The Maghreb awaits a new government in France

State interests go beyond electoral alliances and governmental compromises. France, as a former coloniser of North Africa and second European power, has strong interests that tie it to the Maghreb, and which it cannot and will not renounce. 

It is true, however, that the possibility of an absolute or relative majority for Jordan Bardella and Marine Le Pen's National Rally party, with the consequent cohabitation with President Emmanuel Macron, who would in any case keep the helm of the ship, promised to have an impact on social, migratory, religious, cultural and public order issues that are important for the bilateral relations of these countries with their former metropolis. However, no matter how irritating the political measures that would be taken by an eventual government of the nationalist right, or in the current case of the radical left of the New Popular Front, the interests of the state will continue to prevail. 

In the worst moments of tension in recent years between the French government and the governments of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritania, there has never been any question of suspending diplomatic relations. There have been tense moments, even with the respective ambassadors being recalled for consultation, but there has never been any consideration of severing relations. 

The web of interests that France has woven with North Africa ranges from the signing of bilateral agreements and treaties at all levels, to institutional, political, military, financial and security relations. On the whole, these are 'win-win relations', for although Maghreb leaders are sometimes highly critical of what they see as unequal mutual benefits, the agreements are mutually advantageous. 

The Maghreb capitals, especially Algiers and Rabat, skilfully manage their relations with third parties (Russia or China in the case of Algeria, and the United States in the case of Morocco) to exert pressure and gain better advantages in their struggles with France. But neither Moscow nor Washington can unseat Paris as a whole, for linguistic, historical and geopolitical reasons. 

The next French government and its ministerial design will therefore be closely scrutinised by the Maghreb leaders: will the future prime minister visit Rabat first, or will it be Algiers? Or will he perhaps organise an extraordinary meeting of the 5+5 Forum so that none of his allies feel discriminated against? The Franco-Maghreb issue goes beyond the political power ambitions of the protagonists of the "suspense".