The "Amazigh" fellah defending the throne
Paraphrasing the French political scientist Remy Leveau, the Moroccan fellah defender of the throne1, I could state, without ambiguity, that the "Amazigh" fellah has become, through recent electoral processes of September 8th, the main defender of the Moroccan monarchy. Why?
Unlike the famous and relevant thesis of Remy Leveau, former advisor to the Moroccan Ministry of the Interior, who asserted that the monarchy relied on rural (and Berber) notables to thwart the power of the urban and bureaucratic bourgeoisie in the cities, in order to ensure the maintenance of political immobility, this time, we can salute the palace for having pertinently bet on the figure of a great "Amazigh" bourgeois, who has the extraordinary merit of succeeding in mobilizing the "fellahs" and the rural populations to go to the polls, which has caused an increase in the rate of participation, and above all, it has made it possible to dethrone the Islamists of the Party of Justice and Development (PJD), who have been in power for the past decade.
What is surprising is that almost all journalists, political scientists and researchers, whether Moroccan (such as Mustapha Selhami, Mohamed Tozy, Mounia Bennani-Chraibi, Hassan Aourid, Aboubakr Jamai...), French (Pierre Vermeren, David Goeury, Gauthier Rybinski...), Spanish (Francisco Peregil, Ignacio Cembrero...) and other foreigners have put forward various reasons to try to explain the decline of the "Muslim brothers". ), whether they are Spanish (Francisco Peregil, Ignacio Cembrero...) and other foreigners have put forward various reasons to try to explain the downfall of the "Muslim brothers", except for a decisive factor that they have all minimized, underestimated or simply ignored, which is the ethnic vote. Now, the mobilization of this ethnic vote of the Amazigh-speaking citizens of the peripheral regions has been decisive in the debacle of political Islamism, as it was also decisive in the failure of the Authenticity and Modernity Party (the WFP, created by an adviser to the king) by massively boycotting the previous elections of October 6, 2016/2966 in the mountainous regions, and to deprive him of access to the presidency of the government!
However, Mustapha Sehimi, speaking on the optimal scenario for the future government coalition, he proposed that Mr. Aziz Akhennouch, president of the winning group, the National Assembly of Independents (RNI) and new head of the executive, should count on integrating the People’s Movement (MP) into his government: so that the Amazigh world does not feel excluded. Unfortunately, our political scientist continues to ignore that the times have changed profoundly and that the MP is no longer the spokesman of the Amazigh-speaking populations, since the Amazigh Movement emerged in force in the decade of the 1990s. This party, created in 1958 to counter the hegemony of the Istiqlal Party (PI), had largely disappointed these Amazigh-speaking rural populations simply because during the first government of Dr. Saad Eddine El Othmani held the three key ministerial posts for the promotion of the Amazigh language and culture, namely National Education, Culture and Communication. Strangely, he didn't do anything except to maintain his pan-Arabist attitude and oppose the change of the name of the official news agency from “Arab Maghreb” to “Great Maghreb”, so that it would be in tune with the constitutional reform of 1 July 2011, which MP Rniste Abdellah Ghazi claimed!
Indeed, the majority of the populations of this “Amazigh world” or rather of the five Amazigh-speaking regions (Rif, Middle Atlas, Upper Atlas, Souss and southeast of Assamar), accustomed to boycotting, and which WFP wanted to win in its case in the previous elections (with the obvious complicity from within which had previously banned the creation of an Amazigh nationalist party, namely the Moroccan Amazigh Democrat Party (PDAM) led by the late lawyer Ahmed ADGHIRNI) changed their attitude. Thanks to our ambitious strategy and communication campaigns on social networks2, she chose participation and moved to the polling stations en masse. She voted for various groups, but a lot of her bet for the partisan formation that was most attentive to them, and which was able to incorporate into its program some complaints of the Amazigh movement. She bet for a useful vote in favour of the NIR. (www.facebook.com/Amadalpresse/videos/969558010445702/ ).
For example, in the Souss region, the PJD won the highest number of votes, 203,138 out of 967 944 or 22 %, followed by WFP (20 %) and RNI (15.5 %) in the 2016/29663 elections. But this time, the Amazigh-speaking populations have profoundly penalised the formation of the PJD Muslim brothers by relegating it to eighth place, collecting only 18 seats compared to 196 seats that the RNI captured. According to the statistical data published by the Agadir wilaya on the results of these general elections at the level of Agadir Prefecture Ida Outanane, for example, the RNI came first with more than 50,832 votes against only 5,386 for the PJD, almost ten times more! Similarly, in the region of Assamar, which often voted for the People’s Movement, there was strong competition with the RNI.
On the other hand, and on a national scale, rural voting differs significantly from urban voting. The latter voted overwhelmingly in favour of the PJD, but the poor strategy of the PJD to be abstaining to secure a third term, and counting with the complicity of the WFP Secretary General, lawyer Abdellatif Ouahbi, to seal pre-election alliances, did not give all the results he expected. On the contrary, it has largely promoted its dizzying fall, despite the mobilisation of some stars and the dirty campaign of discrediting and ongoing fake news against Amghar Aziz Akhennouch by their electronic militias (and also those of the WFP). In the end, the PJD was unable to mobilise the urban masses (and Arab-speaking populations) because of its government management, which largely destroyed the purchasing power of the middle class, further impoverished the unfavourable classes and ruined the trade of suased small traders and grocers (because of allowing the national market to be flooded with Turkish products and BIM stores), and that with the Pandemic, their ministers, unlike those of RNI, did not take almost any measures in favour of halting the socio-economic damage of the Covid-19 pandemic!
However, I have always argued that the winds of change in favour of the democratic transition in Morocco could only come from the mountains, from these Amazigh-speaking, marginalised and landlocked regions, following the example of the independence that had been ripped out of Franco-Spanish colonisation just when young Amazighs joined the Moroccan National Liberation Army in 1955. Already in my article in “The Moroccan Monarchy and Imazighen”4, I pointed out that: the old Makhzen policy, which still persists to rely on traditional, retrograde and medieval political elites, is doomed in a categorical way to accumulate more failures. The Amazigh youth has a great challenge before it if it wants to aspire to live in a modern and open state, it is to become involved more decisively, by organising themselves politically, in the destiny of their country, by substituting the old rural elite clientelist. Because the winds of democratisation in Tamazgha always come from its mountains and it is time for the old subjects of the "absoltist monarchy" to be removed from the political scene by young citizens defending the rule of law.”
Just before four months of the disappearance of the late King Hassan II, the Spanish journalist Pedro Canales had stated in El Pais on 14 March 1999, following an international seminar on the problem of Islam and Amazigh culture that the David Montgomery Hart Foundation — which I chair — had organised in the city of Granada, that: “this is the first time that the two main political and socio-cultural currents in Morocco have submitted their positions in a public debate. With a view to a democratic transition that should take place in Morocco following the succession of the throne, the combination of these forces can give stability to the future politics of this Maghreb country”. This statement had aroused an alarm at the palace and indeed that the union of these mobilisation forces a posteriori and alongside the youth of the left movements, they committed themselves to triggering the Movement of February 20 of 2011/2961. A revolutionary movement that led to constitutional reform and the recognition of the Amazigh language as an official language, but unfortunately it allowed Islamists to take power to be the most organised. Since then, these “so-so-moderate” Islamists in power have only blocked the Amazigh file, the claims and rights of the Amazighs!
In reality, the leaders of the PJD, as well as those of PAM and left and extreme left parties such as the USPF, have always taken Amazigh-speaking voters as political mercenaries, people who defend their ideologies, positions and interests at the expense of their own legitimate interests and rights.
But, as my friend, colleague and professor, the late North American anthropologist David M. Hart, the Rifains, and by extension the Amazighs, said, are pragmatic people. Islamists can deceive them once by their “religious business” and their hypocritical moralising discourse, a second time, but not a third! There is a time when young people and Amazigh fellahs are truly aware of their identity, rights and electoral issues. As a result, these thousands of young people from these abandoned regions, trained in various universities, such as Oujda, Agadir, Ouarzazate, Errachidia, Meknes, Marrakesh, Béni Mellal, with their presence on social networks like Facebook, have helped to awaken the collective and political consciousness of the “Amazigh Fellahs”. they consciously and actively became involved in the political and peaceful change of the government, despite the ban on the creation of political formations tending to “Amazigh nationalism.” Farmers, traders and young people from the “Amazigh world” mobilised pragmatically, punished the PJD and voted in favour of the secular and liberal parties, and more particularly, in favour of a renewed party that heard them.
In conclusion, the vast majority of Amazigh-speaking populations have decidedly chosen and trusted an Amazigh leader, Amghar Aziz Akhennouch, who, in addition, has more historical and political legitimacy because his father was part of the armed resistance for Morocco’s independence5. The latter stated: “I'm proud to be amazigh. Proud to belong to this laborious community that has given so many entrepreneurs and traders to Morocco. However, where the Amazighs live, they are often the most difficult territories. Where I come from, in Tafraout, province of Tiznit, region of Souss Massa, there are rocks, a very beautiful landscape, but there are few sources of income. It is the working capacity of the inhabitants that allows them to get out of it. The 2011 Constitution sought by Her Majesty provides true answers to what is called the Amazigh cause. Unfortunately, the implementing decrees have been far behind schedule. It must be tackled”6. And let’s hope that his government is really keen on it.
Rachid RAHA. Amghar of the Amazigh World Assembly
Notes:
(1)- Remy Leveau, le fellah marocain défenseur du trône, Presse de la Fondation des Sciences Politiques, Paris 1976
(2)- https://amadalamazigh.press.ma/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%BA-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AC%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84/
(3)- https://tafra.ma/ya-til-un-vote-tachelhit/
(4)- http://www.rachidraha.com/Monarchie.html
(5)- www.facebook.com/Amadalpresse/videos/374403540811676/
(6)- Jeune Afrique n°3034 du 3 mars 2019