Sahara autonomy proposal remains stalled
When the Kingdom of Morocco presented its "Autonomy Plan for the Sahara" to the UN in April 2007, the impact on world public opinion, governments and representatives at the United Nations was overwhelming.
At the time, Morocco was in the midst of a process of national reconciliation, internal transformations, and the granting of individual rights and public freedoms, including the release of political prisoners from prison and the return of exiles.
The important role of King Mohammed VI
The new reign of Mohammed VI wanted to put an end to the dirty pages of its recent past. The proposal to the UN made on behalf of the Alawite sovereign was along these lines.
The autonomy plan was bold and quite detailed. It consisted of 35 points, including the negotiation of a new autonomy statute within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty and national unity. It offered the "population of the Saharan territory" administrative, social, cultural, financial and fiscal powers. The Moroccan state reserved for itself powers relating to national security, defence, foreign relations and the system for exploiting natural resources. The King, head of state, would retain his role as Emir of the Believers and guarantor of coexistence between religious creeds.
The powers of the future "Autonomous Region of the Sahara" would be broadly comparable to those of the Spanish autonomous regions: election of a parliament and local government, autonomous police, management of infrastructure, water, electricity, transport, education, health, employment, sports, environment and defence of "Hassania" culture. And as in Spain, the Statute of Autonomy was to be submitted to the populations concerned and approved in a referendum "in accordance with the principle of self-determination", as stipulated in the draft.
The proposal made in the name of King Mohammed VI is well formulated, and over the years, Moroccan diplomacy has endeavoured to convey it bilaterally and multilaterally to governments and regional groups for its adoption. The Spanish government of Pedro Sánchez gave its approval last year, considering it 'the most serious, credible and realistic' way to definitively resolve the Western Sahara dispute.
However, as no agreement has been reached between the parties to the conflict - two for the Sahrawi independence fighters and Algeria, which are the Moroccan government and the Polisario Front; and four for Morocco and the UN Secretary General's special representative, which are the governments of Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania, and the Polisario Front movement - the implementation of the Plan has stalled.
Autonomy Plan for Western Sahara
The Moroccan administration, theoretically charged with developing the plan in its various facets, has not done so, and the Plan remains as it was formulated in 2007. And it is precisely in its development that there are points of friction, ambiguous and controversial formulas, which give rise to mistrust and do not help to provide guarantees and security to the population concerned.
Rabat has not yet explained what it will do with the refugee population in Algeria, in the town of Tindouf and its surroundings. Nor has it made explicit what the situation will be for the Sahrawi exodus, the vast majority of whom live in Spain, but also in other European and American countries. Will the refugees and exiles be considered Moroccan citizens? Will they be given passports? Will they be able to travel freely?
One point that remains unclear is the future of the Polisario Front movement: will it have to disband or will it be able to participate in political life in the Sahara as a "Sahrawi autonomist party" or similar formulation, will its representativeness be recognised, and in what form does Morocco envisage the political participation of "organised" Sahrawis?
The question also arises again, as in 1991, who will be allowed to vote in the referendum exercise to adopt the Statute of Autonomy and to take part in the local legislative elections that are to produce the parliament, the autonomous government and the president of the autonomous region that the King will endorse.
As for perhaps the most contentious point, and one that needs visibility, that of the "Sahrawi People's Army", an armed movement with several thousand fighters, which "resumed" hostilities against Morocco in November 2020, what will its future be? Will Morocco demand its disbanding and the surrender of weapons? Or does it plan to integrate, partially or in phases, the armed fighters into the local security forces, police, gendarmerie, auxiliary forces?
Is it feasible to integrate the "Saharawi army" into the Kingdom's Royal Armed Forces (FAR)? It is not unthinkable. Morocco has a history and experience that few other countries have had with this problem. When the Kingdom gained independence from France on 14 May 1956, the FAR was created, the main body of which was made up of the 5,000 members of the National Liberation Army that had fought against Franco-Spanish colonialism. But this backbone of the Resistance Movement (ELN), together with the Southern Liberation Army, was joined by 14,000 Moroccan soldiers from the French army and 10,000 Moroccan soldiers from the Spanish army. The Moroccan military command, headed by the commander-in-chief Sultan Mohammed V, managed to unify them, although not without problems and crises. Would it be possible to repeat this historic experience today? In 1956, the 5,000 soldiers of the Resistance had to integrate 24,000 others from the colonial armies they had fought against. Today, will the 300,000 or 400,000 troops, depending on the sources, who make up the Royal Armed Forces be able to integrate the 5,000 troops of the Sahrawi People's Army?
As for the guarantees needed to set this process in motion, will Morocco accept the participation of third parties in the supervision of the autonomy process? What role can Spain play as the former coloniser of the Saharan "provinces"? And what about Algeria? If, as Rabat claims, Algiers is "an integral part of the conflict", what will be its involvement in the different stages of the project?
In addition to requiring the acceptance of the two or four parties to the conflict, the process of developing the future Statute of Autonomy for the Sahara appears to be enormously complex, economically, socially, culturally, politically and legally.