.5% and a public debt of 154% of GDP, she will end up suffering serious socio-economic problems), since Forza Italia would surely support him to become prime minister, although, yes, in the other vice-president (and at the same time head of Foreign Affairs), Antonio Tajani, he has a top-level rival to replace Meloni one day.

In turn, Matteo Renzi, who still retains the "prurience" of having been the youngest president of the Council of Ministers in the history of republican Italy (he was 39 years old when in February 2014 he received the "incarico" of forming a government from the then President Napolitano), and who is also the only one who can say, along with Silvio Berlusconi and Bettino Craxi, that he knows what it is to have a government that lasts more than 1,000 days (1,020 to be precise). 1000 days (1,020 to be more precise), he is now "suffering" in the Senate with his seat as MP for Campania and his party, Italia Viva, is virtually at a standstill. In practice he is growing because every year that administrative elections are called he manages to have more municipal representatives and also councillors in the governments of each region, but the reality for him is that at the moment his real chances of continuing his political career are more in the European elections of 2024 (where he could become the first transalpine president of the European Council, after two Belgians (Van Rompuy and Michel) and a Polish (Tusk), or as head of an important commission, such as Economic Affairs or Competition) than national politics, where, like Salvini, he would only become president of the Council of Ministers through an "incarico" from the President of the Republic, but not through a victory at the ballot box.

Returning to the Roman Meloni, the various elections have shown that she is benefiting from a mixture of votes in her favour and protest votes. Take the example of the last elections for the government of the Lazio region. It is true that it took it away from the Democratic Party (PD, another party in a very low ebb), which had governed there for two consecutive legislatures, but it is equally true that Lazio is a historic bastion of the right, and Meloni's party (Fratelli d'Italia) is by far the strongest within the transalpine right, so it is to be expected that Meloni would win in this region. But one has to look at the data in its "cruder" side: her candidate (Boccia) won with 52% of the vote, but with only 37% voter turnout. In other words, only two out of ten inhabitants of the Lazio region voted for Meloni's candidate, and, what is worse, a PD-Terzo Polo at its worst almost reached 38% of the vote (the candidate of Cinque Stelle, with 9% of the vote, made a fool of herself, as was to be expected, but Cinque Stelle, without "reditto di citadinanza", has very little to do at the present time).

In European politics, too, Meloni counts for far less than one might think, especially in the eyes of the main European leaders. A few days ago the German chancellor and the French president had dinner together to decide on many issues (including what to do about the war in Ukraine, which seems to have no end, and which continues to divide the members of the Union): had the former prime minister Mario Draghi been president of the Council of Ministers, the German chancellor and the French president would almost certainly not have dared to exclude the head of the eurozone's third largest economy, but of course Meloni is not Draghi, and they knew it. 

Looking ahead, Meloni knows that, with a centre-left in full reconstruction and the centre-right's large majority in parliament, she can look forward to the coming months with peace of mind. But those "dark clouds on the horizon" that Mario Draghi spoke of last summer are becoming clearer and clearer: the interest rate hike is forcing the Meloni government to spend close to 100 billion euros on interest payments alone. 100 billion euros just to pay interest on the debt, weighing heavily on other policies; the growth forecast by the European Commission is currently at 0.8%, so there is no recession, but very little economic momentum (compared to 6.3% in 2021 and 3.3% in 2022); and although the energy issue is well on track (among other reasons because Draghi left the way "clear" with the pact with the Algerian government last July), this does not prevent a very significant rise in the cost of living that will generate increasing social unrest.

We will see how the still "young" Meloni government continues to develop (it is only four months old at the moment), but, given the way things are going, we can see that in the various regional government elections in the second half of the year (Abruzzo, Sardinia, etc.) we may see the beginning of the current government's fall in popularity. Everything will depend a lot on the Russian-Ukrainian war, but the fact that none of the main transalpine economists (such as Fabio Panetta or Daniele Franco) did not want to be in charge of the Economy and Finance portfolio, and that a mere graduate in Economics from Bocconi University such as the "leghista" Giorgetti had to be called in to take charge, says a lot about what those who know the most about economics expected to happen in the future: it is not yet clearly perceived, but it is all a matter of time.

Pablo Martín de Santa Olalla Saludes is a lecturer at the Camilo José Cela University and author of the book "Historia de la Italia republicana" (Silex Ediciones, 2021).