Spain in the Sahara after Trump  

Every time that Spanish governments have taken an initiative on the colonial question of Western Sahara, they have fallen by the wayside.   

The first major Spanish mistake in the Sahara was made by the Sagasta government, which was unable to notify the Berlin Conference (1884-1885) of the Spanish installation along the coast of the Sahara with the construction of the city of Villa Cisneros (today Dakhla), which meant that the colonial powers gathered in Germany were unable to recognise Spanish sovereignty over the half-million-square-kilometre Saharan territory, which is larger than Spain itself. Later, in 1900, the Treaty of Paris between Spain and France enabled the latter to annex the Iyil salt flats which Spain lost. In all the agreements signed between Spain and France on the territorial delimitation of the colonies, the Spanish governments always lost out.  

In 1958, the Madrid government made the Sahara a Spanish province, the result of the union of the two territories under its administration: the Spanish Sahara and Rio de Oro. This was a necessary, albeit belated, decision, but it was not followed by its practical consequences, such as full Spanish nationality for its inhabitants. It lasted until 1976. At that time, the Spanish government considered granting the province extensive autonomy, which it did not implement either. 

When the Polisario Front, which aimed to decolonise the region, emerged in 1973, Spain had contacts with the movement formed mostly by former Saharawi students in Spain. The Madrid government was incapable of seeing the future and left Polisario no alternative but to fall into the arms of Colonel Gaddafi of Libya and Colonel Bumedian of Algeria.  

Another major historical mistake was the Madrid Agreement of 14 November 1975, signed by Spain, Morocco and Mauritania, whereby Madrid announced its definitive withdrawal from the Sahara by 28 February 1976 and transferred the administration of the territory, until that day tripartite with the signatories, entirely to Rabat and Nouakchott. It was a legal agreement, deposited in the United Nations register, and has never been rejected by the UN. However, Spain forgot about it, as if it had never existed, and in the years since then the Transition governments have not publicly proclaimed with a solemn declaration that the administration of the territory now falls to Morocco, after Mauritania withdrew from it.    

These preliminary notes could very well be the preamble to the need arising today. Following the recognition by the United States of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, established by a presidential executive order, what should Spain's position be? The most consistent with Spain's responsibility for the origin of the conflict would be to recognise that the territory is legally under the administration of Morocco, which would de facto imply acceptance of its sovereignty over it.   

Would Spain's recognition of Moroccan sovereignty at the time automatically mean the end of the conflict? Not at all. Would it mean Spain renouncing its responsibility and role in the search for a solution? Not at all. Does it then mean that Spain is betraying the Sahrawi population, as we hear somewhat here and there? Of course not. Spain continues to play a leading role in helping the few hundred thousand Saharawis to live in peace.   

The conflict will continue as long as the specific historical identity of the populations living in the Sahara is not recognised and materialised. Recognising Moroccan territorial sovereignty is only changing the framework in which the definitive solution must be found. Mohamed VI's proposal for a broad advanced autonomy for the territory is a first fundamental step.   

Firstly, it would gain political stability and security in the region that encompasses northwest Africa and southwest Europe. The search for a Saharan inclusion as a specific territory in the kingdom of Morocco would unblock the project of the United Kingdom's Greater Maghreb, of which it would naturally be a part. A Moroccan-Saharan solution within the unified Maghreb would defuse the time bomb weighing down the region, with the terrorist groups roaming its territories, allied with the drug and human trafficking mafias towards Europe.   

Second, it would enable fruitful tripartite agreements to be reached between Spain, Morocco and Algeria. The hindrance caused by the territorial conflict in the region keeps the border between Algeria and Morocco closed, the only hermetically sealed border between two countries in the world.   

Third, it would enable Madrid to take advantage of the Spain-Morocco route to project itself economically and commercially towards West and Central Africa, on the one hand, and towards the horizontal Mediterranean ring through North Africa to Egypt and the Middle East, on the other.   

However, it is obvious that this historic decision by the Spanish government, if it were to happen, would bring about enmity and cause blisters. Enemies of former colonial powers in Africa, such as France and Britain, who do not want the Spanish-speaking area to be settled below Ceuta and Melilla and confined to the Canary Islands.    

In Spain, such a decision would make old anti-Moroccan lobbies still active in social and sociological networks and in financial and military friendship circles grind their teeth. The simple reminder made by the Moroccan prime minister of "the Moroccanness of Ceuta and Melilla" these days, and the enraged Hispanic reactions, shows this.   

The government should also confront its own economic partners, who are turning support for "the Saharan cause" into a battering ram against the Alawite monarchy, a prelude to the republican crusade they wish to plunge Spain into. Some of its members have historical roots and are therefore rivals in terms of strength, such as the Basque and Catalan nationalists, with whom it is necessary to talk; others, which are more populist, are mere substitutes of poor quality, which are constantly losing steam and are therefore dispensable.  

Third and last is the Saharan community already established in Spain, most of whom are Spanish nationals, to whom the government should explain that admitting Moroccan sovereignty and administration of the former colony does not mean abandoning the population of Tindouf or the territory to its fate. Spain will continue to defend its legitimate right to an identity, history and culture.   

Nor will it be easy for the Spanish government to cope with the possible angry reactions of Algeria, which has not forgotten what happened in the 70s. Recognising the Sahara under the Moroccan flag does not mean excluding Algeria. Quite the contrary: Algiers is an irreplaceable piece of the regional equation, which is not the case of either France or the United Kingdom, and therefore has every right to be part of the negotiation.   

Naturally, Spain should follow the path opened up by Donald Trump. However, a crux of the matter remains unknown: will the Spanish government be capable of taking the bull by the horns and recognising Moroccan sovereignty in the Sahara, as the United States has done?  This would be a major step towards stability in the western Mediterranean.