The ‘annus horribilis’ of Iran

In the Iranian theocracy, the ayatollahs act as vicars of al-Mahdi, the redeemer of Islam whose appearance is expected shortly before the Day of Judgment, whose nearness will signal the threefold collapse of the East, West and Mesopotamia. It is possible that the perfect storm in which Iran is immersed, decimated by the viral pandemic, paralyzed by economic drowning, and spearheaded by the casualties among its leaders, is leading Iranian clergymen to wonder whether they are not witnessing the imminence of the Last Days.

The truth is that it is difficult to exaggerate the gravity of the situation in the Persian country, which entered the new decade of the Gregorian calendar by losing Soleimani, a key pillar of the regime, shortly after a series of skirmishes in the waters of the Strait of Hormuz, prolonged by the unilateral US withdrawal from the multinational Iranian denuclearisation agreement, and the consequent economic embargo measures. 

The arrival of the COVID-19 to Persian lands found an extremely fragile political ecosystem with an internal legitimacy increasingly questioned in public. It should be remembered that it was precisely the discontent in the streets that precipitated Khomeini's arrival in power, and so the Ayatollahs are well aware of the capacity of social unrest to overthrow regimes in Iran. Significantly, the main focus of the pandemic is in the shrine of Qom, the theological centre and pilgrimage site on which the clerical power that gives legitimacy to the Iranian regime is articulated, and whose isolation has exposed the perverse dynamics of the dual power structure in Iran; the supporters of the civilian option represented by Hassan Rohani and the minions of militarist orthodoxy, led by Ali Khamenei, have been engaged in an internal struggle for political control that has only succeeded in putting sticks in the wheels of coordinated action against the pandemic, delaying inevitable draconian measures such as those adopted in Italy and Spain and allowing themselves the luxury of getting caught up in the false dilemma between economy and health, resulting in a delay that has worsened the health situation.

These systemic weaknesses of Iran have not escaped the attention of other regional geopolitical actors, fellow travellers of the Persian theocracy, especially that of its Iraqi neighbours, with whom the shared religious and cultural ties among Shiites have allowed Tehran to exert a remarkable influence in Baghdad, after the fiasco of the American invasion in 2003. The impact of the pandemic has quickly spread to Iraq, which has witnessed the fall of a prime minister and subsequent government instability that accentuates the inability to deal with the pandemic, and the reluctance of Iraqis to lend themselves as a battleground and collateral damage to the antagonism between Washington and Tehran. 

The health systems of both countries are overwhelmed, forcing the Revolutionary Guard and Hizbullah militias to exert social control in Iraq and Lebanon as well, infiltrating political commissars among health professionals and spreading conspiracy theories about the origin of the epidemic among the population. This, however, cannot hide the inevitable self-folding of the Iranian government, forced to postpone its expansion in the region to avoid its own collapse, given that the meagre financial resources that Tehran still obtained from its scarce allies have been reduced to their minimum expression, as these countries are prioritizing saving themselves, so it is unthinkable that Iranian investments in Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon and Syria could alleviate Iran's liquidity. 

In addition to the limitations of a foreclosed economy, widespread corruption further complicates the provision of medical aid and the distribution of health materials. Such is the degree of mistrust among the population that the Iranian Prosecutor's Office has even threatened with summary executions those who speculate with masks and other health equipment, and has mobilised a quarter of a million basichian paramilitaries who are authorised to enter private homes to identify and extract infected civilians.

The confusion among Iran's elites has led Ali Khamenei to announce the more than likely restriction of public congregations during the month of Ramadan, while other sectors of the leadership are trying to identify productive sectors that can be reopened to avoid a total collapse of the economy, without causing a second wave of contagion. This is exactly the same debate that is taking place in Western societies, which nevertheless have the capacity to finance the economic standstill by contracting debt, a mechanism that is a priori forbidden to Iran. This has led Hassan Rohani not only to rescue 1 billion euros from the National Development Fund in order to have liquidity, but, more significantly, to begin discussions with the International Monetary Fund to open negotiations for a rescue under another name. 

The ayatollahs seem to have concluded that among the options available to avoid regime change, there is neither increased repression nor the diversion of internal tensions by projecting them towards an external enemy. The implementation of radically unpopular measures such as mass confinement can only be carried out Chinese-style, through enforced compliance or with the consent of the confined. The Iranian state lacks both the coercive strength of the Chinese dictatorship and its economic muscle, so the only viable alternative within its reach is to make a pact with the devil, alleviating the material situation of the Iranian people by means of an urgent, massive and conditional injection of international funds that will force Iran and its clients to put the Islamic revolution on hold for a better occasion.