Sacralisation of Xi Jinping, and then?

People's Guide. This will in all likelihood be the brand new title with which President Xi Jinping will be invested at the end of the 20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It is not just any distinction, since it will signify the definitive sacralisation of his figure, converted from that moment on into an absolutely untouchable one, and whose wishes will be much more than orders, it will be the will of the new god of Beijing. He will be the pinnacle of the other powers he already holds, and which will surely be renewed: General Secretary of the Communist Party, head of the CCP's Central Military Commission and President of China.

This will break the custom of not accumulating more than two mandates "to avoid the totalitarian temptation that comes with eternalising oneself in power", as proclaimed in party resolutions under Deng Xiaoping's leadership. Xi Jinping will thus open the way to accumulating and wielding power even greater than that of Mao Zedong, albeit without the latter's historical legitimation as the guide and leader of the revolution that defeated Chiang Kai-Shek's nationalists and changed China's course forever. But Xi Jinping will surpass him in power by deeds.

The new great helmsman aspires to improve on his predecessor's epic: territorially reunify the country by incorporating, by degree or by force, the island of Taiwan, break the dike of island states that supposedly prevent its expansion beyond the limits of the China Sea, and complete the challenge to the global leadership of the United States.
 
Such a daunting task requires first and foremost that the entirety of China's vast population be steadfast in its support for the supreme leader. And Xi Jinping has sought to complete this task through a relentless pursuit of corruption within the party and a relentless crackdown on minorities and dissidents who might question the party's all-encompassing power.

The actions of the disciplinary supervisory bodies have thus multiplied, especially this year, when more than a thousand senior leaders have been subjected to summary trials, not only for corruption but also for failing to meet the economic, social or environmental targets set by the CCP leadership. The official media, i.e. all of them, have made particular mockery of figures such as the former vice-minister of Public Security, Sun Lijun, sentenced to death, commuted to life imprisonment, for having accumulated 92 million dollars in commissions that could be considered bribes; former Justice Minister Fu Zhenghua, also convicted of pocketing $16 million without being able to justify its source, and Wang Like, former director of Political Affairs of Jiangsu province, with a hidden fortune of another $62 million from accepting thousands of bribes. Fu and Wang will spend the rest of their lives in prison, having also had their death sentences commuted. During the first ten years of their sentences, they will be fellow inmates of the former police chiefs of Shanghai, Chongqing and Shanxi province, who have also been convicted of corruption.

In addition to issuing a stern warning to those within the party who dare to challenge its power and its guidelines, Xi Jingping has sought with this campaign to restore respect for the CCP, whose 98 million members are considered not only the elite of the regime but also the backbone of the nation.

Respect, but also fear, because China has become the first country in the world in which the entire population is monitored and supervised by an advanced control system in which artificial intelligence (AI) has become the most powerful security tool. It is safe to conclude that not a fly moves in China without Xi Jingping knowing about it.

Under such conditions, it is highly unlikely, if not impossible, for any popular opposition movement to succeed. But neither does it seem easy to do so within the CCP leadership itself, despite its hierarchical structure: the Permanent Commission and the Political Bureau, as the highest bodies in which all the pacts and moves of the hierarchs are cooked up and elucidated, bodies that are completely opaque to public opinion, which is only informed of the conclusions without being able to ask why.

These bodies, however, even behind closed doors, will have to discuss the country's major problems: the consequences of the isolation caused by Xi Jinping's Covid Zero policy, which is exasperating millions of people in forced confinement; the dizzying decline of the real estate bubble; and the sharp slowdown in economic growth.

In terms of foreign policy, China, which abstained in the latest UN vote to condemn Russia for the annexation of four Ukrainian regions, will surely continue its policy of cooperation with Africa, Latin America and Asia, accentuating its antagonism to the Euro-American model. Beijing is trying to prove that its model of society, which does not consider values such as freedom to be fundamental, is more efficient than its antagonist. This is an approach that is dear to the ears of all dictators in office or in power, especially if it is accompanied by heavy investment in infrastructure and other areas of development, from which it is always possible to extract some commission for one's own benefit. Corruption that Xi Jinping does not shy away from abroad, even if he pursues and punishes it relentlessly at home.